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Chapter 1 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Over the past few decades, fertility has declined sharply in most member countries of the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Today, almost no 
OECD country has a total fertility rate (TFR) 1 above the population replacement rate of 
2.1 children per woman. 2  Important factors associated with this general decline in 
developed countries’ TFRs are not only the improvement of contraceptive technology and 
a decline in infant mortality (see e.g Goldwin and Katz, 2000, 2002), but also increased 
income and, hence, higher opportunity costs of children (see e.g. Becker, 1981), the rise 
in the labor force participation of women (see e.g. Ahn and Mira, 2002 and Feyrer et al., 
2008) as well as the expansion of social security systems and the redundancy of children 
as providers in old age (see e.g. Sinn, 2004). 
There are various economic consequences of low fertility, ranging from a decline in the 
working-age share of the population to a slowdown of economic growth as well as 
financial difficulties in health care and pensions systems (Bloom et al., 2010). Concerns 
about low fertility and the sustainability of welfare-state systems are therefore increasing 
in most OECD countries. These concerns revived debates about family policies as a 
remedy against fertility decline and its consequences. Being confronted with distinct 
                                                 
1 Total fertility rates represent the average number of children that would be born to a woman during her 
lifetime if she were to pass through her childbearing years conforming to the age-specific fertility rates of 
that period (OECD Family Database, 2010a). 
2 The replacement rate is the rate of fertility at which the population of developed countries can remain 
constant in the long run (OECD Family Database, 2010a). 
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policy objectives and instruments, governments in affected countries have therefore 
introduced policy measures intended to support the private decision to have children and 
to reverse the trend of population aging. At the European level, the need to increase 
female participation in the labor market is an explicit political objective, to be reached, 
along with other measures, by improving the provision of child care facilities (European 
Council, 2002). Moreover, the European Union has set the struggle against child poverty 
as one of the priorities of the "European Social Model", also by supporting women’s 
employment through job security, flexibility and quality, and through an adequate support 
via care facilities (Esping-Andersen, 2002). 
Especially the reconciliation of having children and female labor market participation is 
seen as a desirable path of family policy. Against this background, this thesis aims to shed 
light on the link between family policies, fertility, employment, and child care within the 
framework of theoretical models with endogenous fertility. 
From the literature we can discern three microeconomic theories of fertility: The 
"Chicago Model", "Leibenstein’s Model", and "Easterlin’s Theories". All three 
approaches apply the theory of consumer behavior to childbearing decisions. The authors, 
however, disagreed regarding the relevant determinants and therefore developed different 
fertility theories. The "Chicago Model" assumes children to be consumer durable goods 
from which parents consume a flow of services (Becker, 1960). Leibenstein (1957, 1974), 
on the other hand, considers children to be commitment goods. 3 The major difference 
between the two theories lies in the consumption theory used. While the "Chicago Model" 
uses the conventional microeconomic theory of consumption, Leibenstein introduces a 
new theory of consumer behavior which assumes the existence of goods which are subject 
to increasing marginal utility up to some level and normal diminishing marginal utility 
beyond that level. Both theories focus on developed countries and conclude that the 
relationship between income and fertility is positive despite the evidence showing that 
higher income households have fewer children and, that in the course of economic 
development, family size has decreased. Easterlin (1969, 1973) introduces a broader 
framework of the production of children which is applicable not only to fertility trends in 
developed countries but also to the developing countries. He uses two different theories of 
fertility to capture these differentiated trends: the relative income hypothesis and the 
threshold of fertility regulation hypothesis. The first hypothesis is intended to explain the 
                                                 
3 Leibenstein (1957) assumes that expenditures on children reflect a commitment undertaken by parents 
such as the provision for old-age security. 
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post World War II baby boom, while the second hypothesis is intended to explain the 
high fertility rates in the less developed countries. 
The theory of fertility that was mainly founded by Gary S. Becker (1960, 1965), Robert J. 
Willis (1973), Theodore P. Schultz (1973), Dennis De Tray (1973), and Yoram Ben-
Porath (1973) is based on the consolidation of three theoretical concepts: the household 
production function, the individual human capital and the theory time allocation. This so 
called New Home Economics, also known as "Chicago School", is one of the main 
approaches in the field of family economics. This dissertation will also focus on the 
"Chicago Model" and the key assumptions of this model are therefore explained in further 
detail in the following.  
In a first approach to the economic analysis of fertility, Becker (1960) created a 
framework for the analysis of fertility decisions. He identified five key determinants of 
the demand for children: individual preferences of the parents and their income, the 
quality of children, the costs of children, and the supply of children. These determinants 
were adopted by many economists (see e.g. Becker and Lewis, 1973; Willis, 1973; De 
Tray, 1973; Cigno, 1986, 1991) and form the basis of the New Home Economics. 
From an economic perspective, children in developed economies are referred to as 
consumer goods and are thus part of the parents’ utility function. According to Becker 
(1960), the parents’ utility function and therefore the course of the indifference curves 
depends among others on individual preferences such as cultural and social differences. 
Individual preferences regarding children, for example, may be linked to religion, 
ethnicity or the parents’ age. Another important component of the demand for children 
described by Becker (1960) is the quality of a child. In his model, a child’s quality 
increases in additional expenses for the child and is measured by the real expenses of 
parents per child. Children can thus not be considered homogeneous consumer goods and 
the fertility theory of Becker (1960) therefore shows a significant interaction between 
quantity and quality of children. This interaction between quantity and quality of children 
has been taken up by many economists and will also be discussed in this thesis.  
Becker also stresses two further elements of the demand for children: the income of the 
parents and the cost of a child. Willis (1973) likewise emphasizes the importance of the 
cost of a child in fertility theory and names explicitly the opportunity costs to the parents 
caused by an extra child. The opportunity costs equal the unused opportunities of the 
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parents in form of income and mobility loss in life due to having children. Both authors 
stress the role of female wages, representing the opportunity cost of childbearing, as a 
determinant of fertility. Female wages are seen to have both (positive) income and 
(negative) substitution effects on fertility, with opposite effects on female labor force 
participation. Income from sources other than women’s wages is expected to have a 
positive effect on the demand for child services, assuming such services are a normal 
good.4 As already mentioned, Becker (1960) hypothesizes that child services have both 
quality and quantity dimensions, so that rising incomes need not necessarily lead to larger 
desired numbers of children.  
In the following chapters, this dissertation analyses three main issues in the area of family 
economics: the effects of different family policies on fertility and the secondary earner’s 
labor supply, the demand for external child care as well as an analysis of the demand for 
quantity and quality of external child care. In the following, I provide non-technical 
summaries and outlooks of the three chapters of this thesis. 
 
Chapter 2:  Three Family Policies to Reconcile Fertility and Labor Supply 
This chapter presents a comparison of the effects of three different benefit programs 
(child benefits, parental leave payments, subsidies for external child care) on fertility, 
investments in quality of children, labor supply, and welfare within a static model of a 
family with endogenous fertility and labor supply of the secondary earner.5 
Since the 1960s, all OECD countries have experienced a considerable decline in fertility. 
TFR dropped to an unprecedented low, reaching an average of 1.65 in the OECD-30 
countries at the turn of the century. This gave rise to a focus on family policy in several 
countries. Monetary and in-kind transfers, child care systems, labor market conditions etc. 
were re-considered as means to foster the birth of children and to reverse the trend of 
population aging. Some countries already achieved first results such that the average TFR 
in the OECD-30 countries in 2010 therefore amounted to 1.7. Nevertheless, fertility levels 
in many countries are still very low and vary considerably among the OECD countries. In 
                                                 
4 Willis (1973) introduced the term child services for the total amount of child quality. He was the first to 
use the concept of a household production function as a basis for the relationship of child quantity and 
quality and to consider time inputs in the child’s quality function. 
5 This chapter is based on the article "Three family policies to reconcile fertility and labor supply", which is 
joint work with Robert Fenge from the University of Rostock. 
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2010, Iceland and New Zealand were the only OECD-30 countries with a fertility rate 
above the replacement fertility rate of 2.1. In Southern Europe, Eastern Europe, and in 
Germany fertility is still below 1.5, while Iceland, New Zealand, Ireland, Mexico, France, 
the Scandinavian countries as well as the USA constitute the countries with the highest 
total fertility rates in the OECD-30.  
Researchers attribute the differences in the patterns of Western European fertility levels to 
mainly demographic and to socio-economic factors, among the latter in particular to the 
change in women’s labor force participation. Since the 1970s, women’s employment rates 
have increased in all OECD countries. However, averaging across developed countries, 
the correlation between fertility and female labor force participation has recently turned 
positive. Figure 1.1 shows the cross-country relationship between female employment 
rates and total fertility rates of the OECD-30 countries in 2010. The figure demonstrates 
that many countries with high female labor force participation also have high fertility 
rates. By implementing new or improving their existing family policies, those countries 
found a way to reconcile fertility and female labor supply. 
 
Figure 1.1: Cross-country relationship between female employment rates and total 
fertility rates (2010) 
 
  Data Source: OECD Family Database (2010a) 
 
In order to explain this variation in both the fertility and the female employment rates 
across countries, we analyze the effects of three different family policies on fertility and 
the secondary earner’s labor supply: Child benefits and parental leave payments, which 
are implemented in almost all OECD countries, as well as child care subsidies, which 
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have been well-developed in France and Sweden but are also existent in other countries. 
We compare the effectiveness of the three policy instruments in raising the number of 
children and increasing secondary earner’s labor supply.  
Within the framework of our static model with endogenous fertility, we consider both 
absolute and differential effects of the family policy instruments. The differential effects 
of budget-neutral policy changes are important to compare the relative performance of the 
policy instruments in fostering the number of children or parental labor supply. Our 
differential analysis shows that the only policy reform which can produce incentives to 
have more children, a higher demand for external child care, and, at the same time, act as 
stimulation for more labor supply of parents is given by an increase in child benefits 
compensated by a budget-neutral reduction of parental leave payments. This policy 
therefore qualifies as a way to improve the incentives to combine family and work.  
Comparing the effectiveness of parental leave payments to a subsidy for external child 
care, we find that the family policy instrument that supports the child care (external or 
parental) with the less elastic response is more effective in fostering fertility. A policy 
change that shifts transfers from leave payments to subsidies for external child care 
increases the demand for external child care and the employment of secondary earners. At 
the same time, this policy change can set positive incentives for having children if the 
demand for external child care is not too elastic. 
Our welfare analysis shows that if child benefits are part of the family policy in an 
economy, it is welfare improving to complement this by introducing subsidies to external 
child care in exchange for lower child benefits up to a certain provision level. We also 
find that substituting very high levels of parental leave payments by subsidies for external 
child care may also increase welfare.  
 
Chapter 3:  Public Provision versus Subsidization of Private External Child Care 
The focus of Chapter 3 lies on the provision of child care. In this chapter, we compare the 
effectiveness of an improved public provision of child care to a subsidization of privately 
provided external child care. 
In recent decades, child care services have become a matter of serious public concern. As 
also shown in Chapter 2, affordable child care services may improve the reconciliation of 
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work and family life and thus foster labor market participation and gender equality. At the 
Barcelona meeting in March 2002, the European Council passed a recommendation that 
its member states remove “barriers and disincentives for female labor force participation 
by, inter alia, improving the provision of child care facilities” (European Council, 2002). 
The purpose of the initiative was to increase women’s labor-force participation rates in 
member states to 60% (European Council, 2002). The main objectives of an improved 
provision of external child care are thus to fight family poverty by increasing mothers’ 
participation in the labor market and to enhance child development and equality of 
opportunity for children. By lowering the cost of childbearing in terms of labor market 
and career opportunities, child care facilities may also provide an important answer to 
declining fertility rates. The question that arises is whether the provision should be 
organized by the public or be left to private forces and in this case may be subsidized by 
the state. 
 
Figure 1.2: Public expenditure on child care (2009, in % of GDP) 
 
 
Data Source: OECD Family Database (2010b) 
 
Figure 1.2 shows the public expenditure on child care in 2009 as a percentage of the gross 
domestic product (GDP) for selected OECD countries. It can be seen that the Nordic 
countries have the highest child care expenditures, while Italy, New Zealand, Mexico, 
Germany and the United States have the lowest spending. There are thus wide differences 
regarding the public expenditure on child care among the OECD countries.  
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When comparing the expenditure of a country to its enrolment rates (Figure 1.3) one can 
see that it is not necessarily those countries with the highest spending that have the 
highest enrolment rates.  
 
Figure 1.3: Enrolment rates in child care among children under age three          
(2010, in %) 
 
     
Data Source: OECD Family Database (2010c) 
 
There might therefore also be other important factors such as cultural aspects that are 
essential for the demand for external child care. One nevertheless notices that countries 
like Germany, Italy or the Mexico with the lowest expenditure relative to GDP are also 
those countries with the lowest enrolment rates for children under age three. 
In this chapter, we analyze parental preferences for external child care and compare the 
effects of publicly provided child care as well as of a subsidy on child care provided by 
the private market on both fertility and the secondary earner’s labor supply. Our model 
predicts that a subsidy for external child care leads to an increase in both fertility and the 
secondary earner’s labor supply. Publicly provided child care, on the other hand, has both 
a negative effect on fertility and on the secondary earner’s labor supply due to the 
negative income effect. We find that as long as there is no full subsidy, richer households 
prefer a subsidy for private child care to a regime with purely private child care, while 
poorer households prefer publicly provided child care. The larger the subsidy for privately 
provided external child care, the more households benefit as more households can afford 
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and low income households benefit the most from the subsidy from redistribution both via 
taxation and via the number of children. By offering free child care provided by the 
private market, the government could therefore foster both fertility and the secondary 
earner’s labor supply. 
 
Chapter 4:  The Role of Government in Child Care Provision 
In Chapter 4, we model the household’s decision for choosing publicly provided child 
care or a parental child care benefit and compare the effects of the policy instruments on 
fertility, the secondary earner’s labor supply as well as on welfare.6 
Most OECD countries are facing dilemmas and tensions related to the complex 
interaction between changes in the labor market, demography, fertility trends, and 
children’s opportunities. One policy option that has received considerable attention is 
making high quality child care available and affordable. (Attanasio et al., 2008) In this 
chapter, we therefore analyze the impact of changes in both the quantity and the quality of 
child care provision. In order to account for the aspect of the affordability of child care, 
we consider price effects and the parent’s choice whether to demand publicly provided 
child care or to receive a child benefit. Parents can opt for publicly provided child care or 
receive a parental child care benefit. This reflects the German system of parental child 
care benefits, the so called "Betreuungsgeld"7, that are only obtainable for parents who 
either care for their children themselves or demand privately provided external child care. 
Comparing the proportion of children under age three enrolled in formal child care in 
Germany in 2011 (Figure 1.4), it becomes obvious that there are large differences 
between the German states. While there has been universally high child care coverage in 
the East built up by the socialist regime of the former German Democratic Republic, the 
provision of public child care in the West has only been expanded within the last couple 
of years. The enrollment rates therefore vary from below 15% in the South-East and the 
West to above 50% in the East.  
 
                                                 
6 This chapter is based on the article "The Role of Government in Child Care Provision", which is joint 
work with Robert Fenge from the University of Rostock. 
7 The "Betreuungsgeld" was introduced at the beginning of 2013 and is a monthly child care supplement for 
parents whose children aged three and under are not in a state-subsidized nursery. (Federal Ministry for 
Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth, 2013) 
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Figure 1.4: Proportion of children under age three enrolled in formal child care in 
Germany (2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth (2012) 
 
Figure 1.5: Proportion of nursery teachers with a professional education or formal 
education (൐160 hours) in Germany (2011) 
 
 
 
Source: Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth (2012) 
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Comparing the proportion of nursery teachers with a professional or formal education in 
Germany in 2011 (Figure 1.5) one also finds large qualitative differences within the 
German states. The proportion varies from below 40 percent in Baden-Württemberg, 
Hesse, and Berlin to above 85 percent in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. This 
demonstrates that there are not only large differences with respect to the quantity of 
publicly provided child care but also large variations regarding the quality of public child 
care in Germany. In order to be able to differentiate between the impact of a change in the 
quantity and the quality of child care provision, we analyze the parents’ preferences for 
both quantity and quality of publicly provided child care.  
Our main findings are the following. We find that for households opting for public child 
care, an increase in the quantity of publicly provided child care has a negative effect on 
both fertility and secondary earner’s labor supply while the effects of an increase in its 
quality depend on the price effect and may be positive. Our results also suggest that both 
a price subsidy for publicly provided child care and the parental child care benefit has a 
negative effect on fertility and the secondary earner’s labor supply for all households. 
Regarding welfare, we find that for households choosing an interior solution of parental 
and external child care both policy instruments, a parental child care benefit and publicly 
provided child care, are equally effective. The household’s decision which policy 
instrument to choose only depends on the relative benefit the household receives in total. 
This decision is independent of the household’s income. For households choosing a 
corner solution, on the other hand, the decision depends on a variety of parameters: their 
income, their preferences for children, child care and consumption as well as on the 
policy parameters. Low income households choosing a corner solution of staying at home 
and not consuming external child care opt for a parental child care benefit if they have a 
small preference for children and their quality. For high income households, the decision 
depends on differences between the qualities of private and public external child care. If 
the relative benefit a household receives from the policy instruments is identical and the 
quality of private external child care is larger than the quality of publicly provided child 
care, a household in this corner solution also benefits more from the parental child care 
benefit than from publicly provided child care. 
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Chapter 2 
 
 
2 Three Family Policies to Reconcile 
Fertility and Labor Supply 8 
 
 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
There has been a steady and significant decline in birth rates in most industrialized 
countries over the last 40 years. According to OECD statistics, total fertility rates in the 
1970s were well above 2 children per woman and are now in 2010 as low as 1.4 in 
countries like Italy, Spain, Germany, and Japan. Within the high-income countries of the 
world, today no country is solidly above the fertility rate of 2.1 children per woman that is 
needed to replace the population at a constant level. Some other countries like France, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom managed to counteract this downside trend and to re-
increase their birth rates. Hence, those countries could avert an as dramatic population 
decrease as for example in Germany. (OECD Family Database, 2010a) 
Important factors linked to the decline of birth rates are higher incomes, and hence higher 
opportunity costs of children, the rise in labor-force participation of women, and the 
expansion of social security systems in developed countries. According to Becker (1960 
                                                 
8 This chapter is based on joint work with Robert Fenge 
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and 1981) and Becker and Lewis (1973), income increases may reduce fertility if the 
income elasticity for the quality of children exceeds the income elasticity for the quantity 
of children. Willis (1973) points out that increasing female wages will increase female 
labor-force participation and thus have a negative impact on the demand for children 
because of the higher opportunity costs. Sinn (2005) emphasizes the redundancy of 
having children as providers for old-age in the presence of social security systems and the 
positive externality of children in pay-as-you-go pension systems.  
Due to the aging process associated with this decline in fertility, the developed countries 
are facing severe challenges for social security systems and labor markets. To counter 
this, most developed countries have implemented political incentives to correct for the 
low fertility rate and to improve the income position of families in the last decades. A 
central role in those family policies plays the compatibility of employment and children. 
High opportunity costs arise because a parent has to reduce labor supply in order to take 
care of the children. The foregone wage income and also the lost time of on-the-job 
training and qualification which reduces the wage opportunities in the future is a strong 
obstacle for having children. Family policies are constructed to provide relief to this 
quandary and to give secondary earners the opportunity to go to work and at the same 
time to bring up children.  
However, increasing fertility may not be a goal of public policies per se. A higher number 
of children comes at a cost in terms of consumption and income of the parents. Even for 
children the quality of life may decrease if policies address only the quantity of children. 
Therefore, a comparative static analysis of policy instruments with respect to fertility and 
labor supply is not sufficient to evaluate the effects and to assess the effectiveness of 
family policies. For a comparison of family policies a welfare analysis is necessary which 
takes account of all impacts on the families, who in particular carry the costs of financing 
the family policies as tax payers.  
This paper presents a comparison of benefit programs for families and analyzes the 
effects on welfare, fertility, employment and investments in quality of children within a 
model with endogenous fertility and labor supply of a secondary earner. In this paper, we 
do not deal with a justification for family policies. Nor do we analyze reasons in our 
model why the government should foster the number of children in the economy. This has 
been discussed in several other papers (e.g. Demeny, 1986 and Sinn, 2004). Instead, we 
are concerned with the relative performance of instruments of family policies which are 
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widely used in developed countries. We analyze how effectively instruments of family 
policies are able to achieve a compatibility of family and work. In particular, we compare 
the incentives of policy measures to have children and at the same time at least not to 
reduce the employment of parents. Furthermore, a welfare analysis compares the effects 
of family policies on the well-being of families. We use a standard Beckerian welfare 
approach to families and consider the number of children and a quality function of 
children which both enter the parental utility. Within this framework, we analyze the 
effects of changes in child benefits, in a child subsidy on bought-in child care as well as 
in parental leave payments. 
Child benefits have been implemented in almost all OECD countries and there have been 
several empirical studies (e.g. Gauthier and Hatzius, 1997, Cigno et al., 2003, and 
Laroque and Salanié, 2008) showing that they have a positive impact on the demand for 
children. Nevertheless countries such as Germany with very low fertility rates and 
relatively low female employment rates pay relatively high child benefits. Policy 
differences between high and low fertility countries as well as countries with high and 
low female employment rates can rather be found in the rates for parental leave payments, 
child care subsidies, and tax breaks towards families.   
Both Sweden and France have achieved to keep their fertility rates relatively high and 
both countries have well developed subsidized care systems. This might lead to the 
conclusion that investing in child care is an important political instrument to help 
increasing fertility rates. In the empirical literature one finds mixed evidence about the 
success of child care subsidies in fostering fertility. While Hank et al. (2004) find positive 
effects of full-time subsidized child care on fertility for Germany, Haan and Wrohlich 
(2009) only find significant effects for highly-educated women and women who give 
birth for the first time.  
The third policy parameter we want to analyze, the rate of parental leave payments, has 
especially been implemented in Germany and Sweden. In the empirical literature one also 
finds mixed evidence on the effects of parental leave payments on fertility and the 
secondary earner’s labor supply. Spiess and Wrohlich (2008) simulate fiscal costs and 
expected labor market outcomes of a parental leave benefit reform in Germany. They 
provide evidence that all income groups benefit and that in the second year, mothers 
increase their working hours and labor market participation significantly. Lalive and 
Zweimüller (2009) show that an extension of the Austrian parental leave period increases 
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fertility but lengthens the time women spend at home. Other studies also show that leave 
expansions are associated with increased leave-taking (e.g. Pronzato, 2009 and Han et al., 
2009). Bergemann and Riphahn (2011) study the labor supply effects of a major change 
in the maternity leave benefit system in Germany on the intention of mothers to return to 
the labor market. They find that the change to a benefit system that replaced two-thirds of 
pre-birth earnings for at most one year succeeded in speeding up mothers’ return to work. 
In this paper, we complement the empirical literature by analyzing a simple model of 
household decisions on children and labor supply and isolating the incentive effects of the 
policy instruments which sometimes work in opposite directions. These results explain 
some of the ambiguity of the empirical evidence. There is also some theoretical literature 
on family decisions and family policies (see e.g. Cigno, 1986 and 1991; Ermisch, 1989; 
Apps and Rees, 2004; Cigno and Luporini, 2011). This paper contributes to this literature 
by analyzing the differential effects of the chosen policy instruments on fertility as well as 
labor supply and thus addressing the problem of work-family balance. The differential 
effects of a budget-neutral policy change, in particular, are important to compare the 
relative performance of the policy instruments in fostering the number of children or 
parental labor supply. We qualify our results by considering re-distributional effects and 
also distinguish between high- and low-income earners. Furthermore, we add a welfare 
analysis or - to be accurate - an analysis of the policy effects on the parental utility which 
comprises the number and quality (of life) of children. This enables us to calculate the 
distortions of the different policies and to compare them regarding to the benefit of 
parents.  
Our main results are the following. Comparing child benefits with subsidies for external 
child care, we find that a higher subsidy for external child care and a budget-neutral 
reduction of child benefits increases the employment rate of a secondary earner in a 
family who is net contributor to the policy change but induces negative incentives for 
fertility. The comparison of child benefits with parental leave payments leads to the 
following cases. In the case of identical families increasing child benefits combined with 
a budget-neutral decrease in parental leave payments sets positive incentives for having 
children and the demand for external child care and, at the same time, increases the labor 
supply of the parents. In the case of heterogeneous families with differing wages this 
policy change stimulates fertility and external child care only for parents with low 
opportunity costs of staying at home with the children. However, the effect on the labor 
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supply of the secondary earner is ambiguous. A budget-neutral policy reform that 
increases the subsidy for external child care and reduces parental leave payments has a 
positive effect on the secondary earner’s employment and the demand for external child 
care in the case of identical families. Furthermore, fertility increases if the families 
respond less elastic to price changes of external child care than to the change of 
opportunity costs of parental child care. These results are based on the fact that parental 
leave payments have a negative impact on the employment of parents because they set the 
same incentives as an implicit wage tax on continued work. Therefore, the other two 
policy instruments are more effective in fostering fertility while at the same time 
maintaining incentives for work. 
The welfare analysis includes all the effects of the policy instruments on parental utility, 
in particular the consumption effects. We find that the introduction of subsidies for 
external child care from zero up to a certain provision level and a budget-neutral 
reduction of child benefits make all families better off in the case of identical households. 
In the case of heterogeneous households it is welfare improving for all families who are 
net recipients of the subsidy system. The welfare of the families who are net payers can 
go in either direction depending on the tax burden they face relative to the advantage of 
receiving subsidies. Furthermore, introducing subsidies and cutting parental leave 
payments can increase parental utility in families who respond more elastic to opportunity 
costs than prices of external child care if the replacement rate of the leave payments for 
net wage income is very high. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we introduce the model. Section 2.3 
presents the comparative static results. In section 2.4, we calculate the welfare effects of 
exchanging family policies and section 2.5 concludes.  
 
 
2.2 The model 
 
For simplicity, we divide the life cycle of each person into two phases of the same 
duration. During the first phase, a person entirely depends on parental support, while in 
the second, the adult person allocates his or her time to either working and thus 
contributing to family income or to raising children. For ease of exposition, we also 
assume that all men and women are neatly paired off into conventional families. Family 
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݅’s decisions are assumed to be taken by the parents who derive utility from their own 
consumption, ܿ௜ , their number of children, ݊௜ , and their children’s quality of life, ݍ௜ , 
according to the additively separable utility function   
ܷሺܿ௜, ݊௜, ݍ௜ሻ ൌ ݑሺܿ௜ሻ ൅ ݑሺ݊௜ሻ ൅ ݑሺݍ௜ሻ  (2.1)
 
for ݅ ∈ ሼ1,… ,ܰሽ. We assume the utility function to be continuous, strictly concave, and 
strictly increasing in all arguments. The quality per child, ݍ௜, can be understood as a good 
produced domestically by the parents who use as inputs time spent with the child and a 
child-specific consumption good, ݖ௜, bought on the market. The price on the market for 
the child-specific consumption good is ܤ . For simplicity, we assume that only the 
secondary earner of family ݅ spends time with the children. Time spent with a child can 
be divided into the secondary earner’s own time, ݄௜ , and the time the child spends at 
external child care, ݃௜. The market price for child care, ݃௜, is denoted by ߨ. The strictly 
concave domestic production function for quality is given by 
ݍ௜ ൌ ݍሺ݄௜, ݃௜, ݖ௜ሻ (2.2)
 
and increases monotonically in all arguments.  
The secondary earner allocates her time to working which yields wage at the rate ݓ௜ and 
to leisure time. We assume that child rearing is the only domestic time requiring parental 
time so that she spends her leisure time completely with the children. Through the 
endogeneity of ݊௜, the secondary earner’s labor supply is also endogenous. If she has ݊௜ 
children her parental time equals ݄௜݊௜ . The rest of secondary earner ݅’s total time is 
working time and given by ܮ௜ ൌ 1 െ ݄௜݊௜ , her gross income therefore equals ݓ௜ܮ௜ . 
Secondary earners carrying a larger wage rate ݓ௜ thus have higher opportunity costs of 
raising children. The primary earner allocates all her time to working and her gross salary 
is ܻ.  
The family’s budget constraint is given by 
ሺ1 െ ݐሻሺܻ ൅ ݓ௜ܮ௜ሻ ൅ ߙ݊௜ ൅ ߛݓ௜ሺ1 െ ݐሻ݄௜݊௜ ൌ ܿ௜ ൅ ܤݖ௜݊௜ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߚሻߨ݃௜݊௜ (2.3)
 
where ߙ  represents the child benefit, ߚ  the share of bought-in child care which is 
subsidized and ߛ the share of foregone net wage income of the secondary earner staying 
at home with the children which is granted as parental leave payment by the government.  
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The parents choose consumption, ܿ௜, the number of children, ݊௜, the secondary earner’s 
time spent with a child, ݄௜, the amount of bought-in child care, ݃௜, and the child-specific 
consumption, ݖ௜ , so as to maximize their utility, ݑሺܿ௜, ݊௜, ݍ௜ሻ, by taking account of the 
child’s quality production and their budget constraint. We abbreviate the first derivative 
of a function ݕሺݔሻ by ݕ௫. 
The household decision problem is given by 
max௖೔,௡೔,௛೔,௚೔,௭೔ ݑ൫ܿ௜, ݊௜, ݍ௜ሺ݄௜, ݃௜, ݖ௜ሻ൯ 
ݏ. ݐ.		ሺ1 െ ݐሻሺܻ ൅ ݓ௜ܮ௜ሻ ൅ ߙ݊௜ ൅ ߛݓ௜ሺ1 െ ݐሻ݄௜݊௜ ൌ ܿ௜ ൅ ܤݖ௜݊௜ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߚሻߨ݃௜݊௜  
(2.4)
 
The first-order conditions yield the following necessary and sufficient conditions of the 
concave maximization problem: 
ݑ௡
ݑ௖ ൌ ܤݖ௜ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߚሻߨ݃௜ ൅ ݓ௜ሺ1 െ ݐሻሺ1 െ ߛሻ݄௜ െ ߙ ≡ ௡ܲ,௜ (2.5)
ݑ௤
ݑ௖ ݍ௛ ൌ ݓ௜ሺ1 െ ݐሻሺ1 െ ߛሻ݊௜ ≡ ௤ܲ೓,௜ (2.6)
ݑ௤
ݑ௖ ݍ௚ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߚሻߨ݊௜ ≡ ௤ܲ೒,௜ (2.7)
ݑ௤
ݑ௖ ݍ௭ ൌ ܤ݊௜ ≡ ௤ܲ೥,௜ (2.8)
 
All conditions have the well-known meaning that the marginal rate of substitution 
between the respective decision variables has to be equal to the marginal rate of 
transformation at the utility maximum. A variation in any of the policy parameters may 
affect the price of quantity as well as quality of children. Next to costs of parental time, 
the upbringing of children also incurs a cost per child, ܤݖ௜, which covers child-specific 
consumption expenditure. The net cost of children ௡ܲ,௜ in (2.5) is therefore composed of 
family ݅’s consumption cost per child plus the net cost of external child care plus the 
opportunity cost of forgone net wage income of the secondary earner minus the child 
benefits. Children are considered consumption goods with positive net costs. The 
marginal net price of a child, ௡ܲ,௜, decreases with a higher child benefit, ߙ, as well as with 
a higher subsidy for child care, ߚ, and higher parental leave payments, ߛ.  
The marginal net price of parental time spent with the children, ௤ܲ೓,೔, in (2.6) consists of 
the net wage loss while the marginal price for external child care, ௤ܲ೒,௜, in (2.7) equals the 
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net cost for the utilization of this service. Obviously, child benefits have no effect on the 
price of quality while the subsidy for child care decreases the price for bought-in child 
care and the parental leave payment reduces the net price of parental time spent with the 
child.  
In the following, the net wage is abbreviated by ݓෝ௜ ൌ ሺ1 െ ݐሻݓ௜	and the first derivative of 
utility with respect to the quality inputs ݔ௜ ∈ ሼ݄௜, ݃௜, ݖ௜ሽ, ܷ௤ݍ௫ ൐ 0, by ܷ௤ೣ and the second 
derivative, ൫ܷ௤ݍ௫௫ ൅ ܷ௤௤ݍ௫ݍ௫൯ ൏ 0, by ܷ௤ೣ௤ೣ. 
 
 
2.3 Comparative statics: The effects of changes in the family 
policy system 
 
First, we analyze the absolute effects of the policy instruments on fertility, secondary 
earner’s labor supply, the demand for external child care and parental and child-specific 
consumption. Second, we compare the policies by investigating the differential or relative 
effects of exchanging mutually the instruments in a budget-neutral reform. By implicit 
differentiation of the first-order conditions (2.5) - (2.8), we derive the results and present 
in the following the impact on fertility, labor supply and demand for external child care. 
The derivation and the other effects on consumption can be found in Appendix 2.A.  
 
2.3.1 Absolute effects  
 
We start by analyzing the effects of a variation in the child benefit rate on quantity and 
quality of children. The effect of an increase in the child benefit rate on the quantity of 
children  
߲݊௜
߲ߙ ൌ െݏ௡௡ െ ݊௜݅௡ ൌ
1
ܦ௜ ݑ௤೓௤೓ݑ௤೒௤೒ݑ௤೥௤೥൫ݑ௖ െ ݊௜ݑ௖௖ ௡ܲ,௜൯ ൐ 0 (2.9)
 
is positive as the determinant of the bordered Hessian matrix is negative (ܦ௜ ൏ 0) and 
൫ݑ௖ െ ݊௜ݑ௖௖ ௡ܲ,௜൯ ൐ 0. As expected, additional child benefits encourage fertility as they 
reduce the cost of having children. The income effect, െ݊݅௡, with respect to ߙ is positive 
and the substitution effect, െݏ௡௡, is positive since an increase in ߙ decreases the marginal 
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net price of a child in (2.5). The size of the effect is driven by family ݅’s number of 
children, ݊௜, and their marginal price for a child, ௡ܲ,௜. The impact of an increase in ߙ is 
therefore larger for high income families. On the contrary, secondary earners with a 
smaller wage rate invest more in parental consumption when ߙ  is increased (see 
Appendix 2.A). 
 
An increase in the child benefit rate has also a positive effect on both parental time and 
time the child spends in external child care as ቀ݊௜ݑ௖௖ݑ௡௡ ൅ 2ݑ௡ݑ௖௖ െ ௨೎
మ
௡೔ቁ ൐ 0  (see 
Appendix 2.A): 
 
Regarding the effects of an increase in the child benefit rate on the inputs of children’s 
quality, parental and external child care time, the substitution effects of the marginal cost 
of quantity on the demand for quality are negative. As child benefits have no direct effect 
on the quality of children, the ratio of quality and quantity will fall since the relative price 
of quality to quantity rises with ߙ. This can be illustrated by a comparison of the net price 
of children with respect to the number of children in (2.5) and to the quality of children in 
(2.6) and (2.7). The price for quality of children is not affected by changes in the child 
benefit rate. Therefore, the change of the relative price in favor of the quantity of children 
reduces the parental time and the child care and, hence, the quality of children. However, 
the positive income effect dominates this substitution effect. 
The size of the effect of an increase in ߙ on parental time in (2.10) is driven by the 
marginal net price of parental time, ௤ܲ೓,௜, and is thus larger for high income families. The 
size of the effect on the time the children spend in external child care in (2.11) depends on 
the marginal price for external child care, ௤ܲ೒,௜, which is independent of the wage income. 
Hence, child benefits have a stronger impact on high income earners to stay home with 
the children than on low income earners whereas the effect on the demand for external 
ݍ௛ ߲݄௜߲ߙ ൌ ݏ௡௤೓ ൅ ݊௜݅௤೓ ൌ െ
1
ܦ௜ ݑ௤೒௤೒ݑ௤೥௤೥ ௤ܲ೓,௜ ቆ݊௜ݑ௖௖ݑ௡௡ ൅ 2ݑ௡ݑ௖௖ െ
ݑ௖ଶ
݊௜ ቇ ൐ 0 
 (2.10)
ݍ௚ ߲݃௜߲ߙ ൌ െݏ௡௤೒ െ ݊௜݅௤೒ ൌ െ
1
ܦ௜ ݑ௤೓௤೓ݑ௤೥௤೥ ௤ܲ೒,௜ ቆ݊௜ݑ௖௖ݑ௡௡ ൅ 2ݑ௡ݑ௖௖ െ
ݑ௖ଶ
݊௜ ቇ ൐ 0 
 (2.11)
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child care is the same. Thus, the labor supply of the high income secondary earner 
decreases by more.  
 
Proposition 2.1: Increasing the child benefit rate encourages fertility and the demand for 
external child care while it discourages the secondary earner’s labor supply. The effects 
on fertility and labor supply are larger for high income secondary earners. As child 
benefits only have a direct effect on the quantity of children, an increase in the child 
benefit rate leads to a decrease in the ratio of quality and quantity of children.  
 
The other two policy instruments have no clear effect on fertility. The absolute effect of 
an increase in the subsidy for bought-in child care, ߚ, depends on the price elasticity of 
demand for external child care time, that is  ൬1 ൅ ௚೔௨೜೒೜೒௨೜೒ ൰ ൌ ൬1 ൅
ଵ
ఌ೒,೔൰, where ߝ௚,௜ ≡
ௗ௚೔
ௗ௉೜೒,೔
௉೜೒,೔
௚೔ ൏ 0. If family ݅’s demand for external child care time is inelastic, ߝ௚,௜ ൐ െ1, 
fertility increases with a higher subsidy, and vice versa. 
߲݊௜
߲ߚ ൌ െߨ ቀ݃௜ݏ௡௡ ൅ ݊௜ݏ௤೒௡ ൅ ݃௜݊௜݅௡ቁ
ൌ ߨܦ௜ ݑ௤೒ݑ௤೓௤೓ݑ௤೥௤೥൫ݑ௖ െ ݊௜ݑ௖௖ ௡ܲ,௜൯ ቆ1 ൅
1
ߝ௚,௜ቇ ⋛ 0 
(2.12)
 
The size of the effect on fertility in (2.12) rises with the price of external child care, ߨ, the 
number of children of family ݅, ݊௜, and the marginal price for quantity, ௡ܲ,௜. A higher ߚ 
decreases the net price of a child, ௡ܲ,௜, which induces a positive income effect, െߨ݃௜݊௜݅௡, 
and a positive substitution effect on the demand for the number of children, െߨ݃௜ݏ௡௡. 
Both effects exceed the negative substitution effect of the marginal cost of bought-in child 
care on the demand for quantity, െߨ݊௜ݏ௤೒௡ , if ߝ௚,௜ ൐ െ1  holds. For families with 
ߝ௚,௜ ൏ െ1	, the negative substitution effect dominates the other two effects and the total 
effect on fertility is thus negative. This negative substitution effect arises because a higher 
ߚ decreases the net price of a child less than the net price of external child care. Hence, 
the relative price between the quantity of children and child care increases so that the 
family decides for fewer children relative to the demand for child care.  
The absolute effect of an increase in the parental leave payments, ߛ, is similar to the 
effect of the subsidy. The difference is that now the size of the effect increases in the 
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secondary earner’s net wage rate, ݓෝ௜, and the direction of the effect on fertility depends 
on the elasticity of demand for parental child care time, that is  ൬1 ൅ ௛೔௨೜೓೜೓௨೜೓ ൰ ≡ ൬1 ൅
ଵ
ఌ೓,೔൰, with ߝ௛,௜ ≡
ௗ௛೔
ௗ௉೜೓,೔
௉೜೓,೔
௛೔ ൏ 0. Only for families whose demand for parental child care 
time is inelastic, that is ߝ௛,௜ ൐ െ1, parental leave payments have a positive impact on the 
number of children. The impact of an increase in the parental leave payment on fertility is 
thus ambiguous.  
߲݊௜
߲ߛ ൌ െݓෝ௜൫݄௜ݏ௡௡ െ ݊௜ݏ௤೓௡ ൅ ݄௜݊௜݅௡൯
ൌ ݓෝ௜	ܦ௜ ݑ௤೓ݑ௤೒௤೒ݑ௤೥௤೥൫ݑ௖ െ ݊௜ݑ௖௖ ௡ܲ,௜൯ ቆ1 ൅
1
ߝ௛,௜ቇ ⋛ 0	
(2.13)
 
The size of this effect depends on the secondary earner’s net wage rate  ݓෝ௜	. If  ߝ௛,௜ ൐ െ1 
holds, the positive income effect, െݓෝ௜݄௜݊௜݅௡, and the positive substitution effect of the 
marginal price of quantity on the demand for children, െݓෝ௜݄௜ݏ௡௡, exceed the negative 
substitution effect of the marginal costs of parental child care time on the demand for 
children, െݓෝ௜݊௜ݏ௤೓௡, and the total effect on fertility is thus positive. The last substitution 
effect is negative because higher parental leave payments reduce the opportunity costs of 
staying home with the children.  
Considering the effects on the time management, we find the following pattern of both the 
subsidy for external child care and the parental leave payments. Each instrument increases 
the demand for that type of child care (parental or external) which marginal price it 
directly lowers. The indirect effect on the complementing type of child care is ambiguous. 
The effect of an increase in ߚ is ambiguous with respect to parental time and positive for 
the demand of time children spend in external child care. 
ݍ௛ ߲݄௜߲ߚ ൌ ߨ ቀ݃௜ݏ௡௤೓ ൅ ݊௜ݏ௤೒௤೓ ൅ ݃௜݊௜݅௤೓ቁ
ൌ െ ߨܦ௜ ݑ௤೒ݑ௤೥௤೥ ௤ܲ೓,௜ ቆ݊௜ݑ௖௖ݑ௡௡ ൅ 2ݑ௡ݑ௖௖ െ
ݑ௖ଶ
݊௜ ቇ ቆ1 ൅
1
ߝ௚,௜ቇ ⋛ 0 
 (2.14) 
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ݍ௚ ߲݃௜߲ߚ ൌ െߨ ቀ݃௜ݏ௡௤೒ ൅ ݊௜ݏ௤೒௤೒ ൅ ݃௜݊௜݅௤೒ቁ
ൌ ߨܦ௜ ቈቀݑ௖ݑ௤೥௤೥ ௤ܲ೓,௜
ଶ ൅ ݑ௖ݑ௤೓௤೓ ௤ܲ೥,௜ଶ െ ݃௜ݑ௤೓௤೓ݑ௤೥௤೥ ௤ܲ೒,௜ቁ ቆ݊௜ݑ௖௖ݑ௡௡
൅ 2ݑ௡ݑ௖௖ െ ݑ௖
ଶ
݊௜ ቇ ൅ ݊௜ݑ௖ݑ௤೓௤೓ݑ௤೥௤೥൫ݑ௖௖ ௡ܲ,௜
ଶ ൅ ݑ௡௡൯቉ ൐ 0 
 (2.15)
 
The effect of an increase in the subsidy on external child care on parental time in equation 
(2.14) is positive if ߝ௚,௜ ൐ െ1 and negative if ߝ௚,௜ ൏ െ1 holds.  
Both of the substitution effects in (2.14) are negative for the following reason: A higher ߚ 
decreases the price of a child but not the opportunity cost of parental time. Hence, the 
quantity of children becomes relatively less costly than increasing the quality by staying 
at home. Furthermore, as the net cost of external child care decreases it becomes 
relatively more attractive to buy more child care on the market than to provide own 
parental time for the children. However, the positive income effect, ߨ݃௜݊௜݅௤೓, exceeds the 
negative substitution effects for families with ߝ௚,௜ ൐ െ1. As before, the size of the total 
effect increases in the secondary earner’s income. 
Regarding the demand for external child care in (2.15), both the income effect, 
െߨ݃௜݊௜݅௤೒, and the own substitution effect of the marginal costs of bought-in child care 
on the time the child spends in external child care, െߨ݊௜ݏ௤೒௤೒ , are positive and they 
exceed the negative substitution effect of the marginal cost of quantity on the time the 
child spends in child care, െߨ݃௜ݏ௡௤೒.  
The overall effect of an increase in parental leave payments ߛ on parental time is positive 
while the effect on external child care time is ambiguous. 
ݍ௛ ߲݄௜߲ߛ ൌ ݓෝ௜൫݄௜ݏ௡௤೓ െ ݊௜ݏ௤೓௤೓ ൅ ݄௜݊௜݅௤೓൯
ൌ ݓෝ௜	ܦ௜ ቈቀݑ௖ݑ௤೒௤೒ ௤ܲ೥,௜
ଶ ൅ ݑ௤೎ݑ௤೥௤೥ ௤ܲ೒,௜ଶ െ ݄௜ݑ௤೒௤೒ݑ௤೥௤೥ ௤ܲ೓,௜ቁ ቆ݊௜ݑ௖௖ݑ௡௡
൅ 2ݑ௡ݑ௖௖ െ ݑ௖
ଶ
݊௜ ቇ ൅ ݊௜ݑ௖ݑ௤೒௤೒ݑ௤೥௤೥൫ݑ௖௖ ௡ܲ,௜
ଶ ൅ ݑ௡௡൯቉ ൐ 0 
 (2.16)
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ݍ௚ ߲݃௜߲ߛ ൌ െݓෝ௜ ቀ݄௜ݏ௡௤೒ െ ݊௜ݏ௤೓௤೒ ൅ ݄௜݊௜݅௤೒ቁ
ൌ െݓෝ௜	ܦ௜ ݑ௤೓ݑ௤೥௤೥ ௤ܲ೒,௜ ቆ݊௜ݑ௖௖ݑ௡௡ ൅ 2ݑ௡ݑ௖௖ െ
ݑ௖ଶ
݊௜ ቇ ቆ1 ൅
1
ߝ௛,௜ቇ ⋛ 0 
 (2.17)
 
Concerning parental time in (2.16), the positive income effect, ݓෝ௜݄௜݊௜݅௤೓, and the positive 
own substitution effect of the marginal costs of parental time on the demand for parental 
time, െݓෝ௜݊௜ݏ௤೓௤೓ , exceed the negative substitution effect of the marginal price for 
quantity on the demand for parental time, ݓෝ௜݄௜ݏ௡௤೓. Parental leave payments work like an 
implicit tax on continued work. Therefore, they set incentives to decrease labor supply. At 
the same time they improve the quality of the children. Since the net price of the number 
of children decreases by less than the net price of parental time, the quality of children 
increases relatively to the quantity. Regarding the time the children spend at external 
child care in (2.17), on the other hand, the two substitution effects are negative and only 
fall short of the positive income effect, െݓෝ௜݄௜݊௜݅௤೒, if ߝ௛,௜ ൐ െ1 holds. For family ݅ with 
ߝ௛,௜ ൏ െ1, the total effect on ݃௜ is thus negative.  
The more the government subsidizes external or parental child care, the more family ݅ 
takes advantage of the subsidized type of child care and the share of this type of child care 
in total time spent with the children increases disproportionately. 
 
Proposition 2.2: A subsidy for external child care and parental leave payments have 
similar effects on fertility and the use of time for child care. Both policy instruments have 
positive effects on fertility only for families whose demand for external child care - in the 
case of the subsidy - or whose demand for parental child care time - in the case of leave 
payments - is inelastic. The subsidy increases the demand for external child care for all 
families, while the leave payments increase the parental time (reduce the secondary 
earner’s labor supply) for all families. Parental leave payments reduce the opportunity 
cost of staying home so that they work like an implicit tax on continued work. 
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2.3.2 Differential effects 
 
We now compare mutually the effectiveness of the three policy instruments in raising the 
number of children and increasing the secondary earner’s labor supply. Considering a 
budget neutral substitution of two instruments allows us to determine the relative size of 
the effect of each instrument. The government’s budget is given by: 
ݐሺܻ ൅ ݓഥܮሻ ൌ ߙ ത݊ ൅ ߚߨ݃̅ ത݊ ൅ ߛݓෝഥ ത݄ ത݊ (2.18)
 
where ത݊, ݃̅, ത݄, ݓഥ , and ݓෝഥ  represent the average number of children, use of external child 
care, parental child care, wage and net wage respectively. In the following, we consider 
first average families, i.e. families with average wage income and average demand. This 
is also the case of identical families. Second, we consider re-distributional effects and 
families who are heterogeneous in wage earnings and demand. We differentiate between 
two groups of families in the benefit system: families who are initially, i.e. before the 
reform, net contributors or net receivers of the tax-financed family policies. 
Looking at first at an exchange of child benefits and subsidies for bought-in child care, 
the budget keeps constant if ݀ߙ ൌ െߨ݃̅݀ߚ. We distinguish ceteris paribus between two 
groups of families, those who initially consume below average, that is ݃௜ ൏ ݃̅, and those 
who initially consume above average external child care, that is ݃௜ ൐ ݃̅. The families of 
the first group are net contributors to the policy change while families of the second group 
are net recipients. As both the child benefit and the subsidy for external child care depend 
on the number of children, there is no redistribution with respect to the number of 
children.  
An increase in the subsidy, ߚ, accompanied by a reduction of the child benefit, ߙ, so as to 
keep the budget constant has the following differential effects. Taking account of 
equations (2.9) and (2.12), the effect on the number of children, ݊௜, is given by: 
݀݊௜
݀ߚ |ௗఈୀିగ௚തௗఉ ൌ
߲݊௜
߲ߚ ݀ߚ ൅
߲݊௜
߲ߙ ݀ߙ ൌ െߨ ቂሺݏ௡௡ ൅ ݊௜݅௡ሻሺ݃௜ െ ݃̅ሻ ൅ ݊௜ݏ௤೒௡ቃ
ൌ ߨܦ௜ ݑ௤೒ݑ௤೓௤೓ݑ௤೥௤೥൫ݑ௖ െ ݊௜ݑ௖௖ ௡ܲ,௜൯ ቈ1 ൅
ሺ݃௜ െ ݃̅ሻݑ௤೒௤೒
ݑ௤೒
቉ 
(2.19)
 
Combining equations (2.10) and (2.14) gives the differential effect for the secondary 
earner’s parental time, ݄௜: 
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݄݀௜
݀ߚ |ௗఈୀିగ௚തௗఉ ൌ
߲݄௜
߲ߚ ݀ߚ ൅
߲݄௜
߲ߙ ݀ߙ ൌ ߨ ቂ൫ݏ௡௤೓ ൅ ݊௜݅௤೓൯ሺ݃௜ െ ݃̅ሻ ൅ ݊௜ݏ௤೒௤೓ቃ
ൌ െ ߨܦ௜ ݑ௤೒ݑ௤೥௤೥ ௤ܲ೓,௜ ቆ݊௜ݑ௖௖ݑ௡௡ ൅ 2ݑ௡ݑ௖௖ െ
ݑ௖ଶ
݊௜ ቇ ቈ1 ൅
ሺ݃௜ െ ݃̅ሻݑ௤೒௤೒
ݑ௤೒
቉ 
 (2.20)
 
With equations (2.11) and (2.15) a budget-neutral comparison of the effects of the two 
policy instruments on the demand for external child care yields:  
݀ ௜݃
݀ߚ |ௗఈୀିగ௚തௗఉ ൌ
߲݃௜
߲ߚ ݀ߚ ൅
߲݃௜
߲ߙ ݀ߙ ൌ െߨ ቂቀݏ௡௤೒ ൅ ݊௜݅௤೒ቁ ሺ݃௜ െ ݃̅ሻ ൅ ݊௜ݏ௤೒௤೒ቃ
ൌ െ ߨܦ௜ ቊቆ݊௜ݑ௖௖ݑ௡௡ ൅ 2ݑ௡ݑ௖௖ െ
ݑ௖ଶ
݊௜ ቇ ቂݑ௤೓௤೓ݑ௤೥௤೥ ௤ܲ೒,௜ሺ݃௜ െ ݃̅ሻ
െ ݑ௖ݑ௤೥௤೥ ௤ܲ೓,௜ଶ െ ݑ௖ݑ௤೓௤೓ ௤ܲ೥,௜ଶ ቃ െ ݊௜ݑ௖ݑ௤೓௤೓ݑ௤೥௤೥൫ݑ௖௖ ௡ܲ,௜ଶ ൅ ݑ௡௡൯ቋ 
 (2.21)
 
From the three derivations (2.19), (2.20) and (2.21) we can infer the following results. In 
the case of identical families (or families with average demand for child care), ݃௜ ൌ ݃̅  for 
all ݅, a reduction of child benefits in favor of higher subsidies for child care decreases 
fertility and parental time and increases the demand for external child care. In case of a 
subsidy for external child care the money is bound to this service whereas the child 
benefits are paid unconditional. Therefore, an increase in ߚ  has a smaller impact on 
fertility than an increase in ߙ, and it leads to a substitution of parental child care by 
external child care so that the secondary earner’s labor supply increases. 
For heterogeneous families whose initial demand for external child care is lower than 
average, ݃௜ ൏ ݃̅, the subsidy for child care has again a weaker effect on fertility and on 
parental child care than child benefits. The reason is that this policy change increases the 
price of a child ௡ܲ,௜ from (2.5) and decreases the price of external child care ௤ܲ೒,௜ from 
(2.7) for all families with ݃௜ ൏ ݃̅  inducing the substitutional effect mentioned above. 
However, this is the group of families who are net contributors to the policy change. If the 
financial net burden of the family is high enough, ݃௜ ≪ ݃̅, the demand for external child 
care may even diminish with this policy change. 
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The effect of the budget neutral increase in ߚ  for all families with ݃௜ ൐ ݃̅  is 
straightforward with respect to the demand for external child care. For those net recipients 
of the subsidy the policy change leads to more external child care. The effects are 
ambiguous for fertility behavior and parental child care. They depend on family ݅’s price 
elasticity of the demand for external child care. The policy change decreases the price of a 
child ௡ܲ,௜ and, at the same time, the price of external child care ௤ܲ೒,௜ goes down. If the 
family’s demand is inelastic, ߝ௚,௜ ൐ െ1, the last price relief increases external child care 
only to a small amount but transmits to a higher fertility and even higher parental child 
care.  
Hence, supporting the demand for child care is only a more promising way of fostering 
fertility than child benefits for net recipients if their demand for external child care is 
inelastic. At the same time, it decreases the labor supply of the secondary earner. For all 
families, the effect increases in ௡ܲ,௜ and it therefore depends on the secondary earner’s 
income. 
Combining our results from (2.20) and (2.21), we can conclude that for most families a 
higher subsidy of external child care and a budget-neutral reduction of child benefits leads 
to an increase in the demand for bought-in child care and a decrease in parental child care. 
The last effect is equivalent to an increase in the secondary earner’s employment rate. 
However, at the same time the incentives for having children are negative.  
The same policy exchange also leads to both less parental and child-specific consumption 
for net contributors while the effect is ambiguous for the others (see Appendix 2.B). This 
negative effect on consumption can be explained by the fact that in the case of the subsidy 
the money is bound to external child care and thus does not benefit consumption in the 
way the child benefit does. 
 
Proposition 2.3: A budget-neutral increase in a subsidy for external child care 
accompanied by a decrease in child benefits has a negative effect on fertility and a 
positive effect on the secondary earner’s labor supply for family ݅ consuming ݃௜ ൑ ݃̅. The 
same policy exchange leads to an increase in the demand for external child care for 
families with ݃௜ ൐ ݃̅. 
 
Chapter 2: Three Family Policies to Reconcile Fertility and Labor Supply 
28 
 
Comparing child benefits and the rate of parental leave payments, a budget neutral 
substitution requires ݀ߙ ൌ െݓෝഥ ത݄݀ߛ. In this case, we have to again differentiate between 
two groups of families: Net contributors, that is ݓෝ௜݄௜ ൏ ݓෝഥ ത݄, and net recipients, that is 
ݓෝ௜݄௜ ൐ ݓෝഥ ത݄ , of the policy change. As both the child benefit and the parental leave 
payments depend on the number of children, there is no redistribution with respect to the 
number of children.  
Taking account of (2.9) and (2.13), the effect of increasing parental leave payments on the 
number of children is given by: 
݀݊௜
݀ߛ |ௗఈୀି௪ෝഥ௛ഥௗఊ ൌ
߲݊௜
߲γ ݀γ ൅
߲݊௜
߲ߙ ݀ߙ ൌ ൫ݓෝഥ ത݄ െ ݓෝ௜݄௜൯ሺݏ௡௡ ൅ ݊௜݅௡ሻ ൅ ݓෝ௜݊௜ݏ௤೓௡
ൌ ݓෝ௜ܦ௜ ݑ௤೓ݑ௤೒௤೒ݑ௤೥௤೥൫ݑ௖ െ ݊௜ݑ௖௖ ௡ܲ,௜൯ ቈ1 ൅
൫ݓෝ௜݄௜ െ ݓෝഥ ത݄൯ݑ௤೓௤೓
ݓෝ௜ݑ௤೓
቉ 
(2.22)
 
The effect of the policy exchange on the time parents spend with their children at home, 
݄௜, we derive from (2.10) and (2.16): 
݄݀௜
݀ߛ |ௗఈୀି௪ෝഥ௛ഥௗఊ ൌ
߲݄௜
߲γ ݀γ ൅
߲݄௜
߲ߙ ݀ߙ ൌ െ൫ݓෝഥ ത݄ െ ݓෝ௜݄௜൯൫ݏ௡௤೓ ൅ ݊௜݅௤೓൯ െ ݓෝ௜݊௜ݏ௤೓௤೓
ൌ െ 1ܦ௜ ቊቆ݊௜ݑ௖௖ݑ௡௡ ൅ 2ݑ௡ݑ௖௖ െ
ݑ௖ଶ
݊௜ ቇ ቂ൫ݓෝ௜݄௜ െ ݓෝ
ഥ ത݄൯ݑ௤೒௤೒ݑ௤೥௤೥ ௤ܲ೓,௜
െ ݓෝ௜ݑ௖ ቀݑ௤೒௤೒ ௤ܲ೥,௜ଶ ൅ ݑ௤೥௤೥ ௤ܲ೒,௜ଶ ቁቃ
െ ݓෝ௜݊௜ݑ௖ݑ௤೒௤೒ݑ௤೥௤೥൫ݑ௖௖ ௡ܲ,௜ଶ ൅ ݑ௡௡൯ቋ 
 (2.23)
 
And the effect of the budget-neutral exchange of instruments on the time spent at external 
child care, ݃௜,  follows from (2.11) and (2.17): 
݀ ௜݃
݀ߛ |ௗఈୀି௪ෝഥ௛ഥௗఊ ൌ
߲݃௜
߲γ ݀γ ൅
߲݃௜
߲ߙ ݀ߙ ൌ ൫ݓෝഥ ത݄ െ ݓෝ௜݄௜൯ ቀݏ௡௤೒ ൅ ݊௜݅௤೒ቁ ൅ ݓෝ௜݊௜ݏ௤೓௤೒
ൌ െݓෝ௜ܦ௜ ݑ௤೓ݑ௤೥௤೥ ௤ܲ೒,௜ ቆ݊௜ݑ௖௖ݑ௡௡ ൅ 2ݑ௡ݑ௖௖ െ
ݑ௖ଶ
݊௜ ቇ ቈ1
൅ ൫ݓෝ௜݄௜ െ ݓෝ
ഥ ത݄൯ݑ௤೓௤೓
ݓෝ௜ݑ௤೓
቉ 
 (2.24)
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The impact of a policy reform with higher parental leave payments and a budget-neutral 
decrease in child benefits can thus be derived from (2.22), (2.23) and (2.24). For identical 
(or average) families with ݓෝ௜ ൌ ݓෝഥ  and ݄௜ ൌ ത݄ , the incentives for children and for the 
demand for external child care are negative while incentives for parental time with the 
children are positive. This means the reverse policy may generate desired incentives for 
family behavior. An increase in child benefits at the cost of lower parental leave payments 
will raise the number of children and the demand for external child care and, at the same 
time, it will stimulate the labor supply of parents. The reason is that the child benefits 
have directly positive (income) effects on the number of children and the demand for 
external child care. Additionally, the budget-neutral decrease in leave payments reduces 
the implicit tax on work. Hence, if the positive effect of external child care on the quality 
of children is equal or higher than the positive effect of parental child care a policy reform 
with higher child benefits and lower parental leave payments may support fertility and 
parental employment without lowering the quality of children. Such a policy would 
qualify as a way to balance family and work. 
The results are not clear-cut when we consider heterogeneous families with differing 
wages. The impact of higher leave payments at the cost of lower child benefits on fertility 
is negative for secondary earners whose income weighted parental time is smaller than the 
average, that is ݓෝ௜݄௜ ൏ ݓෝഥ ത݄. In this case the parental leave payment therefore has a weaker 
effect on fertility than child benefits. Hence, for families with low opportunity costs of 
staying home and taking care of their children, a child benefit is a more effective 
instrument to set incentives for children than a parental leave payment. At the same time, 
the policy leads to a decrease in the demand for external child care. However, the effect 
on parental child care is ambiguous. The reason is that this group of families is net 
contributor to the policy change and the quantity as well as the quality of the children 
may be effectively reduced.   
For secondary earners with above-average initial opportunity costs, ݓෝ௜݄௜ ൐ ݓෝഥ ത݄ , the 
policy reform induces a higher demand for time spent with the children and, hence, a 
lower labor supply. The net recipients of this policy therefore reduce employment. The 
effects on the number of children and external child care depend on the price elasticity of 
the demand for parental child care time. For family ݅ having high initial opportunity costs 
ݓෝ௜݄௜ ≫ ݓෝഥ ത݄  such that ൣ൫ݓෝ௜݄௜ െ ݓෝഥ ത݄൯ݑ௤೓௤೓ ൅ ݓෝ௜ݑ௤೓൧ ൏ 0, the budget-neutral increase in 
parental leave payments leads to an increase in both fertility and the demand for external 
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child care. Net recipients of the policy with high opportunity costs of staying home 
therefore may benefit from an increase in ߛ to an extent that they also raise their demand 
for external child care and for children. 
Combining our results from (2.23) and (2.24), we can conclude that the policy exchange 
has a negative effect on the demand of external child care for families with ݓෝ௜݄௜ ൑ ݓෝഥ ത݄ 
and a positive effect on parental child care for secondary earners with ݓෝ௜݄௜ ൒ ݓෝഥ ത݄. Only 
families who initially have very large opportunity costs of staying at home, may use the 
additional parental leave payments to consume more external child care. 
The policy exchange of child benefits and parental leave payments by ݀ߙ ൌ െݓෝഥ݄݀ߛ 
leads also to less parental and child-specific consumption for families with ݓෝഥ ത݄ ൐ ݓෝ௜݄௜ 
(see Appendix 2.B). This reduction in parental and child-specific consumption can be 
explained by the increased parental child care time and thus reduced family income.  
 
Proposition 2.4: An increase in parental leave payments accompanied by a budget-
neutral reduction in child benefits leads to a decrease (increase) in fertility and a lower 
(higher) demand for external child care for secondary earners with ݓෝ௜݄௜ ൑ ݓෝഥ ത݄ (ݓෝ௜݄௜ ≫
ݓෝഥ ത݄). The same policy exchange leads to an increase in parental child care for families 
with ݓෝ௜݄௜ ൐ ݓෝഥ ത݄. 
 
When comparing the effects of an increase in the subsidy for external child care and a 
budget-neutral reduction of parental leave payments such that ݀ߛ ൌ െ గ௚ത௪ෝഥ௛ഥ ݀ߚ we obtain 
the fertility change with (2.12) and (2.13): 
݀݊௜
݀ߚ |ௗఊୀିగ௚ത௪ෝഥ௛ഥௗఉ ൌ
߲݊௜
߲ߚ ݀ߚ ൅
߲݊௜
߲γ ݀γ
ൌ െߨ ൬݃௜ െ ݓෝ௜݄௜ݓෝഥ ത݄ ݃̅൰ ሺݏ௡௡ ൅ ݊௜݅௡ሻ െ ߨ݊௜ ൬ݏ௤೒௡ ൅
݃̅
ത݄
ݓෝ௜
ݓෝഥ ݏ௤೓௡൰
ൌ െ ߨܦ௜ ݑ௤೥௤೥൫݊௜ݑ௖௖ ௡ܲ,௜ െ ݑ௖൯ ൤൬݃௜ െ
ݓෝ௜݄௜
ݓෝഥ ത݄ ݃̅൰ ݑ௤೓௤೓ݑ௤೒௤೒
൅ ݑ௖ ൬ݑ௤೓௤೓ ௤ܲ೒,௜ െ
݃̅
ത݄
ݓෝ௜
ݓෝഥ ݑ௤೒௤೒ ௤ܲ೓,௜൰൨ 
(2.25)
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From equations (2.14) and (2.16) we derive the impact on parental child care: 
 
The effect on external child care follows from (2.15) and (2.17): 
 
For identical families (ݓෝ௜ ൌ ݓෝഥ, ݃௜ ൌ ݃̅, ݄௜ ൌ ത݄), we get the following results. Given a 
policy change that shifts transfers from leave payments to subsidies for external child care 
it is hardly surprising that the demand for external child care increases while the parental 
time with children at home will be reduced (see (2.26) and (2.27)). Whether the subsidy 
for external child care or the parental leave payments are more effective in fostering 
fertility depends on the elasticity of demand for external child care and parental child care 
(see (2.25)). The family policy instrument that supports the child care (external or 
parental) with the less elastic response is more effective in fostering fertility. E.g. if the 
݄݀௜
݀ߚ |ௗఊୀିగ௚ത௪ෝഥ௛ഥௗఉ ൌ
߲݄௜
߲ߚ ݀ߚ ൅
߲݄௜
߲γ ݀γ
ൌ ߨ ൬݃௜ െ ݓෝ௜݄௜ݓෝഥ ത݄ ݃̅൰ ൫ݏ௡௤೓ ൅ ݊௜݅௤೓൯ ൅ ߨ݊௜ ൬ݏ௤೒௤೓ ൅
݃̅
ത݄
ݓෝ௜
ݓෝഥ ݏ௤೓௤೓൰
ൌ െ ߨܦ௜ ቊቆ݊௜ݑ௖௖ݑ௡௡ ൅ 2ݑ௡ݑ௖௖ െ
ݑ௖ଶ
݊௜ ቇ ൤൬݃௜ െ
ݓෝ௜݄௜
ݓෝഥ ത݄ ݃̅൰ ݑ௤೒௤೒ݑ௤೥௤೥ ௤ܲ೓,௜
൅ ݑ௖ݑ௤೥௤೥ ௤ܲ೓,௜ଶ ൅
݃̅
ത݄
ݓෝ௜
ݓෝഥ ݑ௖ ቀݑ௤೒௤೒ ௤ܲ೥,௜
ଶ ൅ ݑ௤೥௤೥ ௤ܲ೒,௜ଶ ቁ൨
൅ ݃̅ത݄
ݓෝ௜
ݓෝഥ ݊௜ݑ௖ݑ௤೒௤೒ݑ௤೥௤೥൫ݑ௖௖ ௡ܲ,௜
ଶ ൅ ݑ௡௡൯ቋ 
 (2.26)
݀ ௜݃
݀ߚ |ௗఊୀିగ௚ത௪ෝഥ௛ഥௗఉ ൌ
߲݃௜
߲ߚ ݀ߚ ൅
߲݃௜
߲γ ݀γ
ൌ െߨ ൬݃௜ െ ݓෝ௜݄௜ݓෝഥ ത݄ ݃̅൰ ቀݏ௡௤೒ ൅ ݊௜݅௤೒ቁ െ ߨ݊௜ ൬ݏ௤೒௤೒ ൅
݃̅
ത݄
ݓෝ௜
ݓෝഥ ݏ௤೓௤೒൰
ൌ െ ߨܦ௜ ቊቆ݊௜ݑ௖௖ݑ௡௡ ൅ 2ݑ௡ݑ௖௖ െ
ݑ௖ଶ
݊௜ ቇ ൤൬݃௜ െ
ݓෝ௜݄௜
ݓෝഥ ത݄ ݃̅൰ ݑ௤೓௤೓ݑ௤೥௤೥ ௤ܲ೒,௜
െ ݑ௖ ൬ݑ௤೥௤೥ ௤ܲ೓,௜ଶ ൅ ݑ௤೓௤೓ ௤ܲ೥,௜ଶ ൅
݃̅
ത݄
ݓෝ௜
ݓෝഥ ݑ௤೥௤೥ ௤ܲ೒,௜
ଶ ൰൨
െ ݊௜ݑ௖ݑ௤೓௤೓ݑ௤೥௤೥൫ݑ௖௖ ௡ܲ,௜ଶ ൅ݑ௡௡൯ቋ 
 (2.27)
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demand for external child care responds less elastic to changes in the price than the 
willingness of parents to stay at home – which means the (negative) price elasticity of 
external child care is larger than the elasticity of parental child care, that is  ߝ௚ ൐ ߝ௛ 9 – 
we find that the subsidy for external child care, ߚ, sets better incentives for children than 
a parental leave payment at rate, ߛ.  In summary, a policy change of higher subsidies for 
external child care and lower leave payments increases the demand for external child care 
and the employment of secondary earners. At the same time, it can set positive incentives 
for having children if the demand for external child care is not too elastic.  
For heterogeneous families, the response to this policy change is not so clear-cut and 
depends on a family’s demand for external child care relative to average demand and the 
relative opportunity costs of staying at home, that is the relation between ௚೔௚ത  and 
௪ෝ೔௛೔
௪ෝഥ௛ഥ . The 
budget-neutral increase in the subsidy for external child care has a negative effect on 
parental child care for all secondary earners whose relative demand for external child care 
is smaller than the relative opportunity costs of staying at home, that is ௚೔௚ത ൏
௪ෝ೔௛೔
௪ෝഥ௛ഥ . Hence, 
this group’s labor supply will increase due to the policy exchange. Furthermore, the 
demand for external child care increases in all families with ௚೔௚ത ൐
௪ෝ೔௛೔
௪ෝഥ௛ഥ . For this group, the 
effect on parental child care is also likely to be negative. Combined with the result for the 
effect of the budget-neutral policy exchange on ݃௜  in (2.27), we find that the ratio of 
external to parental child care will increase for all families. Increasing the subsidy for 
external child care has thus a positive effect on secondary earner ݅’s labor supply. 
The effect of the budget-neutral policy exchange on fertility is ambiguous and depends 
next to the relation between ௚೔௚ത  and 
௪ෝ೔௛೔
௪ෝഥ௛ഥ  also on the relation between the price elasticity of 
external child care and the income weighted elasticity of parental child care, that is 
௨೜೒೜೒
௨೜೒
݃̅ and ௨೜೓೜೓௨೜೓
௪ෝഥ௛ഥ
௪ෝ೔ . The budget-neutral increase in the subsidy for external child care 
has a positive effect on fertility for all families with ௚೔௚ത ൐
௪ෝ೔௛೔
௪ෝഥ௛ഥ  whose price elasticity of 
external child care is larger than the income weighted elasticity of parental child care, that 
is ߝ௚ ൐ ௪ෝ೔௪ෝഥ ߝ௛. 
                                                 
9 This condition is equivalent to the requirement that the elasticity of marginal utility w.r.t. ݄ is larger than 
w.r.t. ݃, that is ௨೜೓೜೓௨೜೓
ത݄ ൐ ௨೜೒೜೒௨೜೒ ݃̅. 
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The differential effects on parent’s and children’s consumption are again shown in 
Appendix 2.B. 
 
Proposition 2.5: An increase in subsidies for external child care accompanied by a 
budget-neutral decrease in parental leave payments has a positive effect on the secondary 
earner’s labor supply and the demand for external child care in the case of identical 
families. Moreover, fertility increases if the price elasticity of external child care is larger 
than the elasticity of parental time with the children, that is 
௨೜೓೜೓
௨೜೓
ത݄ ൐ ௨೜೒೜೒௨೜೒ ݃̅. In the case 
of heterogeneous families, the same budget-neutral exchange leads to an increase in the 
demand for external child care for all families whose relative demand for external child 
care is larger than the relative opportunity costs of staying at home, that is ௚೔௚ത ൐
௪ෝ೔௛೔
௪ෝഥ௛ഥ . 
Parental child care decreases in all families with ௚೔௚ത ൏
௪ෝ೔௛೔
௪ෝഥ௛ഥ . 
 
 
2.4 Welfare analysis 
 
In the welfare analysis, we analyze the differential impact of an exchange of family policy 
instruments on family ݅’s utility. We dare to talk of family’s utility or welfare because the 
quality function ݍሺ݄, ݃, ݖሻ can be taken as a utility of a child nested in the parents’ utility 
function. Nevertheless, the decisions which influence the utility of the children are taken 
by the parents. In the following, we discuss in particular the redistribution effects of 
budget-neutral policy exchanges on different income groups. We assume that the 
benevolent government maximizes the household’s indirect utility function subject 
ܸሺߙ, ߚ, ߛሻ to the government’s budget constraint in (2.18). The maximization problem 
can be written as: 
maxఈ,ఉ,ఊ ܸሺߙ, ߚ, ߛሻ
ൌ ݑ ቀܿ௜ሺߙ, ߚ, ߛሻ, ݊௜ሺߙ, ߚ, ߛሻ, ݍ௜൫݄௜ሺߙ, ߚ, ߛሻ, ݃௜ሺߙ, ߚ, ߛሻ, ݖ௜ሺߙ, ߚ, ߛሻ൯ቁ
൅ ߤ ቄݐ ቂܻ ൅ ݓഥ ቀ1 െ ത݄ሺߙ, ߚ, ߛሻ ത݊ሺߙ, ߚ, ߛሻቁቃ െ ߙ ത݊ሺߙ, ߚ, ߛሻ െ ߚߨ݃̅ሺߙ, ߚ, ߛሻ ത݊
െ ߛݓෝഥ ത݄ሺߙ, ߚ, ߛሻ ത݊ሺߙ, ߚ, ߛሻቅ 
 
(2.28)
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The total derivative of ܸሺߙ, ߚ, ߛሻ is then given by: 
ܸ݀ ൌ ቊ߲ݑ߲ܿ௜
߲ܿ௜
߲ߙ ൅
߲ݑ
߲݊௜
߲݊௜
߲ߙ ൅
߲ݑ
߲ݍ௛
߲݄௜
߲ߙ ൅
߲ݑ
߲ݍ௚
߲݃௜
߲ߙ ൅
߲ݑ
߲ݍ௭
߲ݖ௜
߲ߙ
െ ߤ ቈ൫ݐݓഥ ൅ ߛݓෝഥ൯ ቆ߲ത݄߲ߙ ത݊ ൅ ത݄
߲ ത݊
߲ߙቇ ൅ ത݊ ൅ ߙ
߲ ത݊
߲ߙ ൅ ߚߨ ൬
߲݃̅
߲ߙ ത݊ ൅ ݃̅
߲ ത݊
߲ߙ൰቉ቋ ݀ߙ
൅ ቊ߲ݑ߲ܿ௜
߲ܿ௜
߲ߚ ൅
߲ݑ
߲݊௜
߲݊௜
߲ߚ ൅
߲ݑ
߲ݍ௛
߲݄௜
߲ߚ ൅
߲ݑ
߲ݍ௚
߲݃௜
߲ߚ ൅
߲ݑ
߲ݍ௭
߲ݖ௜
߲ߚ
െ ߤ ቈ൫ݐݓഥ ൅ ߛݓෝഥ൯ ቆ߲ ത݄߲ߚ ത݊ ൅ ത݄
߲ ത݊
߲ߚቇ ൅ ߙ
߲ ത݊
߲ߚ ൅ ߨ݃̅ ത݊
൅ ߚߨ ൬߲߲݃̅ߚ ത݊ ൅ ݃̅
߲ ത݊
߲ߚ൰቉ቋ ݀ߚ
൅ ቊ߲ݑ߲ܿ௜
߲ܿ௜
߲ߛ ൅
߲ݑ
߲݊௜
߲݊௜
߲ߛ ൅
߲ݑ
߲ݍ௛
߲݄௜
߲ߛ ൅
߲ݑ
߲ݍ௚
߲݃௜
߲ߛ ൅
߲ݑ
߲ݍ௭
߲ݖ௜
߲ߛ
െ ߤ ቈ൫ݐݓഥ ൅ ߛݓෝഥ൯ ቆ߲ത݄߲ߛ ത݊ ൅ ത݄
߲ ത݊
߲ߛቇ ൅ ߙ
߲ ത݊
߲ߛ ൅ ߚߨ ൬
߲݃̅
߲ߛ ത݊ ൅ ݃̅
߲ ത݊
߲ߛ൰
൅ ݓෝഥ ത݄ ത݊቉ቋ ݀ߛ 
 (2.29)
 
Using the comparative static results in (2.9) – (2.17) as well as the comparative static 
results for parental and child-specific consumption in Appendix 2.A, we can derive the 
welfare change due to policy reforms with the following mutual exchanges of policy 
instruments.  
First, we keep the parental leave rate, ߛ , constant and consider a budget neutral 
substitution of child benefits, ߙ, and subsidies for external child care, ߚ. Taking account 
of the results of the comparative statics, an increase in ߚ accompanied by a reduction in ߙ 
keeps the government’s budget constant if ݀ߙ ൌ െߨ݃̅݀ߚ: 
ܸ݀
݀ߚ |ௗఈୀିగ௚തௗఉ ൌ ߣߨሺ݃௜ െ ݃̅ሻ݊௜
൅ ߣߨ ത݊ ߤܦഥ ቊቂ൫ݐݓഥ ൅ ߛݓෝഥ൯ݑ௤೥௤೥ ௤ܲ೓തതതത ௤ܲ೒തതതത
െ ߚߨ൫ݑ௤೥௤೥ ௤ܲ೓ଶതതതത ൅ ݑ௤೓௤೓ ௤ܲ೥ଶതതതത൯ቃ ቆ ത݊ݑ௖௖ݑ௡௡ ൅ 2ݑ௡ݑ௖௖ െ
ݑ௖ଶ
ത݊ ቇ
൅ ݑ௤೓௤೓ݑ௤೥௤೥ ௤ܲ೒തതതതൣߙ ൅ ߚߨ݃̅ ൅ ത݄൫ߛݓෝഥ ൅ ݐݓഥ൯൧ ቀݑ௖௖ ௡ܲഥ െ
ݑ௖
ത݊ ቁ
െ ߚߨ ത݊ݑ௤೓௤೓ݑ௤೥௤೥൫ݑ௖௖ ௡ܲଶതതത൅ݑ௡௡൯ቋ 
(2.30)
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where the determinant of the bordered Hessian matrix for the average consumer is 
negative: ܦഥ ൏ 0 10.  
This policy exchange can lead to changes of welfare in both directions depending on the 
initial consumption of external child care, the number of children, and the size of the 
subsidy ߚ which already exists. For example, families with average or below average 
demand for external child care will be affected negatively by a further increase in the 
subsidy if the subsidy is already quite high. For those families, the subsidy is not 
important as a transfer and as net contributors to the subsidy scheme their utility falls by a 
further increase in ߚ.  
A definite improvement of welfare can be derived when looking at an introduction of a 
subsidy for external child care (the case of ߚ ൌ 0). If child benefits are already used, we 
find that complementing this instrument by subsidies increases the utility of all families 
consuming at least the average time of external child care, that is ݃௜ ൒ ݃̅, as the second 
term is positive: 
ܸ݀
݀ߚ |ௗఈୀିగ௚തௗఉ,ఉୀ଴
ൌ ߣߨሺ݃௜ െ ݃̅ሻ݊௜
൅ ߣߨ ത݊ݑ௤೥௤೥ ௤ܲ೒തതതത
ߤ
ܦഥ ቊ ௤ܲ೓തതതത൫ݐݓഥ ൅ ߛݓෝഥ൯ ቆ ത݊ݑ௖௖ݑ௡௡ ൅ 2ݑ௡ݑ௖௖ െ
ݑ௖ଶ
ത݊ ቇ
൅ ݑ௤೓௤೓ൣߙ ൅ ത݄൫ߛݓෝഥ ൅ ݐݓഥ൯൧ ቀݑ௖௖ ௡ܲഥ െ
ݑ௖
ത݊ ቁቋ 
(2.31)
 
The budget-neutral policy exchange of child benefits to a subsidy for external child care 
is therefore positive for all families consuming ݃௜ ൒ ݃̅ starting at the introduction up to a 
certain initial provision level of the subsidy. The larger the initial provision level of the 
subsidy for external child care, the smaller becomes the group of families who benefit 
from the policies exchange. 
 
 
                                                 
10 The determinant of the bordered Hessian matrix of an average individual is given by 
 ܦഥ ൌ െቀݑ௤೒௤೒ݑ௤೥௤೥ ௤ܲ೓ଶതതതത ൅ ݑ௤೓௤೓ݑ௤೥௤೥ ௤ܲ೒ଶതതതത ൅ ݑ௤೓௤೓ݑ௤೒௤೒ ௤ܲ೥ଶതതതതቁ 
ቆݑ௖௖ݑ௡௡ ൅ 2ݑ௖௖ݑ௡ത݊ െ
ݑ௖ଶ
݊ଶതതതቇ െ ݑ௤೓௤೓ݑ௤೒௤೒ݑ௤೥௤೥൫ݑ௖௖ ௡ܲ
ଶതതത ൅ ݑ௡௡൯ ൏ 0 
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Proposition 2.6: A budget-neutral increase in a subsidy for external child care 
accompanied by a decrease in child benefits leads to higher parental welfare in the case 
of identical families and for heterogeneous families consuming at least average external 
child care (݃௜ ൒ ݃̅) if the subsidy is being introduced and up to a certain initial provision 
level.  
 
Keeping ߚ constant, a budget neutral substitution of child benefits and the rate of parental 
leave payments requires ݀ߙ ൌ െݓෝഥ ത݄݀ߛ. Using our results of the comparative statics, an 
increase in ߛ accompanied by a reduction in ߙ has the following effect on the families’ 
welfare: 
ܸ݀
݀ߛ |ௗఈୀି௪ෝഥ௛ഥௗఊ ൌ ߣ൫ݓෝ௜݄௜ െ ݓෝഥ ത݄൯݊௜
൅ ߣݓෝഥ ത݊ ߤ	ܦഥ ቊቂߚߨݑ௤೥௤೥ ௤ܲ೓തതതത ௤ܲ೒തതതത
െ ൫ݐݓഥ ൅ ߛݓෝഥ൯ ቀݑ௤೒௤೒ ௤ܲ೥ଶതതതത ൅ ݑ௤೥௤೥ ௤ܲ೒ଶതതതതቁቃ ቆ ത݊ݑ௖௖ݑ௡௡ ൅ 2ݑ௡ݑ௖௖ െ
ݑ௖ଶ
ത݊ ቇ
൅ ൣߙ ൅ ߚߨ݃̅ ൅ ത݄൫ݐݓഥ ൅ ߛݓෝഥ൯൧ ݑ௤೒௤೒ݑ௤೥௤೥ ௤ܲ೓തതതത ቀݑ௖௖ ௡ܲഥ െ
ݑ௖
ത݊ ቁ
െ ൫ݐݓഥ ൅ ߛݓෝഥ൯ ത݊ݑ௤೒௤೒ݑ௤೥௤೥൫ݑ௖௖ ௡ܲଶതതത ൅ ݑ௡௡൯ቋ 
 (2.32)
 
As before, the welfare effect in general can go in either direction. The effect of higher 
parental leave payments is likely to be positive for families with secondary earners whose 
opportunity costs for parental time are above average, that is ݓෝ௜݄௜ ൐ ݓෝഥ ത݄, and if the initial 
parental leave payment rate ߛ is small. As before, we observe redistribution with respect 
to the income weighted parental child care time but in case of the parents’ welfare 
additionally with respect to the number of children due to the redistribution of income for 
family policies. The size of this effect therefore depends on the secondary earner’s net 
wage rate, her parental child care time, and the family’s number of children.  
When looking at the case of ߛ ൌ 0, we find that the size of the welfare effect depends on 
the size of the average tax payments ݐݓഥ  of secondary earners. If the average secondary 
earners’ tax payments ݐݓഥ  are small enough, the welfare effect is positive for secondary 
earners whose opportunity costs for parental time are at least at the average, that is 
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ݓෝ௜݄௜ ൒ ݓෝഥ ത݄. For those net recipients of parental leave payments, the positive effect of 
introducing the transfers is higher than the burden of tax financing the scheme. 
ܸ݀
݀ߛ |ௗఈୀି௪ෝഥ௛ഥௗఊ,ఊୀ଴
ൌ ߣ൫ݓෝ௜݄௜ െ ݓෝഥ ത݄൯݊௜
൅ ߣݓෝഥ ത݊ ߤ	ܦഥ ቊቂߚߨݑ௤೥௤೥ ௤ܲ೓തതതത ௤ܲ೒തതതത
െ ݐݓഥ ቀݑ௤೒௤೒ ௤ܲ೥ଶതതതത ൅ ݑ௤೥௤೥ ௤ܲ೒ଶതതതതቁቃ ቆ ത݊ݑ௖௖ݑ௡௡ ൅ 2ݑ௡ݑ௖௖ െ
ݑ௖ଶ
ത݊ ቇ
൅ ൫ߙ ൅ ߚߨ݃̅ ൅ ݐݓഥ ത݄൯ݑ௤೒௤೒ݑ௤೥௤೥ ௤ܲ೓തതതത ቀݑ௖௖ ௡ܲഥ െ
ݑ௖
ത݊ ቁ
െ ݐݓഥ ത݊ݑ௤೒௤೒ݑ௤೥௤೥൫ݑ௖௖ ௡ܲଶതതത ൅ ݑ௡௡൯ቋ 
(2.33)
 
For ߛ ൌ 1, we find that the size of the welfare effect depends only on the average wage 
rate of the secondary earners: 
ܸ݀
݀ߛ |ௗఈୀି௪ෝഥ௛ഥௗఊ,ఊୀଵ
ൌ ߣ൫ݓෝ௜݄௜ െ ݓෝഥ ത݄൯݊௜
൅ ߣݓෝഥ ത݊ ߤ	ܦഥ ቊቂߚߨݑ௤೥௤೥ ௤ܲ೓തതതത ௤ܲ೒തതതത െ ݓഥ ቀݑ௤೒௤೒ ௤ܲ೥ଶതതതത ൅ ݑ௤೥௤೥ ௤ܲ೒ଶതതതതቁቃ ቆ ത݊ݑ௖௖ݑ௡௡
൅ 2ݑ௡ݑ௖௖ െ ݑ௖
ଶ
ത݊ ቇ ൅ ൫ߙ ൅ ߚߨ݃̅ ൅ ݓഥ ത݄൯ݑ௤೒௤೒ݑ௤೥௤೥ ௤ܲ೓തതതത ቀݑ௖௖ ௡ܲഥ െ
ݑ௖
ത݊ ቁ
െ ݓഥ ത݊ݑ௤೒௤೒ݑ௤೥௤೥൫ݑ௖௖ ௡ܲଶതതത ൅ ݑ௡௡൯ቋ 
 (2.34)
 
The welfare effect is now positive for secondary earners whose opportunity costs for 
parental time are above average, that is ݓෝ௜݄௜ ൐ ݓෝഥ ത݄, if the average wage rate is relatively 
small.  
If ߛ equals unity, all of the foregone net wage income due to the parental child care at 
home is fully compensated by the leave payments. Hence, the implicit tax on wage 
income is maximum at this rate of ߛ. The net wage income of the household including 
leave payments according to (2.3) is then given by ሺܻ ൅ ݓሻሺ1 െ ݐሻ. This shows us that 
with increasing provision level of parental leave payments, the distortive part of taxes on 
Chapter 2: Three Family Policies to Reconcile Fertility and Labor Supply 
38 
 
wage income becomes less important and what remains is a lump-sum tax on the full 
income. The higher the full income, the less likely the welfare effect is positive.  
As described before, families with ݓෝ௜݄௜ ൐ ݓෝഥ ത݄  are net recipients of the parental leave 
payments. Nevertheless, families with ݓෝ௜ ൐ ݓෝഥ  finance the policy instruments and, 
therefore, only benefit from a budget-neutral increase in parental leave payments if the 
average secondary earners’ income is low and there is thus little redistribution with 
respect to parental leave payments.  
 
Proposition 2.7: A budget-neutral increase in parental leave payments accompanied by a 
decrease in child benefits leads to a higher parental welfare for families with ݓෝ௜݄௜ ൒ ݓෝഥ ത݄ 
from the introduction up to a certain initial provision level of leave payments if the 
average tax payments of secondary earners are sufficiently small.  
 
Keeping ߙ constant, an increase in a subsidy for child care accompanied by a decrease in 
the rate of parental leave payments is budget neutral if 	݀ߛ ൌ െ గ௚ത௪ෝഥ௛ഥ ݀ߚ. This equals a 
comparison of the two aforementioned welfare effects of the budget-neutral exchanges of 
ߙ and	ߚ as well as	ߙ and ߛ. Substituting	ߛ for ߚ has the following effect on the parents’ 
welfare: 
ܸ݀
݀ߚ |ௗఊୀିగ௚ത௪ෝഥ௛ഥௗఉ ൌ ߣߨ݊௜ ൬݃௜ െ
ݓෝ௜݄௜
ݓෝഥ ത݄ ݃̅൰
൅ ߣߨ ത݊ ߤܦഥ ቊ൤ߚߨ ൬ݑ௤೥௤೥ ௤ܲ೓
ଶതതതത ൅ ݑ௤೓௤೓ ௤ܲ೥ଶതതതത ൅
݃̅
ത݄ ݑ௤೥௤೥ ௤ܲ೓തതതത ௤ܲ೒തതതത൰
െ ൫ݐݓഥ ൅ ߛݓෝഥ൯ ൬݃̅ത݄ ݑ௤೥௤೥ ௤ܲ೒ଶതതതത൅
݃̅
ത݄ ݑ௤೒௤೒ ௤ܲ೥തതതത
൅ ݑ௤೥௤೥ ௤ܲ೓തതതത ௤ܲ೒തതതത൰൨ ቆ ത݊ݑ௖௖ݑ௡௡ ൅ 2ݑ௡ݑ௖௖ െ
ݑ௖ଶ
ത݊ ቇ
െ ݑ௤೥௤೥ ൬ݑ௤೓௤೓ ௤ܲ೒തതതത െ
݃̅
ത݄ ݑ௤೒௤೒ ௤ܲ೓തതതത൰ ൣߙ ൅ ߚߨ݃̅
൅ ത݄൫ݐݓഥ ൅ ߛݓෝഥ൯൧ ቀݑ௖௖ ௡ܲഥ െ ݑ௖ത݊ ቁ
൅ ത݊ݑ௤೥௤೥ ൤ߚߨݑ௤೓௤೓ െ
݃̅
ത݄ ൫ݐݓഥ ൅ ߛݓෝഥ൯ݑ௤೒௤೒൨ ൫ݑ௖௖ ௡ܲଶതതത ൅ ݑ௡௡൯ቋ 
(2.35)
 
The size of the welfare effect of the budget neutral increase in the subsidy for child care 
in (2.35) depends to a large extent on family ݅’s ratio of consumption of ݃௜ to ݄௜ as well 
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as on the average ratio of consumption of ݃̅ to ത݄. In general, the welfare effect can go in 
either direction. We can say more in two special cases.  
Considering the case that the subsidy for external child care is being introduced (ߚ ൌ 0),  
ܸ݀
݀ߚ |ௗఊୀିగ௚ത௪ෝഥ௛ഥௗఉ,ఉୀ଴
ൌ ߣߨ݊௜ ൬݃௜ െ ݓෝ௜݄௜ݓෝഥ ത݄ ݃̅൰
െ ߣߨ ത݊ ߤܦഥ ቊ൤൫ݐݓഥ ൅ ߛݓෝഥ൯ ൬
݃̅
ത݄ ݑ௤೥௤೥ ௤ܲ೒ଶതതതത ൅
݃̅
ത݄ ݑ௤೒௤೒ ௤ܲ೥തതതത
൅ ݑ௤೥௤೥ ௤ܲ೓തതതത ௤ܲ೒തതതത൰൨ ቆ ത݊ݑ௖௖ݑ௡௡ ൅ 2ݑ௡ݑ௖௖ െ
ݑ௖ଶ
ത݊ ቇ
൅ ݑ௤೥௤೥ ൬ݑ௤೓௤೓ ௤ܲ೒തതതത െ
݃̅
ത݄ ݑ௤೒௤೒ ௤ܲ೓തതതത൰ ൣߙ ൅ ത݄൫ݐݓഥ ൅ ߛݓෝഥ൯൧ ቀݑ௖௖ ௡ܲഥ
െ ݑ௖ത݊ ቁ ൅ ത݊
݃̅
ത݄ ൫ݐݓഥ ൅ ߛݓෝഥ൯ݑ௤೒௤೒ݑ௤೥௤೥൫ݑ௖௖ ௡ܲଶതതത ൅ ݑ௡௡൯ቋ 
(2.36)
 
we find that the welfare effect is negative for all secondary earners whose ratio of own to 
average external child care is not larger than their ratio of own to average opportunity 
costs of staying at home, that is ௚೔௚ത ൑
௪ෝ೔௛೔
௪ෝഥ௛ഥ , if the average negative price elasticity of 
external child care is smaller than the average negative elasticity of parental child care 
with respect to the opportunity costs, that is ݑ௤೓௤೓ ௤ܲ೒തതതത ൏ ௚ത௛ഥ ݑ௤೒௤೒ ௤ܲ೓തതതത  
11
. This group of 
secondary earners benefits most from high parental leave payments. Therefore, a budget-
neutral increase in the subsidy for external child care creates a welfare loss for those 
families as long as the provision level is low. For an increasing provision level, the 
welfare effect is ambiguous for families with ௚೔௚ത ൑
௪ෝ೔௛೔
௪ෝഥ௛ഥ  and likely to be positive for 
families with ௚೔௚ത ൐
௪ෝ೔௛೔
௪ෝഥ௛ഥ . 
For very high levels of parental leave payments (ߛ ൌ 1) and with ௚೔௚ത ൒
௪ෝ೔௛೔
௪ෝഥ௛ഥ  at the starting 
point of the policy change, we derive the following welfare result in (2.37). If the average 
gross wage ݓഥ  is small so that the income effect of parental leave payments is low and if 
the rate of leave payments is very high (ߛ → 1), the substitution of the high parental leave 
payments by subsidies for external child care improves the welfare if ߝ௚̅ ൏ ߝ௛̅  in the 
society holds. For those families who benefit relatively more from the subsidy for 
                                                 
11 This condition is equivalent to the requirement that the average elasticity of marginal utility w.r.t. ݄ is 
smaller than w.r.t. ݃, that is ߝ௚̅ ൏ ߝ௛̅. 
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external child care than from the parental leave payments, i.e. ௚೔௚ത ൒
௪ෝ೔௛೔
௪ෝഥ௛ഥ , the replacement 
rate of leave payments is thus too high so that an exchange towards more subsidies is 
welfare improving. 
ܸ݀
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൅ 2ݑ௡ݑ௖௖ െ ݑ௖
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ത݊ ቇ
െ ݑ௤೥௤೥ ൬ݑ௤೓௤೓ ௤ܲ೒തതതത െ
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ത݄ ݑ௤೒௤೒ ௤ܲ೓തതതത൰ ൣߙ ൅ ߚߨ݃̅ ൅ ത݄ݓഥ൧ ቀݑ௖௖ ௡ܲഥ
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(2.37)
 
 
Proposition 2.8: A budget-neutral increase in a subsidy for external child care 
accompanied by a decrease in parental leave payments leads to a decrease in parental 
welfare for families with ௚೔௚ത ൑
௪ෝ೔௛೔
௪ෝഥ௛ഥ  if the society responds more elastic to price changes of 
external child care than to changes of opportunity costs of staying at home, i.e. ߝ௚̅ ൏ ߝ௛̅, 
in case the provision level of the subsidy is low. If, on the other hand, the rate of parental 
leave payments is very high and the average gross wage income is low the same policy 
exchange can be welfare improving for families with ௚೔௚ത ൒
௪ෝ೔௛೔
௪ෝഥ௛ഥ  if ߝ௚̅ ൏ ߝ௛̅holds. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
 
Summarizing our results with respect to the absolute effects, we find that child benefits 
have a larger impact in increasing fertility and reducing labor supply for high income 
earners than low income earners. The reason is that the marginal prices of children and 
parental child care time are higher for high wage incomes so that a reduction of those 
prices by child benefits is more important for high income earners. This result contradicts 
the conventional wisdom that child benefits have more impact on low income families 
and might be driven by our assumption of additive separable utility functions. Apps and 
Rees (2004) show that child benefits might also have a negative effect on fertility as the 
income effect may be negative. In our model, we only consider the direct effects of the 
family policy instruments and child benefits therefore decrease the price for children. 
Hence, child benefits have a stronger impact on high income earners to stay home with 
the children than on low income earners, whereas the effect on the demand for external 
child care is the same. Thus, the labor supply of the high income secondary earner 
decreases by more. Fehr and Ujhelyiova (2013) analysis supports this result with respect 
to in-kind benefits (we do not differentiate between child benefits and in-kind benefits in 
our model). They analyze reform options for child benefits and family taxation in 
Germany within a static model of fertility choice and a simulation. Their simulation 
analysis indicates that higher transfers to families alone may increase birth rates but 
would come at the cost of lower female employment. An increase in in-kind benefits in 
their model also has a stronger effect on the fertility rate of the high-skilled class than that 
of the low skilled class. They show that high-skilled women therefore work significantly 
less since they have more children and the effect on their labor supply is thus stronger 
than on low-skilled women. However, their results regarding child benefits are opposite 
to ours: in this case low-skilled women benefit the most and therefore increase fertility 
and at the same time decrease labor supply by more than high-skilled women.  
Our results suggest that both a subsidy for external child care and parental leave payments 
have ambiguous effects on fertility. This result is in line with empirical findings that show 
mixed evidence about the success of the two policy parameters in fostering fertility (see 
Thévenon and Gauthier, 2011, and Luci-Greulich and Thévenon, 2013 for an overview). 
Luci-Greulich and Thévenon (2013) argue that the ambiguity of the impact of parental 
leave payments on fertility is due to the policy design: On the one hand, the policy 
instrument supports household income and labor market participation around the time of 
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childbirth, which has a positive effect on fertility. However, as entitlements are often 
conditional on employment, they encourage men and women to postpone childbirth 
(which has a negative effect on overall fertility) until they have established themselves in 
the labor market. This hypothesis is confirmed by Adsera (2004) who uses a panel of 23 
OECD nations to study how different labor market arrangements shaped the correlation 
between fertility and female labor participation rates in the countries respectively. Her 
results suggest that labor market insecurity, as measured by unemployment, has a 
significantly negative impact on fertility. She thus finds that an increase in paid leave 
duration has a positive impact on fertility rates. This result is in line with our finding that 
the impact of an increase in leave payments on fertility depends on the secondary earner’s 
wage rate and on the elasticity of demand for parental child care time. Our model, 
however, sheds a very negative light on parental leave payments as we model the 
instrument within a static framework. We therefore ignore the positive long-term effects 
of the policy instrument on the secondary earner’s labor supply via the channel of job 
market security. In our model, parental leave payments work like an implicit tax on 
continued work and therefore decrease the secondary earner’s labor 
Concerning the differential effects, we find that the family policy instrument that supports 
child care (external or parental) with the less elastic response is more effective in 
fostering fertility. Regarding the reconciliation of family and work, our results show that 
the only policy reform which can produce incentives to have more children, a higher 
demand for external child care and, at the same time, act as stimulation for more labor 
supply of parents is given by an increase in child benefits compensated by a budget-
neutral reduction of parental leave payments. This policy qualifies as a way to improve 
the conditions to combine family with work. Another finding is that a policy change that 
shifts transfers from leave payments to subsidies for external child care increases the 
demand for external child care and the employment of secondary earners. This budget-
neutral policy exchange can also set positive incentives for having children if the demand 
for external child care is not too elastic. There is also proof for those findings in the 
empirical literature. Luci-Greulich and Thévenon (2013) empirically test the impact of the 
three family policy instruments on fertility, using macro panel data from 18 OECD 
countries that spans the years 1982–2007. Their results show that paid leave, child care 
services and financial transfers have a positive influence on average, suggesting that the 
combination of these forms of support has a positive effect on the demand for children for 
working parents. However, their findings also suggest that the policy instruments do not 
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all have the same weight: cash benefits covering childhood after the year of childbirth and 
the provision of child care services for children under age three have a larger potential 
influence on fertility than leave entitlements and benefits granted around childbirth. Luci-
Greulich and Thévenon (2013) show that a mix of in-cash and in-kind support has a 
positive influence on fertility and that the development of child care services has a more 
significant impact on fertility trends at the aggregate level than policies extending leave 
entitlements. This result reflects our result that a policy change that shifts transfers from 
leave payments to child benefits or to subsidies for external child care (if the demand for 
external child care is not too elastic) increases the demand for children. Fehr and 
Ujhelyiova (2013) also find that in principle it is possible to increase birth rates and 
female employment rates simultaneously if the government invests in child care facilities 
for children of all ages.  
Our results with respect to welfare show that if child benefits are part of the family policy 
in an economy it is welfare improving to complement this by introducing subsidies to 
external child care in exchange for lower child benefits up to a certain provision level. 
This holds true in the case of identical families as well as for families with above average 
demand for external child care – the net beneficiaries. We find that it may also increase 
welfare to substitute very high levels of parental leave payments by subsidies for external 
child care. For those families who benefit relatively more from the subsidies for external 
child care than from the parental leave payment, the replacement rate of leave payments is 
too high so that an exchange towards more subsidies is welfare improving. 
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Appendix  
 
2.A: Derivation of the comparative statics results 
 
Total differentiation of the first-order conditions of individual utility maximization (2.5) - 
(2.8) yields 
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where the determinant of the bordered Hessian matrix on the left-hand side is denoted by 
ܦ௜. 
The Cramer rule yields the following derivatives: 
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where the minors of the Hessian matrix are given by:  
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ܦ଺ଷ ൌ െݑ௖௖ݑ௤೒௤೒ݑ௤೥௤೥ ௤ܲ೓,௜ ൬ݑ௡௡ ൅
ݑ௡
݊௜ ൰ ൏ 0 
ܦ଺ସ ൌ ݑ௖௖ݑ௤೓௤೓ݑ௤೥௤೥ ௤ܲ೒,௜ ൬ݑ௡௡ ൅
ݑ௡
݊௜ ൰ ൐ 0 
ܦ଺ହ ൌ െݑ௖௖ݑ௤೓௤೓ݑ௤೒௤೒ ௤ܲ೥,௜ ൬ݑ௡௡ ൅
ݑ௡
݊௜ ൰ ൏ 0 
 
From the second-order conditions for a utility maximum follows: ൬ݑ௖௖ݑ௡௡ ൅ ଶ௨೎೎௨೙௡೔ െ
௨೎మ
௡೔మ
൰ ൐ 0 and ቀݑ௡௡ ൅ ௨೙௡೔ ቁ ൏ 0.  The terms ൫݄௜ݑ௤೓௤೓ ൅ ݑ௤೓൯ ⋚ 0 and ቀ݃௜ݑ௤೒௤೒ ൅ ݑ௤೒ቁ ⋚ 0 
have an indefinite sign.  
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As abbreviations for the substitution and income effects we use the following denotation: 
	ݏ௡௖ ≡ ߣ ܦଶଵܦ௜ , 		ݏ௡௡ ≡ ߣ
ܦଶଶ
ܦ௜ , 	ݏ௡௤೓ ≡ ߣ
ܦଶଷ
ܦ௜ , 	ݏ௡௤೒ ≡ ߣ
ܦଶସ
ܦ௜ , 	ݏ௡௤೥ ≡ ߣ
ܦଶହ
ܦ௜ ,	 
ݏ௤೓௖ ≡ ߣ
ܦଷଵ
ܦ௜ , 	ݏ௤೓௡ ≡ ߣ
ܦଷଶ
ܦ௜ 	 , 	ݏ௤೓௤೓ ≡ ߣ
ܦଷଷ
ܦ௜ , 	ݏ௤೓௤೒ ≡ ߣ
ܦଷସ
ܦ௜ , 	ݏ௤೓௤೥ ≡ ߣ
ܦଷହ
ܦ௜ 	, 
ݏ௤೒௖ ≡ ߣ
ܦସଵ
ܦ௜ , 	ݏ௤೒௡ ≡ ߣ
ܦସଶ
ܦ௜ 	 , 	ݏ௤೒௤೓ ≡ ߣ
ܦସଷ
ܦ௜ , 	ݏ௤೒௤೒ ≡ ߣ
ܦସସ
ܦ௜ , 	ݏ௤೒௤೥ ≡ ߣ
ܦସହ
ܦ௜ 	, 
݅௖ ≡ ܦ଺ଵܦ௜ , 	݅௡ ≡
ܦ଺ଶ
ܦ௜ 	 , 	݅௤೓ ≡
ܦ଺ଷ
ܦ௜ , 	݅௤೒ ≡
ܦ଺ସ
ܦ௜ , 	݅௤೥ ≡
ܦ଺ହ
ܦ௜ 	. 
 
From (2.A.2) to (2.A.6) the comparative static results in (2.9) – (2.17) follow. The effects 
for parental and child-specific consumption are the following 
߲ܿ௜
߲ߙ ൌ ݏ௡௖ ൅ ݊௜݅௖ ൌ െ
1
ܦ௜ ݑ௤೓௤೓ݑ௤೒௤೒ݑ௤೥௤೥ሺ݊௜ݑ௡௡ ൅ ݑ௡ሻ ൐ 0 (2.A.7)
ݍ௭ ߲ݖ௜߲ߙ ൌ ݏ௡௤೥ ൅ ݊௜݅௤೥ ൌ െ
1
ܦ௜ ݑ௤೓௤೓ݑ௤೒௤೒ ௤ܲ೥,௜ ቆ݊௜ݑ௖௖ݑ௡௡ ൅ 2ݑ௡ݑ௖௖ െ
ݑ௖ଶ
݊௜ቇ ൐ 0 
 (2.A.8)
߲ܿ௜
߲ߚ ൌ ߨ ቀ݃௜ݏ௡௖ ൅ ݊௜ݏ௤೒௖ ൅ ݃௜݊௜݅௖ቁ
ൌ െ ߨܦ௜ ݑ௤೓௤೓ݑ௤೥௤೥ ቀ݃௜ݑ௤೒௤೒ ൅ ݑ௤೒ቁ ሺ݊௜ݑ௡௡ ൅ ݑ௡ሻ ⋛ 0 
(2.A.9)
ݍ௭ ߲ݖ௜߲ߚ ൌ ߨ ቀ݃௜ݏ௡௤೥ ൅ ݊௜ݏ௤೒௤೥ ൅ ݃௜݊௜݅௤೥ቁ
ൌ െ ߨܦ௜ ݑ௤೓௤೓ ௤ܲ೥,௜ ቀ݃௜ݑ௤೒௤೒ ൅ ݑ௤೒ቁ ቆ݊௜ݑ௖௖ݑ௡௡ ൅ 2ݑ௡ݑ௖௖ െ
ݑ௖ଶ
݊௜ ቇ ⋛ 0 
 (2.A.10)
߲ܿ௜
߲ߛ ൌ ݓෝ௜൫݄௜ݏ௡௖ െ ݊௜ݏ௤೓௖ ൅ ݄௜݊௜݅௖൯
ൌ െݓෝ௜	ܦ௜ ݑ௤೒௤೒ݑ௤೥௤೥൫݄௜ݑ௤೓௤೓ ൅ ݑ௤೓൯ሺ݊௜ݑ௡௡ ൅ ݑ௡ሻ ⋛ 0 
(2.A.11)
ݍ௭ ߲ݖ௜߲ߛ ൌ ݓෝ௜൫݄௜ݏ௡௤೥ െ ݊௜ݏ௤೓௤೥ ൅ ݄௜݊௜݅௤೥൯
ൌ െݓෝ௜	ܦ௜ ݑ௤೒௤೒ ௤ܲ೥,௜ ൫݄௜ݑ௤೓௤೓ ൅ ݑ௤೓൯ ቆ݊௜ݑ௖௖ݑ௡௡ ൅ 2ݑ௡ݑ௖௖ െ
ݑ௖ଶ
݊௜ ቇ ⋛ 0 
 (2.A.12)
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2.B: Differential effects on consumption 
 
Using the absolute comparative static effects (2.9) to (2.17), we can derive the differential 
effects on consumption generated by the following policy changes. 
For ݀ߛ ൌ 0 the budget-neutral increase in ߚ by ݀ߙ ൌ െߨ݃̅݀ߚ yields:  
݀ܿ௜|ௗఈୀିగ௚തௗఉ ൌ ߲߲ܿߚ ݀ߚ ൅
߲ܿ
߲ߙ ݀ߙ ൌ ߨ ቂሺݏ௡௖ ൅ ݊௜݅௖ሻሺ݃௜ െ ݃̅ሻ ൅ ݊௜ݏ௤೒௖ቃ
ൌ െ ߨܦ௜ ሺ݊௜ݑ௡௡ ൅ ݑ௡ሻݑ௤೓௤೓ݑ௤೥௤೥ ቂሺ݃௜ െ ݃̅ሻݑ௤೒௤೒ ൅ ݑ௤೒ቃ 
(2.B.1)
݀ݖ௜|ௗఈୀିగ௚തௗఉ ൌ ߲ݍ௭߲ߚ ݀ߚ ൅
߲ݍ௭
߲ߙ ݀ߙ ൌ ߨ ቂ൫ݏ௡௤೥ ൅ ݊௜݅௤೥൯ሺ݃௜ െ ݃̅ሻ ൅ ݊௜ݏ௤೒௤೥ቃ
ൌ 	െ ߨܦ௜ ቆ݊௜ݑ௖௖ݑ௡௡ ൅ 2ݑ௡ݑ௖௖
െ ݑ௖
ଶ
݊௜ ቇ ݑ௤೓௤೓ ௤ܲ೥,௜ ቂሺ݃௜ െ ݃̅ሻݑ௤೒௤೒ ൅ ݑ௤೒ቃ 
(2.B.2)
 
 
For ݀ߚ ൌ 0 a budget-neutral increase in ߛ by ݀ߙ ൌ െݓෝഥ ത݄݀ߛ yields: 
݀ܿ௜|ௗఈୀି௪ෝഥ௛ഥௗఊ ൌ
߲ܿ
߲γ ݀γ ൅
߲ܿ
߲ߙ ݀ߙ ൌ െ൫ݓෝഥ ത݄ െ ݓෝ௜݄௜൯ሺݏ௡௖ ൅ ݊௜݅௖ሻ െ ݓෝ௜݊௜ݏ௤೓௖
ൌ 1ܦ௜ ݑ௤೒௤೒ݑ௤೥௤೥ሺ݊௜ݑ௡௡ ൅ ݑ௡ሻൣ൫ݓෝ
ഥ ത݄ െ ݓෝ௜݄௜൯ݑ௤೓௤೓ െ ݓෝ௜ݑ௤೓൧ 
(2.B.3)
݀ݖ௜|ௗఈୀି௪ෝഥ௛ௗఊ ൌ
߲ݍ௭
߲γ ݀γ ൅
߲ݍ௭
߲ߙ ݀ߙ
ൌ െ൫ݓෝഥ ത݄ െ ݓෝ௜݄௜൯൫ݏ௡௤೥ ൅ ݊௜݅௤೥൯ െ ݓෝ௜݊௜ݏ௤೓௤೥
ൌ 1ܦ௜ ݑ௤೒௤೒ ௤ܲ೥,௜ ቆ݊௜ݑ௖௖ݑ௡௡ ൅ 2ݑ௡ݑ௖௖
െ ݑ௖
ଶ
݊௜ ቇ ൣ൫ݓෝ
ഥ ത݄ െ ݓෝ௜݄௜൯ݑ௤೓௤೓ െ ݓෝ௜ݑ௤೓൧ 
(2.B.4)
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For ݀ߙ ൌ 0 the budget-neutral increase in ߚ by ݀ߛ ൌ െ గ௚ത௪ෝഥ௛ഥ ݀ߚ  yields: 
݀ܿ௜|ௗఊୀିగ௚ത௪ෝഥ௛ഥௗఉ ൌ
߲ܿ
߲ߚ ݀ߚ ൅
߲ܿ
߲γ ݀γ
ൌ ߨ ൬݃௜ െ ݓෝ௜ݓෝഥ
݄௜
ത݄ ݃̅൰ ሺݏ௡௖ ൅ ݊௜݅௖ሻ ൅ ߨ݊௜ ൬ݏ௤೒௖ ൅
݃̅
ത݄
ݓෝ௜
ݓෝഥ ݏ௤೓௖൰
ൌ െ ߨܦ௜ ሺ݊௜ݑ௡௡ ൅ ݑ௡ሻݑ௤೥௤೥ ൤൬݃௜ െ
ݓෝ௜
ݓෝഥ
݄௜
ത݄ ݃̅൰ ݑ௤೓௤೓ݑ௤೒௤೒
൅ ݑ௖ ൬ݑ௤೓௤೓ ௤ܲ೒,௜ െ
݃̅
ത݄
ݓෝ௜
ݓෝഥ ݑ௤೒௤೒ ௤ܲ೓,௜൰൨ 
(2.B.5)
݀ݖ௜|ௗఊୀିగ௚ത௪ෝഥ௛ഥௗఉ ൌ
߲ݍ௭
߲ߚ ݀ߚ ൅
߲ݍ௭
߲γ ݀γ
ൌ ߨ ൬݃௜ െ ݓෝ௜ݓෝഥ
݄௜
ത݄ ݃̅൰ ൫ݏ௡௤೥ ൅ ݊௜݅௤೥൯ ൅ ߨ݊௜ ൬ݏ௤೒௤೥ ൅
݃̅
ത݄
ݓෝ௜
ݓෝഥ ݏ௤೓௤೥൰
ൌ െ ߨܦ௜ ቆ݊௜ݑ௖௖ݑ௡௡ ൅ 2ݑ௡ݑ௖௖
െ ݑ௖
ଶ
݊௜ ቇ ௤ܲ೥,௜ ൤൬݃௜ െ
ݓෝ௜
ݓෝഥ
݄௜
ത݄ ݃̅൰ ݑ௤೓௤೓ݑ௤೒௤೒
൅ ݑ௖ ൬ݑ௤೓௤೓ ௤ܲ೒,௜ െ
݃̅
ത݄
ݓෝ௜
ݓෝഥ ݑ௤೒௤೒ ௤ܲ೓,௜൰൨ 
 
(2.B.6)
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Chapter 3 
 
 
3 Public Provision versus Subsidization of 
Private External Child Care 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Recently, the provision of child care has received increased attention in most developed 
countries. Child care availability and affordability is a major concern for families and 
most OECD countries therefore aim to improve the provision and to reduce the price for 
child care. The main objectives of an improved availability of external child care are to 
fight family poverty by increasing mothers’ participation in the labor market and to 
enhance both child development and equality of opportunities for children. Affordable 
and good-quality child care services may improve the reconciliation of work and family 
life and therefore foster labor market participation and gender equality. Generous child 
care policies are thus mostly viewed as a key determinant of the observed cross-country 
differences in maternal labor supply and the dramatic growth of female employment over 
the last decades (e.g. Jaumotte, 2003 and Attanasio et al., 2008). 
The focus of this paper is to answer the question whether the provision of child care 
should be organized by the public or left to private forces and then be subsidized by the 
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state in order to improve the reconciliation of work and family life as well as to maximize 
welfare. Publicly provided child care in this context can either be provided by 
municipalities, churches or non-profit organizations while the carriers of privately 
provided child care include for-profit institutions, nannies, au-pairs, or babysitters. In this 
paper, we will mainly focus on the redistributive aspects of publicly provided versus 
subsidized child care. We analyze the households’ preferences for public provision and a 
subsidy on private child care and compare the effects of both child care regimes on 
fertility, usage of external child care, the secondary earner’s labor supply, and on welfare 
with respect to our baseline model without policy intervention.  
The effects of public provision of private goods have been analyzed by several authors, 
e.g. Besley and Coate, 1991, Epple and Romano, 1996, Gouveia, 1997, and Blomquist 
and Christiansen, 1995 and 1999. There is also a large theoretical and empirical literature 
on child care, female labor supply and fertility. Much of this literature has examined the 
link between child care provision, fertility, and female labor supply (e.g. Apps and Rees, 
2004, Lefebvre et al., 2009, and Haan and Wrohlich, 2011). Most papers have found 
positive effects of child care provision on both fertility and labor supply. In our model, we 
want to formally link these two strands of literature.  
Previous theoretical studies on child goods such as child care and education often 
consider parental child care time exogenously given and do not analyze the time 
allocation decisions of parents. Kimura and Yasui (2009) analyze public provision of 
private goods for children in a politico-economic model with endogenous fertility but 
they concentrate on education - which, contrary to child care, is mandatory. De la Croix 
and Doepke (2004, 2009) also focus on education and analyze the differences between 
public and private schooling regimes. De la Croix and Doepke (2004) compare the 
implications of a public and private schooling regime for economic growth and inequality 
by assessing the merits of the different education systems in a framework that accounts 
for the joint decision problem of parents regarding fertility and education. In their second 
article, they analyze why different societies make different choices regarding the mix of 
private and public schooling (De la Croix and Doepke, 2009). Besides the fact that we 
focus on the effects of child care and not education, the main difference of those models 
to our model is that we additionally consider parental care and that the cost of child care 
is therefore not only a resource cost but also a time cost. 
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Borck and Wrohlich (2011) focus on child care and analyze the preferences for public or 
private provision of child care and child goods. They show that there exists a political 
conflict between different income groups and households with a different number of or 
preference for children. Our model is closely related to the model by Borck and Wrohlich 
(2011) but we put a stronger focus on the quality of children and the household’s choice 
of parental and external child care. Additionally, we also analyze a child care regime with 
a subsidized private market. Borck (2014) studies the effect of preferences for child care 
provision, fertility, female labor supply and the gender wage gap. In this model, he also 
discusses the effects of a child care subsidy within a numerical simulation. Borck (2014) 
finds that as long as the subsidy is sufficiently high it has a positive effect both on fertility 
and on female labor supply. 
There exist also many empirical papers on both public and subsidized private child care. 
Havnes and Mogstad (2011) evaluate the long-term effect of child care on labor supply in 
Norway using a 1975 reform. They find that a large-scale expansion of subsidized child 
care had little impact on maternal employment. 12  Instead, they find that the new 
subsidized child care mostly crowds out informal care arrangements implying a 
significant net cost of the child care arrangement. This result is similar to the findings of 
Lundin et al. (2008) who analyze the effects of a Swedish child care reform in 2002 that 
set a cap on the price that municipalities were allowed to charge parents and estimate the 
effects of reductions in child care costs on female labor supply. Their estimated effects of 
child care prices on labor supply are mostly statistically insignificant, but precisely 
estimated. Lundin et al. (2008) thus conclude that in countries with a well-developed and 
highly subsidized child care system, further reductions in the price of child care only have 
small effects on mothers' labor supply.  
There are also various studies examining the effect of child care subsidies for privately 
provided child care. Viitanen (2007) estimates the impact of a voucher for private care 
within the Nordic system of universal provision of public care. He finds that the private 
daycare voucher increased the overall daycare provision in the municipalities 
participating in the experiment and had a significant, positive effect for the use of private 
daycare with zero to negligible effects on the use of public care and labor force 
participation. This result is contrary to a study by Haan and Wrohlich (2011) who 
evaluate the employment and fertility effects of policy reforms by simulating a reform of 
                                                 
12 Subsidized child care in this case refers to public and private child care institutions, eligible for subsidies 
from the government because they satisfy federal quality requirements 
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child care subsidies for working mothers in Germany. Their results suggest that 
increasing child care subsidies, conditional on employment, increases the labor supply of 
all women as well as the fertility rates of the previously childless and highly educated 
women. 
Our contribution to the existing literature is that we explicitly model the parents’ 
preferences for parental child care, publicly provided child care, and privately provided 
external child care. We also add time restrictions regarding the usage of parental and 
external child care time. Our analysis shows that increasing publicly provided child care 
financed by an increase in the income tax leads to a decrease in fertility and the secondary 
earner’s labor supply while it increases the children’s quality for secondary earners with a 
relatively low wage rate. Regarding an increase in the subsidy for external child care, on 
the other hand, our results suggest that this instrument has a positive effect on both 
fertility and the secondary earner’s labor supply. The effect on children’s quality is in this 
case positive for secondary earners with a relatively high wage rate. Building upon these 
findings, we analyze the households’ optimal choice of a child care regime depending on 
the parents’ preferences. One of our main findings is that while richer households benefit 
the most from a small subsidy for external child care, poorer households either profit from 
publicly provided child care or from a full subsidy on external child care. By offering free 
child care provided by the private market the government could therefore both foster 
fertility and the secondary earner’s labor supply as well as at the same time increase the 
households’ welfare. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 3.2 we introduce the economic setup in the 
baseline model and present the comparative static results. The two different child care 
regimes are analyzed in section 3.3. Section 3.4 presents a comparison of preferences 
over the two child care regimes including a numerical simulation of the results. Section 
3.5 concludes.  
 
 
3.2 The baseline model 
 
We use a static model of families with endogenous fertility and labor supply of a 
secondary earner. For simplicity, we divide the life cycle of each person into two phases 
of the same duration. During the first phase, a person entirely depends on parental 
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support, while in the second, the adult person allocates his or her time between working 
and thus contributing to family income and raising children. We consider an economy 
with a large number of households with identical preferences over consumption, the 
number of children and the children’s quality. The population size is normalized to unity. 
A household ݅ derives utility from own consumption, ܿ௜, their number of children, ݊௜, and 
their children’s quality, ݍ௜. The household's preferences are represented by the following 
utility function 
 
௜ܷ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߛሻ ln ܿ௜ ൅ ߛlnሺ݊௜ݍ௜ሻ (3.1)
 
where ߛ ∈ ሼ0,1ሽ captures the relative weight given to their children and ݅ ∈ ሼ1,… ,ܰሽ. 
Note that households care about both child quantity and child quality. Households are 
differentiated on the basis of the secondary earner’s lifetime average wage rate ݓ௜. This is 
the only source of heterogeneity in the model. The primary earner’s income is thus 
assumed to be identical across households. We assume that wages across households are 
distributed according to the cumulative distribution function ܨሺ൉ሻ with finite mean. It is 
assumed that the support of ܨሺ൉ሻ  is Թା  and that ܨሺ൉ሻ  is strictly increasing and twice 
continuously differentiable. Additionally, we assume the mean and variance of the wage 
rate to be finite and median income to be less than the mean income.  
Based on the human capital function of de la Croix and Doepke (2004), the child’s quality 
in our model increases in child specific consumption, ݖ௜ , parental time spend with the 
child, ݄௜ , and external child care, ݏ௜ , bought on the market. The child’s quality is 
represented by the following quasi-concave production function 
  
ݍ௜ ൌ ߠݖ௜ఎሺ1 ൅ ݄௜ሻఘሺ1 ൅ ݏ௜ሻሺଵିఘሻ (3.2)
 
with ߠ ൐ 0 , 	ߟ ∈ ሼ0,1ሽ , and ߩ ∈ ሼ0,1ሽ . The parameters ߟ  and ߩ  represent the parents’ 
preferences for child-specific consumption and parental child care, respectively. This 
quality technology thus assumes diminishing returns to both child-specific consumption 
and parental child care time, but constant returns to scale in parental and external child 
care time. The terms ሺ1 ൅ ݄௜ሻ  and ሺ1 ൅ ݏ௜ሻ  guarantee that the child’s quality remains 
positive even if parents do not care for their child themselves or do not demand external 
child care. We thus do allow for corner solutions with respect to child care but not with 
respect to child-specific consumption.  
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Parents can care for their children themselves or buy external child care on the market. 
The preference parameter for child care time, ߩ, may also be interpreted as to capture 
cultural differences in the attitude towards parental and external child care. The secondary 
earner allocates her time to working which yields wage at the rate ݓ௜ and to leisure time. 
We assume that child rearing is the only domestic time requiring parental time so that she 
spends her leisure time completely with the children. Through the endogeneity of ݊௜, the 
secondary earner’s labor supply is also endogenous. If she has ݊௜ children her parental 
time equals ݄௜݊௜. The rest of the secondary earner’s total time is working time and given 
by ܮ௜ ൌ 1 െ ݄௜݊௜, her gross income therefore equals ݓ௜ܮ௜. Households carrying a larger 
wage rate ݓ௜ thus have higher opportunity costs of raising children. The primary earner 
allocates all her time to working and her gross salary is ܻ. 
Thus, the household’s budget constraint is given by 
ܻ ൅ ݓ௜ܮ௜ ൌ ܿ௜ ൅ ܤݖ௜݊௜ ൅ ߨݏ௜݊௜ (3.3)
 
where ܤ and ߨ are the market prices for child specific consumption goods and external 
child care respectively. 
The parents choose consumption, ܿ௜ , the number of children, ݊௜ , child-specific 
consumption, ݖ௜, the secondary earner’s time spent with a child, ݄௜, and the amount of 
bought-in child care, ݏ௜, so as to maximize their utility, ௜ܷሺܿ௜, ݊௜, ݍ௜ሻ, by taking account of 
the child’s quality production and their budget constraint.  
The household decision problem is given by: 
max௖೔,௡೔,௤೔ ௜ܷ൫ܿ௜, ݊௜, ݍ௜ሺݖ௜, ݄௜, ݏ௜ሻ൯ ݏ. ݐ. (3.3) (3.4)
 
The solution to the household decision problem in (3.4) can either be interior, or at a 
corner where the household chooses either not to work and not to demand external child 
care or to work fulltime and to demand the maximum amount of private external child 
care. For households choosing an interior solution of parental and external child care 
time, the first-order conditions imply 
݊௜∗ ൌ ߛߟ
ሺܻ ൅ ݓ௜ሻ
௡ܲ,௜
 (3.5)
݄௜∗ ൌ ߩ ௡ܲ,௜ െ ߟݓ௜ߟݓ௜  (3.6)
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ݏ௜∗ ൌ
ሺ1 െ ߩሻ ௡ܲ,௜ െ ߟߨ
ߟߨ  (3.7)
ݖ௜∗ ൌ ௡ܲ,௜ܤ  (3.8)
ݍ௜∗ ൌ ߠ
ሺ1 െ ߩሻ ௡ܲ,௜
ߟߨ ൬
௡ܲ,௜
ܤ ൰
ఎ
൬ ߩߨሺ1 െ ߩሻݓ௜൰
ఘ
 (3.9)
 
with ௡ܲ,௜ as the price for child care, ௡ܲ,௜ ൌ ݓ௜ ൅ ߨ. The price for child care increases in 
both the price for external child care and the secondary earner’s wage rate. Note that the 
second-order conditions for a maximum are satisfied.  
The effect of the secondary earner’s wage rate on fertility in (3.5) is ambiguous and 
depends on the ratio of the price for external child care to the primary earner’s income. 
Assuming that the primary earner’s income is sufficient for financing external child care, 
that is ܻ ൐ ߨ, an increase in the wage rate of the secondary earner has a negative effect on 
fertility. The lowest and highest possible fertility rates are then given by lim௪೔→ஶ ݊௜∗ ൌ ߛߟ 
and lim௪೔→଴ ݊௜∗ ൌ ఊఎ௒గ . In this case, we can depict the relationship between fertility and the 
secondary earner’s wage rate as shown in Figure 3.1.  
 
Figure 3.1: The relationship between fertility and the secondary earner’s wage rate 
 
For households whose primary earner cannot afford external child care, that is ܻ ൏ ߨ, an 
increase in the secondary earner’s income leads to an increase in fertility. This is also the 
effect we would observe for single parent families.   
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Note that the demand for external child care in (3.7) increases while parental time in (3.6) 
decreases in the secondary earner’s wage rate ݓ௜. Depending on the size of ߩ and ߟ and 
assuming ߟ ൐ ߩ, parents might decide for a corner solution of caring solely alone for their 
children or consuming the maximum amount of external child care. For households with a 
relatively high preference for parental child care, there is a threshold wage rate, ݓෝ௟௦ , 
below which secondary earners choose a corner solution of not buying external child care, 
ݏ௜∗ ൌ 0. For households with a relatively small preference for parental child care, there is 
a threshold wage rate, ݓෝ௨௛, above which secondary earners choose not to stay at home 
with the children such that ݄௜∗ ൌ 0. We additionally assume that the maximum demand for 
external child care time is one. Parents cannot buy more than one unit of external child 
care time per child. There is thus also a threshold wage rate, ݓෝ௨௦, above which households 
cannot consume more external child care. We also assume that the demand for parental 
child care time is at maximum either ଵ௡೔ if the family has more than one child or one in all 
other cases. The secondary earner’s labor supply cannot be negative such that ݄௜݊௜ ൑ 1 
must hold true. Even though parents do not consume external child care below the 
threshold wage rate of ݓෝ௟௦, they can still increase their number of children in our model. 
With an increasing fertility, the average maximum time the secondary earner can spend 
with each child decreases. Parental child care might therefore increase in the secondary 
earner’s wage rate for households with a wage rate below ݓෝ௟௛.13  
The wage rate thresholds are: 
ݓෝ௟௦ ൌ
ሺߟ ൅ ߩ െ 1ሻߨ
1 െ ߩ  (3.10)
ݓෝ௨௦ ൌ ሺ2ߟ ൅ ߩ െ 1ሻߨ1 െ ߩ  (3.11)
ݓෝ௟௛ ൌ ߩߨ2ߟ െ ߩ (3.12)
ݓෝ௨௛ ൌ ߩߨߟ െ ߩ (3.13)
 
Using the results described above, we can depict the relationship between the demand for 
both parental and external child care and the secondary earner’s wage rate as shown in 
Figure 3.2.  
                                                 
13 See Appendix 3.A for a detailed function of parental and external child care time. 
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Figure 3.2: The relationship between the demand for parental and external child care and the secondary    
earner’s wage rate 
 
These relationships are consistent with the well-known evidence: high income households 
choose relatively low parental child care times with relatively high investments in 
external child care while low income households spend more time at home with their 
children. Note that we do not make an assumption on total child care time. Parental and 
external child care time can therefore be in sum smaller or larger than one.   
Child specific consumption in (3.8) increases in the wage rate of the secondary earner. 
Due to the substitution effect, it also increases in the price for external child care. Having 
introduced the wage thresholds, our results show that the child’s quality in (3.9) increases 
in the secondary earner’s wage rate for all households. 
The indirect utility function associated with the maximization problem is V௜ሺݓ௜ሻ. Due to 
the additional time restrictions on parental and external child care time, the indirect utility 
function increases in the secondary earner’s wage rate. 
 
 
3.3 Child care regimes 
 
Having introduced the baseline model, we now compare the effects of two different child 
care regimes financed by a proportional income tax: a public provision of external child 
care and a subsidization of external child care offered by the private market. 
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3.3.1 Publicly provided child care 
 
At first, we analyze the effects of publicly provided external child care financed by an 
income tax. This setup mimics the system in the Scandinavian countries with universal 
public child care. The quality level of household ݅’s children can in this case be obtained 
through child specific consumption, ݖ௜, own parental time, ݄௜, private purchase of external 
child care, ݏ௜ , and governmental provision of external child care, ݃ , with ݃ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ . 
Following Borck and Wrohlich (2011), we assume that all children receive the same 
quantity of public child care in this economy at no additional cost and that there is no 
possibility to opt out. On the other hand, households are allowed to supplement the 
publicly provided quantity, and the quantity of private purchase may differ across 
households. It should be noted that the fact that the quantity of public child care is 
common to all children does not mean that all households receive the same quantity of 
public services, because the number of children may differ across households. Household 
݅'s quality level for each child, ݍ௜, is given by the following domestic production function:  
ݍ௜ ൌ ߠݖ௜ఎሺ1 ൅ ݄௜ሻఘሺ1 ൅ ݏ௜ ൅ ݃ሻሺଵିఘሻ (3.14)
 
Based on the result of Blau and Currie (2008), we assume that privately and publicly 
provided child care have the same effect on the child’s quality and that parents thus only 
differentiate between their preference for parental and external child care. 14  Public 
provision of external child care is financed by a proportional income tax ݐ with ݐ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ. 
The household’s budget constraint is therefore given by: 
ሺܻ ൅ ݓ௜ܮ௜ሻሺ1 െ ݐሻ ൌ ܿ௜ ൅ ܤݖ௜݊௜ ൅ ߨݏ௜݊௜ (3.15)
 
Following Kimura and Yasui (2009), we assume that the technology for converting 
expenditures into quantity of service is the same as that in the private sector. The 
government's budget constraint is given by 
ݐ൛ܻ ൅ ׬ ሾ1 െ ݄ሺݓሻ݊ሺݓሻሿݓ	݀ܨሺݓሻஶ଴ ൟ ൌ ߨ݃ ׬ ݊ሺݓሻ݀ܨሺݓሻ
ஶ
଴   (3.16)
 
where ݊ሺݓሻ denotes the number of children and ݄ሺݓሻ the parental time spent with the 
children of a household with wage ݓ . For simplification we denote ത݊  as the average 
number of children, ׬ ݊ሺݓሻdܨሺݓሻஶ଴ , and ഥ݉  as the average labor income of a family in 
                                                 
14 Blau and Currie (2008) conclude in their analysis on the provision of high-quality early childhood 
education that neither public nor private care is of uniformly higher quality than the other. We thus model 
public and private external child care as perfect substitutes. 
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the population, ܻ ൅ ׬ ሾ1 െ ݄ሺݓሻ݊ሺݓሻሿݓ	݀ܨሺݓሻஶ଴ , of a household with an average wage 
rate ݓഥ . The government’s budget constraint in (3.16) can thus be written as ݐ ഥ݉ ൌ ത݊ߨ݃.  
As in the baseline model, the solution to the household decision problem can either be 
interior, or at a corner where the household chooses either not to work and not to demand 
external child care or to work fulltime and to demand the maximum amount of private 
external child care. For households choosing an interior solution of parental and external 
child care time, the first-order conditions imply 
݊௜,௚∗ ൌ ߛߟ
ሺܻ ൅ ݓ௜ሻሺ1 െ ݐሻ
௡ܲ,௜,௚
 (3.17)
݄௜,௚∗ ൌ
ߩ ௡ܲ,௜,௚ െ ߟݓ௜ሺ1 െ ݐሻ
ߟݓ௜ሺ1 െ ݐሻ  (3.18)
ݏ௜,௚∗ ൌ
ሺ1 െ ߩሻ ௡ܲ,௜,௚ െ ߟሺ1 ൅ ݃ሻߨ
ߟߨ  (3.19)
ݖ௜,௚∗ ൌ ௡ܲ,௜,௚ܤ  (3.20) 
ݍ௜,௚∗ ൌ 	
ߠሺ1 െ ߩሻ ௡ܲ,௜,௚
ߟߨ ൬
௡ܲ,௜,௚
ܤ ൰
ఎ
൬ ߩߨሺ1 െ ߩሻݓ௜ሺ1 െ ݐሻ൰
ఘ
 (3.21)
	
with ௡ܲ,௜,௚ being the price for child care, ௡ܲ,௜,௚ ൌ ݓ௜ሺ1 െ ݐሻ ൅ ሺ1 ൅ ݃ሻߨ. An increase in 
publicly provided child care thus increases the price for child care as it effectively 
increases the price for private external child care for parents.  
The effect of secondary earner ݅’s wage rate on fertility in (3.17) is ambiguous. While an 
increase in the secondary earner’s wage rate for families whose primary earner’s income 
is relatively low, that is ሾܻሺ1 െ ݐሻ ൏ ሺ1 ൅ ݃ሻߨሿ, has a positive effect on fertility, families 
whose primary earner’s income is relatively high, that is ሾܻሺ1 െ ݐሻ ൐ ሺ1 ൅ ݃ሻߨሿ, will 
decrease their demand for children. Assuming ሾܻሺ1 െ ݐሻ ൐ ሺ1 ൅ ݃ሻߨሿ, the lowest and 
highest possible fertility rates are given by lim௪೔→ஶ ݊௜,௚∗ ൌ ߛߟ  and lim௪೔→଴ ݊௜,௚∗ ൌ
ఊఎ௒ሺଵି௧ሻ
ሺଵା௚ሻగ . Comparing these results with our results of the baseline model in Figure 3.1, we 
find that the highest possible fertility rate decreases in the tax rate while the lowest 
possible fertility rate stays constant. An increase in publicly provided child care 
effectively increases the price for private external child care and therefore has a negative 
effect on the parents’ demand for children. Supporting this result, we find that regarding 
Chapter 3: Public Provision versus Subsidization of Private External Child Care 
61 
 
the tax rate, an increase in publicly provided child care financed by an increasing in the 
income tax leads to a decrease in fertility for all families.  
Our results for households choosing an interior solution suggest that an increase in 
publicly provided child care financed by an increase in the income tax rate leads to an 
increase in parental time in (3.18) and a decrease in the demand for external child care in 
(3.19). Due to redistribution via the income tax, the negative effect on the demand for 
private external child care increases in the secondary earner’s wage rate. The positive 
effect on parental child care, on the other hand, decreases in the secondary earner’s wage 
rate. In this framework, an increase in publicly provided child care thus crowds out 
privately provided child care and at the same time does not have a positive effect on the 
secondary earner’s labor supply due to the strong income effect. 
As in the baseline model, there is a threshold wage rate, ݓෝ௚,௟௦ , below which secondary 
earners choose a corner solution of not buying external child care, ݏ௜,௚∗ ൌ 0  and a 
threshold wage rate, ݓෝ௚,௨௛ , above which secondary earners choose not to stay at home with 
the children such that ݄௜,௚∗ ൌ 0. There is also a threshold wage rate,	ݓෝ௚,௨௦ , above which 
households cannot consume more external child care and a threshold wage rate, ݓෝ௚,௟௛ , 
below which secondary earners cannot further decrease their labor supply. In case of 
publicly provided child care, the maximum demand for external child care time is ሺ1 െ
݃ሻ.  
The wage rate thresholds are: 
ݓෝ௚,௟௦ ൌ
ሺߟ ൅ ߩ െ 1ሻሺ1 ൅ ݃ሻߨ
ሺ1 െ ߩሻሺ1 െ ݐሻ  (3.22)
ݓෝ௚,௨௦ ൌ 2ߟߨ െ ሺ1 െ ߩሻሺ1 ൅ ݃ሻߨሺ1 െ ߩሻሺ1 െ ݐሻ  (3.23)
ݓෝ௚,௟௛ ൌ ߩ
ሺ1 ൅ ݃ሻߨ
ሺ2ߟ െ ߩሻሺ1 െ ݐሻ (3.24)
ݓෝ௚,௨௛ ൌ ߩሺ1 ൅ ݃ሻߨሺߟ െ ߩሻሺ1 െ ݐሻ (3.25)
 
The thresholds in (3.22), (3.24), and (3.25) are larger than in the baseline model for all 
families. They exceed the levels of ݓෝ௟௦, ݓෝ௟௛  and ݓෝ௨௛  by ቀଵା௚ଵି௧ቁ respectively (compare to 
Figure 3.2). Only ݓෝ௚,௨௦  in (3.23) is smaller than ݓෝ௨௦ . Fewer households will buy 
supplementary private external child care if the government offers publicly provided child 
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care. At the same time also fewer households will abstain from parental time. An increase 
in publicly provided external child care thus has a negative effect on the secondary 
earner’s labor supply. These differences in the threshold wages increase in the income tax 
rate and therefore in the amount of publicly provided child care.  
The effect of an increase in the income tax rate on child specific consumption in (3.20) is 
positive. Increasing publicly provided child care by increasing the income tax rate also 
has a positive effect on the child’s quality in (3.21) for all families whose secondary 
earner’s wage rate is smaller than the ratio of average household income to average 
number of children, that is ݓ௜ ൏ ௠ഥ௡ത . These households benefit from redistribution vie the 
income tax. In this case the positive effects on parental child care and child-specific 
consumption dominate the negative effect on the demand for private external child care. 
For secondary earners with a higher wage rate the effect is ambiguous but also likely to 
be positive.15  
 
Proposition 3.1: Increasing publicly provided child care leads to a decrease in both 
fertility and the secondary earner’s labor supply. At the same time, a family is likely to 
invest more in the quality of their children. We thus observe a quantity-quality trade-off 
with respect to public child care.  
 
 
3.3.2 Subsidy on external child care 
 
In the following, we analyze the effects of a subsidization of external child care offered 
by the private market. We assume that there is no publicly provided child care available 
and households have to buy external child care on the private market. This setup mimics 
the system in the United States. If the government subsidizes privately provided external 
child care by ߚ, parents face the following budget constraint: 
ሺܻ ൅ ݓ௜ܮ௜ሻሺ1 െ ߬ሻ ൌ ܿ௜ ൅ ܤݏ௜݊௜ ൅ ߨሺ1 െ ߚሻݏ௜݊௜ (3.26)
 
The subsidy for external child care is financed by the proportional income tax ߬ with 
߬ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ. The government's budget constraint is then given by: 
                                                 
15 The effect of an increase in the tax rate on the child’s quality is positive as long as ൣሺ1 ൅ ߟሻሺ ഥ݉ െ
ത݊ݓ௜ሻሺ1 െ ݐሻ ൅ ߩ ത݊ ௡ܲ,௜,௚൧ ൐ 0 holds. 
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߬ൣܻ ൅ ׬ ሺ1 െ ݄ሺݓሻ݊ሺݓሻሻݓ	݀ܨሺݓሻஶ଴ ൧ ൌ ߚߨ ׬ ݏሺݓሻ݊ሺݓሻ݀ܨሺݓሻ
ஶ
଴   (3.27)
 
Using the same notation as in 3.3.1, the government’s budget constraint in (3.27) can be 
written as ߚ ത݊̅ݏߨ ൌ ߬ ഥ݉ , where ̅ݏ denotes the average time children spend in external child 
care. This implies that ത݊̅ݏߨ ൒ ߬ ഥ݉  holds. For a tax rate ߬ ൌ ௡ത௦̅గ௠ഥ  the subsidy ߚ is equal to 
one and external child care is offered for free to the households.  
As before, the solution to the household decision problem can either be interior, or at a 
corner where the household chooses either not to work and not to demand external child 
care or to work fulltime and to demand the maximum amount of private external child 
care. For households choosing an interior solution of parental and external child care 
time, the first-order conditions imply 
݊௜,ఉ∗ ൌ ߛߟ
ሺܻ ൅ ݓ௜ሻሺ1 െ ߬ሻ
௡ܲ,௜,ఉ
 (3.28)
݄௜,ఉ∗ ൌ
ߩ ௡ܲ,௜,ఉ െ ߟݓ௜ሺ1 െ ߬ሻ
ߟݓ௜ሺ1 െ ߬ሻ  (3.29)
ݏ௜,ఉ∗ ൌ
ሺ1 െ ߩሻ ௡ܲ,௜,ఉ െ ߟߨሺ1 െ ߚሻ
ߟߨሺ1 െ ߚሻ  (3.30)
ݖ௜,ఉ∗ ൌ ௡ܲ,௜,ఉܤ  (3.31)
ݍ௜,ఉ∗ ൌ ߠ
ሺ1 െ ߩሻ ௡ܲ,௜,ఉ
ߟߨሺ1 െ ߚሻ ൬
௡ܲ,௜,ఉ
ܤ ൰
ఎ
ቆ ߩߨሺ1 െ ߚሻሺ1 െ ߩሻݓ௜ሺ1 െ ߬ሻቇ
ఘ
 (3.32)
 
with ௡ܲ,௜,ఉ  being the price for child care in case of a subsidy for external child care, 
௡ܲ,௜,ఉ ൌ ݓ௜ሺ1 െ ߬ሻ ൅ ߨሺ1 െ ߚሻ. An increase in the subsidy thus decreases the parent’s 
costs for external child care and therefore the price for child care, ௡ܲ,௜,ఉ.  
Fertility in (3.28) decreases in the secondary earner’s wage rate for all families with 
ሾܻሺ1 െ ߬ሻ ൐ ߨሺ1 െ ߚሻሿ . The lowest and highest possible fertility rates are given by 
lim௪೔→ஶ ݊௜,ఉ∗ ൌ ߛߟ  and lim௪೔→଴ ݊௜,ఉ∗ ൌ ఊఎ௒ሺଵିఛሻగሺଵିఉሻ . The highest possible fertility rate thus 
increases in the subsidy for external child care. Households can afford more external child 
care and thus also more children. Regarding an increase in the income tax rate, we 
therefore observe an increase in fertility for all families. Hence, an increase in the subsidy 
for external child care leads to an increase in family ݅’s quantity of children (compare to 
Figure 3.1).  
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For households choosing an interior solution, we find that an increase in both the wage 
rate of the secondary earner and in the subsidy for external child care financed by an 
increase in the income tax rate lead to a decrease in parental time in (3.29) and an 
increase in the demand for privately provided external child care in (3.30). Increasing the 
subsidy for external child care thus has a positive effect on the secondary earner’s labor 
supply. These positive effects on labor supply and the demand for external child care 
increase in the secondary earner’s wage rate. 
As in the baseline model, there is a threshold wage rate, ݓෝఉ,௟௦ , below which secondary 
earners choose a corner solution of not buying external child care, ݏ௜∗ ൌ 0, and a threshold 
wage rate, ݓෝఉ,௨௛ , above which parents decide not to stay at home, ݄௜∗ ൌ 0. There is also a 
threshold wage rate,	ݓෝఉ,௨௦ , above which households cannot consume more external child 
care and a threshold wage rate, ݓෝఉ,௟௛ , below which secondary earners cannot further 
decrease their labor supply.  
The wage rate thresholds are: 
ݓෝఉ,௟௦ ൌ
ሺߟ ൅ ߩ െ 1ሻߨሺ1 െ ߚሻ
ሺ1 െ ߩሻሺ1 െ ߬ሻ  (3.33)
ݓෝఉ,௨௦ ൌ
ሺ2ߟ ൅ ߩ െ 1ሻߨሺ1 െ ߚሻ
ሺ1 െ ߩሻሺ1 െ ߬ሻ  (3.34)
ݓෝఉ,௟௛ ൌ
ߩߨሺ1 െ ߚሻ
ሺ2ߟ െ ߩሻሺ1 െ ߬ሻ (3.35)
ݓෝఉ,௨௛ ൌ
ߩߨሺ1 െ ߚሻ
ሺߟ െ ߩሻሺ1 െ ߬ሻ (3.36)
 
All wage thresholds are smaller than in the baseline model and thus also smaller than in 
the child care regime with publicly provided child care for all secondary earners (compare 
to Figure 3.2). More households will buy supplementary private external child care if the 
government subsidizes external child care. At the same time, more households will 
abstain from parental time.  
Regarding child specific consumption in (3.31), an increase in the wage rate has a 
positive effect while an increase in the tax rate has a negative effect. Hence, households 
invest less in child-specific consumption in case of an increase in the subsidy for external 
child care. Concerning the child’s quality in (3.32) we cannot determine which of the 
effects dominates: the negative effects with respect to parental time and child-specific 
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consumption or the positive effect on the demand for external child care. The effect 
depends on the household’s preferences and is thus ambiguous.  
 
Proposition 3.2: Increasing the subsidy for external child care leads to an increase in 
both fertility and the secondary earner’s labor supply. At the same time, family ݅ may 
invest less in the quality of their child. 
 
 
3.4 Comparison of preferences over child care regimes 
 
In this section, we compare households’ preferences for the two child care regimes. We 
make the realistic assumption that the income distribution is skewed to the right and mean 
income thus exceeds median income. Assuming that median household income is below 
average household income implies that the median voter is effectively subsidized by both 
public provision of child care and by a subsidy for external child care. As the "tax price" 
under both child care regimes for the median income household is less than one, the 
chosen funding levels will be positive. 
 
3.4.1 Preferences over child care regimes 
 
Comparing the indirect utility levels of a household in a purely private child care regime 
to the case of publicly provided child care, allows us to determine the critical wage rate, 
ݓෝ௚, for households who benefit from publicly provided child care and who do not. A 
household with a wage rate of the secondary earner ݓ௜ choses public child care if and 
only if  
V௜,௚ሺݓ௜, ݐሻ ൒ V௜ሺݓ௜ሻ  (3.37)
 
where V௜,௚ሺݓ௜, ݐሻ is the indirect utility function associated with the maximization problem 
in section 3.2.1. The resulting critical value, ݓෝ௚ , separates the households who would 
choose publicly provided child care (those with a wage rate at or below ݓෝ௚) from the 
households who would choose a purely private child care regime (those with a wage rate 
above ݓෝ௚).  
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Comparing the indirect utility levels of a household in a purely private child care regime 
and in the case of a subsidy for external child care financed by the income tax, allows us 
to determine the critical wage rate, ݓෝఉ, for households who benefit from the subsidy and 
who do not. A household with a wage rate of the secondary earner ݓ௜ choses a subsidy for 
external child care if and only if  
V௜,ఉሺݓ௜, ߬ሻ ൒ V௜ሺݓ௜ሻ (3.38)
 
where V௜,ఉሺݓ௜, ߬ሻ is the indirect utility function associated with the maximization problem 
in section 3.2.2. The resulting critical value, ݓෝఉ , separates the households who would 
choose the subsidy from the households who would choose a purely private child care 
regime. In this case the relationship between the wage rate and the preference for a 
subsidy is not as straightforward. Low income households do not consume external child 
care (compare to Figure 3.2) and would therefore vote against a subsidy. Starting from the 
threshold wage rate, ݓෝఉ,௟௦ , above which secondary earners choose to buy external child 
care, households can be differentiated between two groups:  one group of households 
which benefits from the subsidy via redistribution and another group which would not 
vote for a subsidy.  
To analyze how preferences for child care provision change with the secondary earner’s 
wage rate, we follow Epple and Romano (1996a) and look at the households’ indifference 
curves in both the ሺݐ, ݃ሻ space and the ሺ߬, ߚሻ space for some (indirect) utility level തܸ : 
ܯ௜,௚ሺݓ௜, ݐ, ݃ሻ ൌ ݀ݐ݀݃ |௏ഥ ൌ െ
݀ ௜ܸ,௚
݀݃
݀ ௜ܸ,௚
݀ݐ
 (3.39)
ܯ௜,ఉሺݓ௜, ߬, ߚሻ ൌ ݀߬݀ߚ |௏ഥ ൌ െ
݀ ௜ܸ,ఉ
݀ߚ
݀ ௜ܸ,ఉ
݀߬
 (3.40)
 
The slope of the indifference curves in (3.39) and (3.40) is positive. Due to the time 
restrictions on parental and external child care time, household preferences can in both 
cases not be ordered by household income. The households’ indifference curves can thus 
cross more than once and an equilibrium may not exist. If we only considered interior 
solutions (that is without the time restrictions for corner solutions of parental and external 
child care time) household preferences could be ordered by household income and the 
slope of the indifference curves would decrease (increase) in the secondary earner’s wage 
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rate for a child care regime with a public provision of (a subsidy on) external child care. 
The optimal tax rate would in this case equal the optimal tax rate of the median voter and 
our results would be closely linked to Borck and Wrohlich (2011). With the time 
restrictions, however, the median voter theorem does not hold. 
In the case of publicly provided child care in (3.39), the slope of the indifference curves 
in the ሺݐ, ݃ሻ space increases with the secondary earner’s wage rate for low income earners 
and decreases for high income earners. Only low income earners benefit from publicly 
provided child care as rich households would choose to opt out and buy privately 
provided child care on the market. 
 
Figure 3.3: Indirect utility of a typical household dependent on the income tax 
 
Figure 3.3 shows the indirect utility as a function of the tax rate for a household with a 
wage rate below ݓෝ௚ . This presents the household’s preferences over taxes to finance 
publicly provided child care. The larger the household’s wage rate, the more the peak of 
the curve shifts to the left and for all households with a wage rate above ݓෝ௚ the optimal 
tax rate would be 0.    
In case of a subsidy for external child care in (3.40), on the other hand, the slope of the 
indifference curves in the ሺ߬, ߚሻ space decreases with the secondary earner’s wage rate for 
both low and high income earners and increases for medium income earners.  
This depicts the "ends against the middle" result of Epple and Romano (1996a): the 
middle class who wants high spending levels is opposed by the rich and poor who want 
low spending levels. Intuitively, this could occur for the following reason: A households’ 
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choice of tax rate depends on whether, at a particular tax rate, the household demands 
external child care or not and on the households’ fertility. Low income households are 
likely to have a higher number of children and therefore they profit more by the 
redistributive nature of the tax. However, households with a low income will not demand 
external child care and thus do not benefit from the subsidy. High income families, on the 
other hand, have a higher demand for external child care but they have a lower number of 
children and do not benefit from the redistribution via the tax rate. The middle class is the 
only group who benefits from both the redistribution via the number of children and the 
usage of external child care. 
 
Figure 3.4: Indirect utility of a typical household dependent on the income tax 
 
Nevertheless, if the preference parameter for parental child care, ߩ, is relatively large, all 
households benefit the most from a full subsidy on external child care and would choose 
ߚ ൌ 1 . In this case there is thus a unique equilibrium. Figure 3.4 shows a typical 
household’s indirect utility as a function of the tax rate and presents the household’s 
preferences over taxes for a child care subsidy. The optimal tax rate in a child care regime 
with a subsidy on external child care is therefore given by 
߬∗ ൌ ത݊̅ݏߨഥ݉  (3.41)
 
With decreasing ߩ , the average demand for external child care increases and less 
households benefit from the redistributive nature of the child care regime with a subsidy 
on external child care. Thus, if households have a small preference for parental child care 
and the average demand for external child care is therefore large, high income households 
would prefer a tax rate of zero. Low and medium income households would still prefer a 
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full subsidy of external child care. Low income households usually do not demand 
external child care, but if it is provided for free, they will consume it and benefit the most 
from the redistribution via the number of children. Having assumed that the income 
distribution is skewed to the right and mean income thus exceeds median income, the 
decisive voter will vote for a full provision of the subsidy.  
 
Proposition 3.3: While richer households benefit the most from a subsidy for external 
child care, poorer households either prefer publicly provided child care or a full subsidy 
on external child care. 
 
 
3.4.2 Numerical simulation 
 
To illustrate our results, we now present a numerical simulation. We calibrate our 
numerical example to broadly fit relevant parameters for Germany. We assume that the 
household income is distributed according to a lognormal-distribution, lnሺܻ ൅
ݓ௜ሻ~ࣨሺߤ, ߪሻ with ߤ ൌ 3.74 and ߪ ൌ 0.464. This results in an average gross household 
income of ഥ݉ ൌ 46.875	16 and median endowment of ݉ெ ൌ 42.1, with income measured 
in 1,000 Euros. We set the primary earner’s income ܻ ൌ 40, the yearly prices for external 
child care ߨ ൌ 10 and for child-specific consumption goods ܤ ൌ 0.1, and the following 
preference and productivity parameters ߛ ൌ 0.75 , ߟ ൌ 0.75 , ߩ ൌ 0.5 , ߠ ൌ 0.05 . The 
resulting fertility and child care choices in the baseline model are ത݊ ൌ 	1.37, ̅ݏ ൌ 0.4, and 
ത݄ ൌ 0.3. The average secondary earner’s wage rate is ݓഥ ൌ 10.928 and the median wage 
rate is ݓெ ൌ 8.058. 
In the following, we compare the indirect utility levels of households in the different child 
care regimes when either one of the two child care regimes is being implemented. In a 
first step, we compare the two child care regimes with the baseline model, namely a 
purely private regime without subsidization. Then, we also compare to utility levels for 
the households with respect to the different child care regimes.  
                                                 
16 This equals the German average gross household income in 2011 (compare to Federal Statistical Office of 
Germany) 
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Setting ݐଵ ൌ ߬ଵ ൌ 0.05  and ݐଶ ൌ ߬ଶ ൌ ௡ത௦̅గ௠ഥ ൌ 0.12  we find the following utility 
differences for the child care regimes. 
Figure 3.5 illustrates the utility differences for a regime with publicly provided child care 
and a purely private child care regime. We find that only households with low wages 
benefit from publicly provided child care. With an increasing income tax, less households 
benefit from publicly provided child care and the utility loss for high income households 
increases. 
ݐଵ ൌ 0.05 ݐଶ ൌ 0.12 
 
Figure 3.5: Preferences for publicly provided versus purely private child care 
 
This result is similar to Borck and Wrohlich (2011) who also find that richer households 
clearly prefer market provision over pure government provision. Our results only differ 
with respect to low income households. By adding the time restrictions, we find that for 
low income households, the preference for publicly provided child care increases in the 
secondary earner’s wage rate. The larger the preference parameter for parental child care, 
ߩ, the further the curve shifts to the right and the utility loss for high income households 
decreases (compare to Figures 3.8 and 3.11 in Appendix 3.B). 17  
Figure 3.6 shows the utility differences of a child care regime with a subsidy for external 
child care and a purely private child care regime. In this case, we find that households 
with very low or high incomes benefit from the policy while households with low 
incomes would choose a purely private child care regime as long as the tax rate is 
relatively low. 
 
                                                 
17 As we are considering an introduction of a child care regime, we have to take into account that changing 
the preference parameter ߩ also affects average fertility and external child care time in the baseline model. 
See Appendix 3.B for the results for ߩ ൌ 0.3 and ߩ ൌ 0.7. 
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߬ଵ ൌ 0.05 ߬ଶ ൌ 0.12 
 
Figure 3.6: Preferences for subsidized versus purely private child care 
 
In case of the optimal income tax (that is ߚ ൌ 1), all households benefit from the child 
care regime with a subsidy on external child care. In this case, external child care would 
be offered for free and all households would demand external child care. Low income 
households with many children benefit the most from the redistribution via the tax system 
and their utility gain in this case would thus be relatively large. 
The larger the preference for parental child care, ߩ, the smaller are both average fertility 
and demand for external child care and the smaller are thus also the utility gains for low 
and medium income households (compare to Figure 3.12 in Appendix 3.B). In this case, 
the necessary tax rate for a full subsidy decreases and high income households benefit 
more from the redistributive nature of the subsidy. The smaller the preference for parental 
child care, however, the more low and medium income households benefit from the 
subsidy while high income households would prefer a purely private child care regime 
(compare to Figure 3.9 in Appendix 3.B).  
 
ݐଵ ൌ 0.05 ൌ ߬ଵ ݐଶ ൌ 0.12 ൌ ߬ଶ 
 
Figure 3.7: Preferences for subsidized versus publicly provided child care 
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In a final step, we compare the child care regime with public provision to the subsidized 
child care regime (Figure 3.7). We find that for a relatively low tax rate, only richer 
households prefer the subsidy over public provision while poorer households would favor 
public provision. In case of a full provision of the subsidy, all households prefer the child 
care regime with a subsidy over the one with publicly provided child care. For a 
decreasing preference for parental child care, the curve shifts upwards while for an 
increasing preference for parental child care, the curve shifts downwards (compare to 
Figures 3.10 and 3.13 in Appendix 3.B). 
 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we analyze households’ preferences for public provision and a subsidy on 
private child care and compare the effects on fertility, use of external child care, the 
secondary earner’s labor supply, and welfare. Our model predicts that publicly provided 
child care increases both the wage threshold for parents who do not buy additional 
external child care on the market and for parents who do not stay at home with their 
children. We thus observe a crowding out of privately provided child care while at the 
same time more parents stay at home with their children. Therefore, publicly provided 
child care in this framework has a negative effect on the secondary earner’s labor supply. 
This result is similar to the findings of Havnes and Mogstad (2011) who analyze a staged 
expansion of subsidized child care in Norway. Their results suggest that there is little, if 
any, causal effect of subsidized child care on maternal employment. Instead, of increasing 
mothers' labor supply, they also find that the subsidized child care mostly crowds out 
informal child care arrangements. We also show that increasing publicly provided child 
care leads to a decrease in fertility while it increases the child’s quality for secondary 
earners with a relatively low wage rate. Hence, we observe a quantity-quality trade-off in 
a child care regime with publicly provided child care.  
A subsidy on privately provided external child care, on the other hand, decreases both the 
wage threshold for parents who do not demand external child care and for parents who 
abstain from parental child care. We find that an increase in the subsidy for external child 
care has both a positive effect on the secondary earner’s labor supply and on the 
household’s fertility. The effect on the child’s quality is in this case positive for secondary 
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earners with a relatively high wage rate. In a child care regime with a subsidy on external 
child care, low income earners thus increase both their fertility and labor supply but at the 
same time invest less in their children’s quality. This result is in line with several 
empirical findings (e.g. Lefebvre and Merrigan, 2008) which study the effect of child care 
subsidies on female labor market participation.  
Regarding the households’ preferences for the two different child care regimes, we find 
that while richer households benefit the most from a subsidy for external child care, 
poorer households either prefer publicly provided child care or a full subsidy on external 
child care. The larger the subsidy for privately provided external child care, the more 
households benefit as the wage threshold for parents who demand external child care 
decreases. In case of a full subsidy all households demand external child care and poor 
households benefit the most from the subsidy both through the redistribution via taxation 
and via the number of children. By offering free child care provided by the private market 
the government could therefore foster both fertility and the secondary earner’s labor 
supply as well as at the same time increase the households’ welfare.  
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Appendix 
 
3.A: Demand functions 
 
Demand function for parental child care in the baseline model: 
݄௜ ൌ
ە
ۖۖ
ۖ
۔
ۖۖ
ۖ
ۓ 1 if ݓ௜ ൏ ݓෝ௟௛ and ݊௜ ൏ 11
݊௜ if ݓ௜ ൏ ݓෝ௟
௛ and ݊௜ ൒ 1
1
݊௜ if ݓෝ௟
௛ ൑ ݓ௜ ൑ ݓෝ௨௛ and ݊௜ ቆߩሺݓ௜ ൅ ߨሻ െ ߟݓ௜ߟݓ௜ ቇ ൒ 1
ߩሺݓ௜ ൅ ߨሻ െ ߟݓ௜
ߟݓ௜ if ݓෝ௟
௛ ൑ ݓ௜ ൑ ݓෝ௨௛ and ݊௜ ቆߩሺݓ௜ ൅ ߨሻ െ ߟݓ௜ߟݓ௜ ቇ ൏ 1
0 if ݓ௜ ൐ ݓෝ௨௛ 0 0
 
(3.A.1)
 
 
Demand function for external child care in the baseline model: 
ݏ௜ ൌ
ە
۔
ۓ 0 if ݓ௜ ൏ ݓෝ௟
௦
ሺ1 െ ߩሻሺݓ௜ ൅ ߨሻ െ ߟߨ
ߟߨ if ݓෝ௟
௦ ൑ ݓ௜ ൑ ݓෝ௨௦
1 if ݓ௜ ൐ ݓෝ௨௦
 
 
(3.A.2)
 
 
3.B: Results of the numerical simulation 
 
Setting ߩ ൌ 0.3, we find the following fertility and child care choices in the baseline 
model:  ത݊ ൌ 	1.57, ̅ݏ ൌ 0.6, and ത݄ ൌ 0.1. The average secondary earner’s wage rate is 
ݓഥ ൌ 6.78 and the median wage rate is ݓெ ൌ 4.43. Parents in this case have a smaller 
preference for parental child care time and average fertility and external child care time 
are thus larger. 
Setting ݐଵ ൌ ߬ଵ ൌ 0.1 and ݐଶ ൌ ߬ଶ ൌ ௡ത௦̅గ௠ഥ ൌ 0.19 we find the following utility differences 
for the child care regimes: 
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ݐଵ ൌ 0.1 ݐଶ ൌ 0.19 
 
Figure 3.8: Preferences for publicly provided versus purely private child care 
 
߬ଵ ൌ 0.1 ߬ଶ ൌ 0.19 
 
Figure 3.9: Preferences for subsidized versus purely private child care 
 
ݐଵ ൌ 0.1 ൌ ߬ଵ ݐଶ ൌ 0.19 ൌ ߬ଶ 
 
Figure 3.10: Preferences for subsidized versus publicly provided child care 
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Setting ߩ ൌ 0.7, we find the following fertility and child care choices in the baseline 
model:  ത݊ ൌ 	1.2, ̅ݏ ൌ 0.1, and ത݄ ൌ 0.5. The average secondary earner’s wage rate is 
ݓഥ ൌ 16.62 and the median wage rate is ݓெ ൌ 13.05. Parents in this case have a higher 
preference for parental child care time and average fertility and external child care time 
are thus smaller. 
Setting ݐଵ ൌ ߬ଵ ൌ 0.01  and ݐଶ ൌ ߬ଶ ൌ ௡ത௦̅గ௠ഥ ൌ 0.03  we find the following utility 
differences for the child care regimes: 
 
ݐଵ ൌ 0.01 ݐଶ ൌ 0.03 
 
Figure 3.11: Preferences for publicly provided versus purely private child care 
 
߬ଵ ൌ 0.01 ߬ଶ ൌ 0.03 
 
Figure 3.12: Preferences for subsidized versus purely private child care 
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ݐଵ ൌ 0.01 ൌ ߬ଵ ݐଶ ൌ 0.03 ൌ ߬ଶ 
 
Figure 3.13: Preferences for subsidized versus publicly provided child care 
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Chapter 4 
 
 
4 The Role of Government in Child Care 
Provision 18 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
All European countries are facing dilemmas and tensions related to the complex 
interaction between changes in the labor market, fertility trends, and children’s 
opportunities. Social policy is therefore confronted with distinct policy objectives and 
instruments. In confronting the issue of low fertility levels and mothers labor market 
participation rates, policy makers have considered and tried a variety of options. One 
policy option that has received considerable attention is making high quality child care 
available and affordable (Attanasio et al., 2008).  
In this paper, we present a theoretical model which analyzes preferences for parental and 
external child care and the effects of public policies on welfare, fertility and investments 
in quality of children within a model with endogenous fertility and labor supply of a 
secondary earner. We compare the households’ preferences for quantity and quality of 
                                                 
18 This chapter is based on joint work with Robert Fenge 
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publicly provided child care as well as for a price subsidy for publicly provided child care 
and a parental child care benefit. Publicly provided child care in this setting can either be 
provided by municipalities, churches or non-profit organizations while the carriers of 
privately provided external child care include for-profit institutions, child care by nannies, 
au-pairs or babysitters. Parents can opt for publicly provided child care or receive a 
parental child care benefit. This reflects the German system of parental child care 
benefits, the so called “Betreuungsgeld”, that are only obtainable for parents who either 
care for their children themselves or demand only privately provided external child care.19 
Parental child care benefits are also established in Finland, Norway, and Sweden but we 
focus on the German system. We analyze how effectively the policy instruments are able 
to achieve a compatibility of family and work and model the parents’ decision whether to 
demand publicly provided child care or receive a parental child care benefit. 
The increased demand for child care accompanying the rise of two-earner couples has 
attracted the attention of policy makers and researchers alike. While the theoretical 
literature is relatively scarce, there exist various empirical studies on child care and 
maternal employment (see Blau and Currie (2006) for a survey).  
Borck and Wrohlich (2011) analyze preferences for a public, private or mixed provision 
of child care both theoretically and empirically. Similar to our theoretical model, they 
model child care as a publicly provided private good. Their model builds on the 
redistributive aspect of public provision of private goods (see Besley and Coate, 1991; 
Epple and Romano, 1996a). They conclude that richer households should prefer market 
provision to purely public or mixed provision while preferences over public versus mixed 
provision depend on the redistributive effect of public provision. We extend their 
approach by additionally considering parental child care and adding differences in the 
qualities of the child care options. Furthermore, we also extend their analysis by 
considering price subsidies for public child care and a parental child care benefit. 
The results of empirical studies on the effect of public child care on fertility and female 
labor supply are ambiguous. Havnes and Mogstad (2011) evaluate the effect of child care 
on labor supply using a 1975 reform. They find that a large-scale expansion of subsidized 
                                                 
19 The “Betreuungsgeld” was introduced at the beginning of 2013 and is a monthly child care supplement 
for parents whose children aged three and under are not in a state-subsidized nursery. At the same time a 
spot in just such a nursery has become a legal entitlement for all children (Federal Ministry for Family 
Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth, 2013) 
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child care in Norway had little impact on maternal employment.20 Instead, they found that 
the new subsidized child care mostly crowds out informal care arrangements implying a 
significant net cost of the child care arrangement. Previous research mostly came to the 
conclusion that affordable and readily available child care is a driving force both of cross-
country differences in maternal employment and of its rapid growth over the last decades 
(see e.g. Jaumotte, 2003; Del Boca, 2002; Aaberge et al. 2005; Attanasio et al., 2008).  
Blau and Currie (2006) point out two fundamental problems of these studies: child care 
access and prices are endogenous to the work decision of mothers and the availability and 
cost of informal care is unobserved. Havnes and Mogstad (2011) conclude that the 
discrepancy between the estimates in the previous literature is likely to be explained by 
differences in biases owing to ignoring the substitution between subsidized and informal 
child care, misspecifications of functional forms for the employment and child care 
equations, and violations of the exclusion restriction.  
There are also some empirical studies analyzing the effect of public child care on fertility. 
Rindfuss et al. (2010) examine a policy reform from the mid-1970s in Norway, which led 
to a substantial expansion of public child care. Their results suggest that moving from 
having no child care slots available for preschool children to having slots available for 
60% of preschool children has a positive effect on fertility. Mörk et al. (2013) exploit the 
exogenous variation in parental fees caused by a Swedish child care reform in 2001 to 
identify the effect of child care costs on fertility. They find that the reduction in child care 
costs increased the number of first and higher order births, but only seemed to affect the 
timing of second births. 
The second policy instrument we want to analyze is a parental child care benefit. 
Gathmann and Sass (2012) use a reform in East Germany that generated exogenous 
variation in child care prices to study the impact of child care costs on child care 
utilization, family labor supply and child well-being. In 2006, the government of 
Thuringia introduced a new family policy that provides generous subsidies to families 
who do not send their child to public child care. This family policy is very similar to the 
in 2013 introduced “Betreuungsgeld” in all German states which we formally analyze in 
our theoretical model. The specific structure of the subsidy in Thuringia is such that it 
declines linearly with the number of hours the eligible child attends public child care. As 
such, the subsidy is equivalent to an increase in the hourly price of public child care (fully 
                                                 
20 Subsidized child care in this case refers to public and private child care institutions, eligible for subsidies 
from the government because they satisfy federal quality requirements 
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compensated by an income subsidy). Gathmann and Sass (2012) find that parents respond 
to those changes in the price for public child care by reducing both public and informal 
daycare and increasing parental child care. Declines in public daycare attendance are 
especially dramatic for children from low-skilled, single parents and low income families. 
Their results suggest that the decline in female labor force participation is strongest for 
single parents and low income households while they find no effect on fertility in eligible 
households.  
Our main findings are the following. We find that for households opting for public child 
care, an increase in the quantity of publicly provided child care has a negative effect on 
both fertility and secondary earner’s labor supply while the effects of an increase in its 
quality depend on the price effect and may be positive. Our results also suggest that both 
a price subsidy for publicly provided child care and the parental child care benefit has a 
negative effect on fertility and the secondary earner’s labor supply for all households. 
Regarding welfare, we find that for households choosing an interior solution of parental 
and external child care both policy instruments, a parental child care benefit and publicly 
provided child care, are equally effective. The household’s decision which policy 
instrument to choose only depends on the relative benefit the household receives in total. 
This decision is independent of the household’s income. For households choosing a 
corner solution, on the other hand, the decision depends on a variety of parameters: their 
income, their preferences for children, child care and consumption as well as on the 
policy parameters. Low income households choosing a corner solution of staying at home 
and not consuming external child care opt for a parental child care benefit if they have a 
small preference for children and their quality. For high income households, the decision 
depends on differences between the qualities of private and public external child care. If 
the relative benefit a household receives from the policy instruments is identical and the 
quality of private external child care is larger than the quality of publicly provided child 
care, a household in this corner solution also benefits more from the parental child care 
benefit than from publicly provided child care 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 4.2 we introduce the economic setup. 
Section 4.3 presents the comparative static results for households choosing an interior 
solution of parental and external child care as well as for households choosing a corner 
solution. In section 4.4, we calculate the welfare effects of the parents’ decision whether 
or not to demand publicly provided child care and section 4.5 concludes.  
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4.2 The model 
 
We use a static model and allow for heterogeneity in the households’ preferences with 
respect to consumption, fertility, and the child’s quality. Family ݅’s decisions are assumed 
to be taken by the parents who derive utility from their own consumption, ܿ௜ , their 
number of children, ݊௜, and their child’s quality of life, ݍ௜. The household's preferences 
are represented by the following utility function 
௜ܷ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߛ௜ሻ ln ܿ௜ ൅ ߛ௜ lnሺ݊௜ݍ௜ሻ   (4.1)
 
with ߛ௜ ∈ ሼ0,1ሽ and ݅ ∈ ሼ1, … , ܰሽ. The parameter ߛ௜ captures the family’s relative weight 
given to their children. Note that households care about both child quantity and child 
quality. The quality per child, ݍ௜, can be understood as a good produced domestically by 
the parents who use as inputs time spent with the child and a child-specific consumption 
good, ݖ௜, bought on the market. For simplicity, we assume that only the secondary earner 
of family ݅ spends time with the children. Time spent with a child can be divided into the 
secondary earner’s own time, ݄௜, the time the child spends at privately provided external 
child care, ݏ௜, and the time the child spends at publicly provided external child care, ݃. 
We assume that publicly provided child care in this setting can either be provided by 
municipalities, churches or non-profit organizations while the carriers of privately 
provided child care include for-profit institutions, child care by nannies, au-pairs or 
babysitters. Parents can decide whether they want to make demands on publicly provided 
child care or not and there is thus a possibility to opt out. If parents decide not to demand 
public child care, they are eligible for a parental child care benefit. In case parents opt for 
public child care, we assume that all children receive the same quantity of public child 
care in this economy. All households are allowed to supplement the publicly provided 
quantity and the quantity of private purchase may differ across households. It should be 
noted that the fact that the quantity of public child care is common to all children whose 
parents opt for public child care does not mean that all households receive the same 
quantity of public services, because the number of children may differ across households. 
The strictly concave domestic production function for a child’s quality is given by 
ݍ௜ ൌ ߠሺݖ௜ሻఎ೔ሺ1 ൅ ݄௜ݍ௛ሻఘ೔൫1 ൅ ߙ௜݃ݍ௚ ൅ ݏ௜ݍ௦൯ሺଵିఘ೔ሻ (4.2)
 
with ߠ ൐ 0 , 	ߟ௜ ∈ ሼ0,1ሽ , and ߩ௜ ∈ ሼ0,1ሽ . The parameter ߩ௜  illustrates the household’s 
preference for parental child care and ሺ1 െ ߩ௜ሻ shows the household’s preference for 
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external child care. ߟ௜ depicts the household’s preference for child-specific consumption. 
This quality technology thus assumes diminishing returns to both child-specific 
consumption and parental child care time, but constant returns to scale in parental and 
external child care time. The parameter ߙ௜  represents the parents’ decision regarding 
public child care. For ߙ௜ ൌ 0 the parents decide against while for ߙ௜ ൌ 1 they opt for 
publicly provided child care. The terms ሺ1 ൅ ݄௜ݍ௛ሻ and ൫1 ൅ ߙ௜݃ݍ௚ ൅ ݏ௜ݍ௦൯  guarantee 
that the child’s quality remains positive even if parents either do not care for their child 
themselves or do not demand external child care. Note that we allow for corner solutions 
regarding parental and external child care time but not regarding child-specific 
consumption. All forms of child care time are assumed to have different qualities: ݍ௛ 
describes the quality of the secondary earner to care for her child while ݍ௚ and ݍ௦ depict 
the quality of the public and private daycare teachers, respectively.  
The secondary earner allocates her time to working which yields income at the rate ݓ௜ 
and to leisure time. We assume that child rearing is the only domestic time requiring 
parental time so that she spends her leisure time completely with the children. Through 
the endogeneity of ݊௜, the secondary earner’s labor supply is also endogenous. If she has 
݊௜ children her parental time equals ݄௜݊௜. The rest of secondary earner ݅’s total time is 
working time and given by ܮ௜ ൌ 1 െ ݄௜݊௜, her average lifetime gross income therefore 
equals ݓ௜ܮ௜ . Secondary earners carrying a larger wage rate, ݓ௜ , thus have higher 
opportunity costs of both having and raising children. The primary earner allocates all her 
time to working and her average lifetime gross salary is ௜ܻ . The market prices for 
privately provided child care, ݏ௜, and publicly provided child care, ݃, are denoted by ߨ௦ 
and ߨ௚, respectively. We assume that the government subsidizes the price for publicly 
provided child care by ߚ. The price on the market for the child-specific consumption 
good, ݖ௜, is denoted by ܤ. Parents can choose whether they want to make demands on 
publicly provided child care or not. If they choose to opt out, they receive a parental child 
care benefit, ߪ, per child. The decision is denoted by the parameter ߙ௜ . For ߙ௜ ൌ 0 the 
family decides to take a parental child care benefit while for ߙ௜ ൌ 1 they opt for publicly 
provided child care. The family’s budget constraint is thus given by: 
ሺ ௜ܻ ൅ ݓ௜ܮ௜ሻሺ1 െ ݐሻ ൌ ܿ௜ ൅ ߨ௦ݏ௜݊௜ ൅ ߙ௜ߨ௚ሺ1 െ ߚሻ݃݊௜ ൅ ܤݖ௜݊௜ െ ሺ1 െ ߙ௜ሻߪ݊௜	 (4.3)
 
Parents choose consumption, ܿ௜, the number of children, ݊௜, the secondary earner’s time 
spent with a child, ݄௜, the amount of bought-in child care, ݏ௜, as well as child-specific 
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consumption, ݖ௜, so as to maximize their utility, ௜ܷሺܿ௜, ݊௜, ݍ௜ሻ, by taking account of the 
child’s quality production and their budget constraint.  
The household decision problem is given by:  
max௖೔,௡೔,௭೔,௛೔,௦೔ ௜ܷ൫ܿ௜, ݊௜, ݍ௜ሺݖ௜, ݄௜, ݏ௜, ݃ሻ൯ ݏ. ݐ. ሺ4.3ሻ (4.4)
 
Following Kimura and Yasui (2009), we assume that the technology for converting 
expenditures into quantity of service is the same as that in the private sector. The 
government's budget constraint is 
ݐൣ തܻ ൅ ݓഥ൫1 െ ത݄ ത݊൯൧ ൌ ߙതߚ ത݊݃ߨ௚ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙതሻߪ ത݊  (4.5)
 
where ߙത  denotes the average decision for publicly provided child care or the parental 
child care benefit, ത݊ the average number of children, ത݄ the average parental child care 
time, and ݓഥ  and തܻ the average secondary earner’s wage rate and primary earner’s income 
in the population, respectively. For simplification, we denote ഥ݉  as the average labor 
income of a family in the population, ൣ തܻ ൅ ݓഥ൫1 െ ത݄ ത݊൯൧. We assume that the government 
and the private market both set their prices for child care according to their marginal 
costs. The variable costs for providing one unit of external child care, ݇ሺݍ௫ሻ఑ݔ, incur for 
employing additional daycare teachers and thus depend on the quality of the child care 
center, with ݔ ∈ ሼݏ, ݃ሽ . Hence, we assume that child care centers can increase their 
quality by recruiting additional daycare teachers. The prices for external child care are 
therefore given by 
ߨ௚ ൌ ݇൫ݍ௚൯఑ (4.6)
ߨ௦ ൌ ݇ሺݍ௦ሻ఑ (4.7)
 
with ݇ ൐ 0 and ߢ ൐ 0. The government’s budget constraint in (4.5) can thus be written as 
ݐ ഥ݉ ൌ ߙതߚ݃ ത݊݇൫ݍ௚൯఑ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙതሻߪ ത݊.  
Hence, in our analysis, the government has four instruments: the quantity and quality of 
publicly provided child care, the price subsidy as well as the parental child care benefit. In 
the following we will analyze the impact of the four instruments on fertility, the 
secondary earner’s labor supply, the child’s quality, and on welfare.  
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The solution to the household decision problem in (4.4) can either be interior, or at a 
corner where the household chooses either not to work and not to demand private external 
child care or to work fulltime and to demand the maximum amount of private external 
child care. For households choosing an interior solution of parental and external child 
care time, the first-order conditions imply21 
݊௜∗ ൌ ߛߟ௜
ሺ ௜ܻ ൅ ݓ௜ሻሺ1 െ ݐሻ
௡ܲ,௜
 (4.8)
݄௜∗ ൌ ߩ௜ ௡ܲ,௜ݍ௛ െ ߟ௜ݓ௜
ሺ1 െ ݐሻ
ߟ௜ݓ௜ሺ1 െ ݐሻݍ௛ 	 (4.9)
ݏ௜∗ ൌ
ሺ1 െ ߩ௜ሻ ௡ܲ,௜ݍ௦ െ ߟ௜ߨ௦൫1 ൅ ߙ௜݃ݍ௚൯
ߟ௜ߨ௦ݍ௦  (4.10)
ݖ௜∗ ൌ ௡ܲ,௜ܤ  (4.11)
ݍ௜∗ ൌ ߠ
ሺ1 െ ߩ௜ሻ ௡ܲ,௜ݍ௦
ߟ௜ߨ௦ ൬
௡ܲ,௜
ܤ ൰
ఎ೔
൬ ߩ௜ߨ௦ݍ௛ሺ1 െ ߩ௜ሻݓ௜ሺ1 െ ݐሻݍ௦൰
ఘ೔
 (4.12)
 
where ௡ܲ,௜ is the relative price for child care: 
௡ܲ,௜ ≡ ݓ௜ሺ1 െ ݐሻݍ௛ ൅
ߨ௦
ݍ௦ ൅
ߙ௜݃ൣߨ௦ݍ௚ െ ߨ௚ሺ1 െ ߚሻݍ௦൧
ݍ௦ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙ௜ሻߪ (4.13)
 
As we assume private and public external child care to be substitutes, the household’s 
benefit from public child care depends on the relative price difference. In the following, 
we assume that the government sets the price subsidy for publicly provided child care, ߚ, 
such that ൣߨ௦ݍ௚ ൐ ߨ௚ሺ1 െ ߚሻݍ௦൧ holds. This implies that the government always sets the 
subsidy such that ൤ߚ ൐ 1 െ ቀ௤೒௤ೞቁ
ሺଵି఑ሻ൨ holds. The government therefore has to consider 
differences in the quality of private and public child care when setting the price for public 
child care. Hence, both publicly provided child care and a parental child care benefit 
increase the relative price for child care, ௡ܲ,௜, in (4.13). The reason for this increase in the 
relative price is that public child care effectively increases the price of private external 
child care while the parental child care benefit effectively increases the price of public 
child care for parents. 
The second-order conditions for a maximum in (4.8) – (4.11) are satisfied. Due to 
increasing opportunity costs of having children, parental child care decreases in the 
                                                 
21 See Appendix 4.A for the derivations. 
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secondary earner’s wage rate. The demand for external child care, on the other hand, 
increases in the secondary earner’s wage rate due to the costs associated with buying 
external child care. Depending on the size of ߩ௜ and ߟ௜, parents might decide for a corner 
solution of caring solely alone for their children or not at all. For households with a 
relatively high preference for parental child care, there is a threshold wage rate, ݓෝ௜,௟௦ , 
below which secondary earners choose a corner solution of not buying external child care, 
ݏ௜∗ ൌ 0. For households with a relatively small preference for parental child care, there is 
a threshold wage rate, ݓෝ௜,௨௛ , above which secondary earners choose not to stay at home 
with the children such that ݄௜∗ ൌ 0. We additionally assume that the maximum demand for 
external child care time is one. Parents can neither buy more than one unit of external 
child care time per child nor spend more time at home with the child. There is thus also a 
threshold wage rate, ݓෝ௜,௨௦ , above which households cannot consume more external child 
care. At maximum they can consume one unit of privately provided external child care. If 
the households additionally demand public child care, the maximum amount of private 
child care decreases to ሺ1 െ ݃ሻ. We furthermore assume that the demand for parental 
child care time is at maximum either ଵ௡೔ or one depending on whether the family has  more 
than one child or not. The secondary earner’s labor supply cannot be negative, such that 
݄௜݊௜ ൑ 1  must hold true. There is thus a threshold wage rate, ݓෝ௜,௟௛ , below which the 
secondary earner cannot spend more time with the child at home. Even though parents do 
not consume external child care below the threshold wage rate of ݓෝ௜,௟௦ , they can still 
increase their number of children in our model. With an increasing fertility, the average 
maximum time the secondary earner can spend with each child decreases. Parental child 
care might therefore increase in the secondary earner’s wage rate for households with a 
wage rate below ݓෝ௜,௟௛ .22  
The thresholds wage rates are 
ݏ௜∗ ൌ 0: ݓෝ௜,௟௦ ൌ
ݍ௛ ቂߟ௜ߨ௦൫1 ൅ ߙ௜݃ݍ௚൯ െ ሺ1 െ ߩ௜ሻܲ݊,݅|ݓ݅ൌ0ቃ
ሺ1 െ ߩ௜ሻሺ1 െ ݐሻ  
(4.14)
ݏ௜∗ ൌ 1 െ ߙ௜݃: ݓෝ௜,௨௦ ൌ
ݍ௛ ቄߟ௜ߨ௦ൣ1 ൅ ݍ௦ ൅ ߙ௜݃൫ݍ௚ െ ݍ௦൯൧ െ ሺ1 െ ߩ௜ሻܲ݊,݅|ݓ݅ൌ0ቅ
ሺ1 െ ߩ௜ሻሺ1 െ ݐሻ  
(4.15)
݄௜∗ ൌ 0: ݓෝ௜,௨௛ ൌ
ߩ௜ܲ݊,݅|ݓ݅ൌ0ݍ௛
ሺߟ௜ െ ߩ௜ሻሺ1 െ ݐሻ (4.16)
                                                 
22 See Appendix 4.B for a detailed demand function of parental and external child care time. 
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݄௜∗ ൌ 1: ݓෝ௜,௟௛ ൌ
ߩ௜ܲ݊,݅|ݓ݅ൌ0ݍ௛
ሾߟ௜ሺ1 ൅ ݍ௛ሻ െ ߩ௜ሿሺ1 െ ݐሻ (4.17)
 
with ௡ܲ,௜ |௪೔ୀ଴ ≡
ߨݏ
ݍݏ
൅ ߙ݅݃ቂߨݏݍ݃െߨ݃ሺ1െߚሻݍݏቃݍݏ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙ݅ሻߪ. The households’ threshold levels thus 
depend critically on the decision whether to demand publicly provided child care or not as 
well as on the size of the family policy instruments and the household’s preferences. 
Changes in the family policy instruments shift the threshold levels to the right or left and 
therefore influence the household’s decision for labor supply. 
Using the results described above, we can depict the relationship between the demand for 
parental as well as privately provided external child care and the secondary earner’s wage 
rate as follows: 
 
Figure 4.1: The relationship between the demand for parental and privately provided external child care    
and the secondary earner’s wage rate (for ߙ௜ ൌ 0) 
 
These relationships are consistent with the well-known evidence: high income households 
choose relatively low parental child care times with relatively high investments in 
external child care. Note that we do not make an assumption on total child care time. 
Parental and external child care time can therefore be in sum smaller or larger than one. 
In case the household has more than one child, the threshold ݓෝ௜,௟௛  shifts to the right and the 
maximum amount of parental child care decreases to ଵ௡೔. For households choosing public 
child care, the maximum amount of external child care they can demand decreases to 
ሺ1 െ ݃ሻ and the threshold ݓෝ௜,௨௦  shifts to the left.  
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4.3 Comparative statics: The effects of changes in the family 
policy system  
 
In the following, we analyze the comparative statics results for changes in the policy 
parameters for households choosing an interior solution as well as for households 
choosing a corner solution of parental and external child care. 
 
4.3.1 Interior solution of parental and external child care 
 
For households choosing an interior solution of parental and external child care, we find 
that fertility in (4.8) decreases in the secondary earner’s wage rate as long as ቄ௒೔ሺଵି௧ሻ௤೓ ൐
గೞ
௤ೞ െ
ఈ೔௚ൣగೞ௤೒ିగ೒ሺଵିఉሻ௤ೞ൧
௤ೞ െ ሺ1 െ ߙ௜ሻߪቅ. That is if the relative income of the primary earner 
is larger than the relative costs for external child care. 23  
Assuming that the primary earner’s income is sufficiently high, we can depict the 
relationship between fertility and the secondary earner’s wage rate as shown in Figure 
4.2:  
 
Figure 4.2: The relationship between fertility and the secondary earner’s wage rate 
 
The lowest and highest possible fertility rates in this case are given by lim௪೔→ஶ ݊௜∗ ൌ
ߛ௜ߟ௜ݍ௛ and lim௪೔→଴ ݊௜∗ ൌ ఊ೔ఎ೔௒೔ሺଵି௧ሻ௉೙,೔|ೢ೔సబ . In our model, families with a positive preference for 
                                                 
23 See Appendix 4.C for the remaining derivations in this section. 
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children, ߛ௜, a positive parental child care quality, ݍ௛, and a positive preference for child-
specific-consumption, ߟ௜, will thus always have children. In case of a single household, 
that is ௜ܻ ൌ 0, fertility would increase in the households’ income.  
An increase in the secondary earner’s parental quality, ݍ௛, on the other hand, always has a 
positive effect on fertility. Regarding the quality of external child care, we find that an 
increase in the quality of privately provided child care in (4.18) has a positive effect on 
fertility for 0 ൑ ߢ ൑ 1:  
߲݊∗݅
߲ݍ௦ ൌ
ߛ௜ߟ௜ሺ1 െ ߢሻሺ ௜ܻ ൅ ݓ௜ሻሺ1 െ ݐሻߨ௦൫1 ൅ ߙ௜݃ݍ௚൯
൫ ௡ܲ,௜൯ଶሺݍ௦ሻଶ
 (4.18)
 
An increase in the quality of publicly provided child care as shown in (4.19), on the other 
hand, has an ambiguous effect on the number of family ݅ ’s children. For a family 
choosing not to demand publicly provided child care, that is ߙ௜ ൌ 0, an increase in the 
quality of public child care always has a negative effect on fertility due to the tax 
increase. For a family choosing ߙ௜ ൌ 1, however, an increase in the quality of publicly 
provided child care might also have a positive effect on fertility depending on its impact 
on the price, that is on ߢ . For 0 ൑ ߢ ൑ 1, the effect of an increase in the quality of 
publicly provided child care on fertility is also negative for households opting for public 
child care.  
߲݊௜∗
߲ݍ௚ ൌ െΛ௜݃ ቊߙ௜ ഥ݉ሺ1 െ ݐሻ ቈ
ߨ௦
ݍ௦ െ
ߢߨ௚ሺ1 െ ߚሻ
ݍ௚ ቉ ൅
ߢߙത ത݊ߚߨ௚
ݍ௚ ቈ ௡ܲ,௜ െ
ݓ݅ሺ1 െ ݐሻ
ݍ݄
቉ቋ (4.19)
߲݊௜∗
߲݃ ൌ െΛ௜ݍ௚ ቊߙ௜ ഥ݉ሺ1 െ ݐሻ ቈ
ߨ௦
ݍ௦ െ
ߨ௚ሺ1 െ ߚሻ
ݍ௚ ቉ ൅
ߙത ത݊ߚߨ௚
ݍ௚ ቈ ௡ܲ,௜ െ
ݓ݅ሺ1 െ ݐሻ
ݍ݄
቉ቋ (4.20)
߲݊௜∗
߲ߚ ൌ െΛ௜݃ߨ௚ ቊߙ௜ ഥ݉ሺ1 െ ݐሻ ൅ ߙത ത݊ ቈ ௡ܲ,௜ െ
ݓ݅ሺ1 െ ݐሻ
ݍ݄
቉ቋ (4.21)
߲݊௜∗
߲ߪ ൌ െΛ௜ ቊሺ1 െ ߙ௜ሻ ഥ݉ሺ1 െ ݐሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙതሻ ത݊ ቈܲ݊,݅ െ
ݓ݅ሺ1 െ ݐሻ
ݍ݄
቉ቋ (4.22)
 
with Λ௜ ≡ ఊ೔ఎ೔ሺ௒೔ା௪೔ሻ௠ഥ൫௉೙,೔൯మ ൐ 0.  
Regarding an increase in the quantity of publicly provided child care in (4.20), the effect 
is negative for all households. For ߢ ൌ 1, the effects of an increase in quality and in 
quantity on fertility only differ with respect to the initial level of ݃ and ݍ௚. The effects of 
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an increase in the price subsidy, ߚ, in (4.21), and of an increase in parental child care 
benefit, ߪ, in (4.22), on fertility are also negative for all households. The reasons for these 
negative effects of the policy instruments on fertility are the following. Assuming 
ൣߨ௦ݍ௚ ൐ ߨ௚ሺ1 െ ߚሻݍ௦൧, an increase in publicly provided child care effectively increases 
the price for private external child care and thus increases the parents relative price for 
child care. As shown in (4.13), the parental child care benefit also increases the 
household’s relative price for child care and thus decreases the parent’s demand for 
children.  
Regarding parental time in (4.9), we find that an increase in the secondary earner’s wage 
rate leads to a decrease in parental child care time for all families. Assuming ߟ௜ ൐ ߩ௜, an 
increase in parental child care quality, on the other hand, has a positive effect on parental 
child care. Concerning the quality of external child care, we find that an increase in the 
quality of privately provided child care leads to a decrease in parental child care time for 
0 ൑ ߢ ൑ 1 and thus increases the secondary earner’s labor supply: 
߲݄∗݅
߲ݍ௦ ൌ െ
ߩ௜ሺ1 െ ߢሻߨ௦൫1 ൅ ߙ௜݃ݍ௚൯
ߟ௜ݓ௜ሺݍ௦ሻଶሺ1 െ ݐሻ  (4.23)
 
An increase in the quality of publicly provided child care as shown in (4.24), however, 
has a positive effect on parental child care for all families choosing ߙ௜ ൌ 0. For families 
choosing ߙ௜ ൌ 1, the impact is ambiguous and depends on price effect, that is on ߢ. For 
0 ൑ ߢ ൑ 1, the effect of an increase in the quality of publicly provided child care has a 
negative effect on the secondary earner’s labor supply for all households. 
߲݄௜∗
߲ݍ௚ ൌ Γ௜݃ ቊߙ௜ ഥ݉ሺ1 െ ݐሻ ቈ
ߨ௦
ݍ௦ െ
ߢߨ௚ሺ1 െ ߚሻ
ݍ௚ ቉ ൅
ߢߙത ത݊ߚߨ௚
ݍ௚ ቈܲ݊,݅ െ
ݓ݅ሺ1 െ ݐሻ
ݍ݄
቉ቋ (4.24)
߲݄௜∗
߲݃ ൌ Γ௜ݍ௚ ቊߙ௜ ഥ݉ሺ1 െ ݐሻ ቈ
ߨ௦
ݍ௦ െ
ߨ௚ሺ1 െ ߚሻ
ݍ௚ ቉ ൅ ߙത ത݊ߚߨ௚ ቈܲ݊,݅ െ
ݓ݅ሺ1 െ ݐሻ
ݍ݄
቉ቋ (4.25)
߲݄௜∗
߲ߚ ൌ Γ௜ ቊߙ௜ ഥ݉ሺ1 െ ݐሻ ൅ ߙത ത݊ ቈܲ݊,݅ െ
ݓ݅ሺ1 െ ݐሻ
ݍ݄
቉ቋ (4.26)
߲݄௜∗
߲ߪ ൌ Γ௜ ቊሺ1 െ ߙ௜ሻ ഥ݉ሺ1 െ ݐሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙതሻ ത݊ ቈܲ݊,݅ െ
ݓ݅ሺ1 െ ݐሻ
ݍ݄
቉ቋ (4.27)
    
with Γ௜ ≡ ఘ೔ఎ೔௠ഥ௪೔ሺଵି௧ሻమ ൐ 0.  
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An increase in the quantity of publicly provided child care in (4.25) has a positive effect 
on parental child care for all households and thus decreases the secondary earner’s labor 
supply. As before, for ߢ ൌ 1, the effects of an increase in quality and in quantity only 
differ with respect to the initial level of ݃ and ݍ௚. The same effect as for an increase in 
the quantity of publicly provided child care applies to an increase in the price subsidy, ߚ, 
in (4.26) and an increase in the parental child care benefit, ߪ, in (4.27). Our model thus 
predicts that an increase in both the subsidy for publicly provided child care and the 
parental child care benefit has a negative effect on the secondary earner’s labor supply for 
all households. Due to the negative income effect caused by the increase in the income 
tax, the secondary earner’s opportunity costs of staying at home with the children and not 
working decrease and the secondary earner therefore increases her parental time. The size 
of the effects therefore decreases in the secondary earners wage rate (compare to Figure 
4.1). 
Summarizing our results with respect to the reconciliation of family and work for 
households choosing an interior solution of parental and external child care, we find that 
only an increase in the quality of privately provided external child care has a positive 
effect on both fertility and the secondary earner’s labor supply for all households if 
0 ൑ ߢ ൑ 1 holds. Even though an increase in the quality of private external child care also 
leads to an increase in the price for child care, parents increase their demand for children 
and at the same time increase their labor supply. For households demanding public child 
care, that is ߙ௜ ൌ 1, an increase in both the quantity of publicly provided child care and 
the price subsidy for publicly provided child care has a negative effect on fertility and 
secondary earner’s labor supply. The effect of an increase in the quality of publicly 
provided child care, however, depends on ߢ and is positive for ߢ ൐ 1. Concerning the 
parental child care benefit, our model predicts a negative effect on both fertility and the 
secondary earner’s labor supply for all households choosing an interior solution of 
parental and external child care.  
 
Proposition 4.1: An increase in the quantity of publicly provided child care, the subsidy 
for public child care as well as in the parental child care benefit has a negative effect on 
both fertility and the secondary earner’s labor supply for all households. Increasing the 
quality of publicly provided child care, however, may increase both fertility and the 
secondary earner’s labor supply for households opting for public child care depending on 
the price effect.  
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Regarding the demand for privately provided external child care in (4.10), we find that an 
increase in the secondary earner’s wage rate has a positive effect while an increase in 
parental child care quality has a negative impact. An increase in the quality of privately 
provided child care has an ambiguous effect on the demand for external child care and 
depends on the price effect of an increase in the quality, that is on ߢ, as well as on the 
household’s preferences for parental child care and child-specific consumption:  
߲ݏ௜∗
߲ݍ௦ ൌ െ
1
ߟ௜ߨ௦ݍ௦ݍ௛ ൜ሺ1 െ ߩ௜ሻ ൤ߢ ௡ܲ,௜ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߢሻ
ߨ௦
ݍ௦ ൫1 ൅ ߙ௜݃ݍ௚൯൨ െ
ߟ௜ߨ௦
ݍ௦ ൫1 ൅ ߙ௜݃ݍ௚൯ൠ 
 (4.28)
 
The same holds true for an increase in both the quality and quantity of publicly provided 
external child care as shown in (4.29) and (4.30) for families choosing ߙ௜ ൌ 1. In both 
cases, the effects are negative if ሺߟ௜ ൅ ߩ௜ሻ ൐ 1 holds. Parents then use publicly provided 
child care as a substitution for private external child care. For families choosing ߙ௜ ൌ 0, 
the effects are in both cases negative due to the increase in the income tax. Therefore, an 
increase in both the quantity and the quality of publicly provided child care leads to a 
crowding-out of privately provided child care for households opting for the parental child 
care benefit and likely also for households opting for public child care.  
߲ݏ௜∗
߲ݍ௚ ൌ
ሺ1 െ ߩ௜ሻ݃൛ߙ௜ ഥ݉ݍ௛ൣߨ௦ݍ௚ െ ߢߨ௚ሺ1 െ ߚሻݍ௦൧ െ ߢߙതߚ ത݊ݓ௜ߨ௚ݍ௦ൟ െ ߟ௜ߙ௜݃ ഥ݉ߨ௦ݍ௛ݍ௚
ߟ௜ ഥ݉ߨ௦ݍ௛ݍ௦ݍ௚  
 (4.29)
߲ݏ௜∗
߲݃ ൌ
ሺ1 െ ߩ௜ሻ൛ߙ௜ ഥ݉ݍ௛ൣߨ௦ݍ௚ െ ߨ௚ሺ1 െ ߚሻݍ௦൧ െ ߙതߚ ത݊ݓ௜ߨ௚ݍ௦ൟ െ ߟ௜ߙ௜ ഥ݉ߨ௦ݍ௛ݍ௚
ߟ௜ ഥ݉ߨ௦ݍ௛ݍ௦  
 (4.30)
߲ݏ௜∗
߲ߚ ൌ
ሺ1 െ ߩ௜ሻ݃ߨ௚ሺߙ௜ ഥ݉ݍ௛ െ ߙത ത݊ݓ௜ሻ
ߟ௜ ഥ݉ߨ௦ݍ௛  (4.31)
߲ݏ௜∗
߲ߪ ൌ
ሺ1 െ ߩ௜ሻሾሺ1 െ ߙ௜ሻ ഥ݉ݍ௛ െ ሺ1 െ ߙതሻ ത݊ݓ௜ሿ
ߟ௜ ഥ݉ߨ௦ݍ௛  (4.32)
 
 
An increase in the subsidy for publicly provided external child care, ߚ, in (4.31) has also 
an ambiguous effect on the demand for privately provided child care for families having 
decided to demand public child care, that is ߙ௜ ൌ 1. The income effect is positive for low 
income earners while it is negative for high income earners due to the associated increase 
in the income tax. The effect is thus more likely to be negative the larger the secondary 
earner’s wage rate. The impact of an increase in ߚ  also depends on the average income, 
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the average demand for public child care, and the average number of children. For 
families opting for the parental child care benefit, that is ߙ௜ ൌ 0, the income effect is 
negative and households thus demand less privately provided external child care. In case 
of an increase in the parental child care benefit in (4.32), however, the effect is 
ambiguous for households choosing ߙ௜ ൌ 0 while the effect is negative for households 
choosing ߙ௜ ൌ 1. The effect for households opting for the parental child care benefit is 
more likely to be positive for households whose secondary earner carries a low wage rate 
as for them the income effect is again positive. For households who decided to demand 
publicly provided child care, we observe a decrease in the demand for privately provided 
child care due to the associated increase in the income tax. This negative effect therefore 
increases in the household’s secondary earner’s wage rate. 
Summarizing our results for households choosing to demand publicly provided child care, 
that is ߙ௜ ൌ 1, we find that there is a crowding-out effect with respect to all policy 
instruments for secondary earners with a high wage rate due to the negative income 
effect. As shown before, only an increase in the quality of publicly provided child care 
may have a positive effect on the secondary earner’s labor supply while for all other 
instruments the effect is negative. Parents thus do not use the publicly provided child care 
to increase their labor supply but rather substitute private external child care time.  
For households choosing ߙ௜ ൌ 0 , we also observe a crowding-out effect of private 
external child care for all three instruments influencing publicly provided child care due 
to the negative income effect. In this case, only an increase in the parental child care 
benefit may lead to a stronger demand for private external child care but at the same time 
it also has a negative effect on the secondary earner’s labor supply. Both effects are 
stronger for low income households. Low income households opting for the parental child 
care benefit therefore use additional parental child care benefit payments to decrease their 
labor supply while they at the same time increase their demand for private external child 
care. 
 
Proposition 4.2: An increase in both the quantity and quality of publicly provided child 
care has a negative effect on the household’s demand for private external child care. An 
increase in the subsidy for publicly provided child care (parental child care benefit) has a 
positive effect on the household’s demand for private external child care for low income 
households opting for public child care (the parental child care benefit).  
Chapter 4: The Role of Government in Child Care Provision 
94 
 
Our model predicts that child-specific consumption in (4.11) increases in the secondary 
earner’s wage rate and decreases in parental child care quality. An increase in the quality 
of privately provided child care has a negative effect on child-specific consumption due to 
the increased price for external child care. For families opting for the parental child care 
benefit, that is ߙ௜ ൌ 0, an increase in both the quantity and quality of publicly provided 
child care has a negative effect. For households choosing ߙ௜ ൌ 1, however, the effect is in 
both cases ambiguous but more likely to be positive for low income households due to the 
redistribution via the income tax. The same applies for an increase in the price subsidy for 
publicly provided child care. An increase in the parental child care benefit, on the other 
hand, has a negative effect on child-specific consumption for families choosing ߙ௜ ൌ 1 
while the effect is ambiguous for families choosing ߙ௜ ൌ 0  and also depends on the 
secondary earners wage rate. 
Regarding the child’s quality in (4.12), we find that an increase in the secondary earner’s 
wage rate has a positive effect. An increase in parental child care quality, on the other 
hand, has a negative effect on the child’s quality. Concerning the quality of external child 
care in (4.33), we find that the impact of an increase depends crucially on the price effect, 
that is on ߢ, as well as on the household’s preferences for parental and child-specific 
consumption. The effect of an increase in ݍ௦ is therefore ambiguous. 
߲ݍ݅∗
߲ݍ௦ ൌ
߶௜ሺ1 െ ߢሻ
ݍ௦ ൛ሺ1 െ ߩ௜ሻ ௡ܲ,௜ݍ௦ െ ሺ1 ൅ ߟ௜ሻߨ௦൫1 ൅ ߙ௜݃ݍ௚൯ൟ (4.33)
 
with ߶௜ ≡ ఏሺଵିఘ೔ሻఎ೔గೞ ቀ
௉೙,೔
஻ ቁ
ఎ೔ ቀ ఘ೔గೞ௤೓ሺଵିఘ೔ሻ௪೔ሺଵି௧ሻ௤ೞቁ
ఘ೔ ൐ 0.  
An increase in the quality of public child care in (4.34), is more likely to have a positive 
impact on the child’s quality for families demanding public child care, that is ߙ௜ ൌ 1. The 
same applies for the effects of an increase in the quantity of public child care in (4.35) 
and an increase in the price subsidy, ߚ, in (4.36). All three effects are also more likely to 
be positive for secondary earners with a low wage rate due to the redistribution via the 
income tax and a large parental child care quality. As an increase in the policy 
instruments leads to an increase in parental child care, the quality of this care is crucial for 
the child’s quality. The effects also depend on the average demand for public child care 
and the average fertility. 
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߲ݍ݅∗
߲ݍ௚ ൌ
߶௜݃
ഥ݉ݍ௛ݍ௚ሺ1 െ ݐሻ ൛ߩ௜ߢߙതߚ ത݊ ௡ܲ,௜ߨ௚ݍ௛ݍ௦
൅ ሺ1 ൅ ߟ௜ሻൣߙ௜ ഥ݉ݍ௛ൣߨ௦ݍ௚ െ ߢߨ௚ሺ1 െ ߚሻݍ௦൧ െ ߢߙതߚ ത݊ݓ௜ߨ௚ݍ௦൧ሺ1 െ ݐሻൟ 
 (4.34)
߲ݍ௜∗
߲݃ ൌ
߶௜
ഥ݉ݍ௛ሺ1 െ ݐሻ ൛ߩ௜ߙതߚ ത݊ ௡ܲ,௜ߨ௚ݍ௛ݍ௦
൅ ሺ1 ൅ ߟ௜ሻൣߙ௜ ഥ݉ݍ௛൫ߨ௦ݍ௚ െ ߨ௚ሺ1 െ ߚሻݍ௦൯ െ ߙതߚ ത݊ݓ௜ߨ௚ݍ௦൧ሺ1 െ ݐሻൟ 
 (4.35)
߲ݍ௜∗
߲ߚ ൌ
߶௜݃ߨ௚ݍ௦
ഥ݉ݍ௛ሺ1 െ ݐሻ ൛ߩ௜ߙത ത݊ ௡ܲ,௜ݍ௛ ൅ ሺ1 ൅ ߟ௜ሻሺߙ௜ ഥ݉ݍ௛ െ ߙത ത݊ݓ௜ሻሺ1 െ ݐሻൟ (4.36)
߲ݍ௜∗
߲ߪ ൌ
߶௜ݍ௦
ഥ݉ݍ௛ሺ1 െ ݐሻ ൛ߩ௜ሺ1 െ ߙതሻ ത݊ ௡ܲ,௜ݍ௛
൅ ሺ1 ൅ ߟ௜ሻሾሺ1 െ ߙ௜ሻ ഥ݉ݍ௛ െ ሺ1 െ ߙതሻ ത݊ݓ௜ሿሺ1 െ ݐሻൟ 
(4.37)
 
The effect of an increase in the parental child care benefit, ߪ, in (4.37), on the other hand, 
is more likely to be positive for households opting for a parental child care benefit, that is 
ߙ௜ ൌ 0 . The impact in this case is more likely to be positive for secondary earners 
carrying a low wage rate and having a large parental child care quality. As before, the 
reason for this is the redistribution via the tax system and the importance of the parental 
child care quality considering the increase in parental child care. 
 
Proposition 4.3: For low income households with a large parental child care quality 
opting for public child care, an increase in both the quantity and quality of as well as in 
the subsidy for publicly provided child care is likely to have a positive effect on the 
child’s quality. The same applies to households opting for a parental child care benefit 
with respect to an increase in the parental child care benefit.  
 
 
 
4.3.2 Corner solutions of parental and external child care 
 
Next to the results for households choosing an interior solution of parental and external 
child care, we also analyze the effects with respect to the children’s quality for 
households choosing a corner solution. We take two different cases into consideration: 
first, secondary earners who stay at home with their children and do not consume any 
private external child care; second, we also consider households who do not spend any 
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time with their children and consume the maximum amount of external child care. In the 
first case, we have to differentiate between two groups of households: those with one 
child at maximum and those with more than one child. In households with ݊௜ ൑ 1 the 
secondary earner can at most spend one unit of time at home, that is ݄௜ ൌ 1, while in 
households with ݊௜ ൐ 1 the secondary earner can only spend at most ଵ௡೔ units of time per 
child at home. The crucial aspect is that in both cases the secondary earner’s labor supply 
is zero, ܮ௜ ൌ 1 െ ݄௜݊௜ ൌ 0, for the period of time she stays at home with her children. In 
the second case, the maximum amount of privately provided external child care the 
household can consume depends on the household’s decision whether to demand public 
child care or not and is thus ሺ1 െ ߙ௜݃ሻ.  
Choosing a corner solution for child care only affects the households’ quality choice for 
their children. We assume that the fertility choice depends on the secondary earner’s 
average lifetime wage rate and is therefore not affected by her decision for this specific 
period of time. The first-order conditions for the children’s quality in the two cases imply 
ݍ௜∗|௛೔ୀଵ,௦೔ୀ଴ ൌ ߠ൫1 ൅ ߙ௜݃ݍ௚൯ ൬
௡ܲ,௜
ܤ ൰
ఎ೔
ቆ 1 ൅ ݍ௛1 ൅ ߙ௜݃ݍ௚ቇ
ఘ೔
 (4.38)
ݍ௜∗|௛೔ୀ ଵ௡೔,௦೔ୀ଴ ൌ ߠ൫1 ൅ ߙ௜݃ݍ௚൯ ൬
௡ܲ,௜
ܤ ൰
ఎ೔
ቆ ߛ௜ߟ௜ሺ ௜ܻ ൅ ݓ௜ሻሺ1 െ ݐሻ ൅ ௡ܲ,௜ݍ௛ߛ௜ߟ௜൫1 ൅ ߙ௜݃ݍ௚൯ሺ ௜ܻ ൅ ݓ௜ሻሺ1 െ ݐሻቇ
ఘ೔
 (4.39)
ݍ௜∗|௛೔ୀ଴,௦೔ୀଵିఈ೔௚ ൌ ߠൣ1 ൅ ݍ௦ െ ߙ௜݃൫ݍ௦ െ ݍ௚൯൧ ൬
௡ܲ,௜
ܤ ൰
ఎ೔
ቆ 11 ൅ ݍ௦ െ ߙ௜݃൫ݍ௦ െ ݍ௚൯ቇ
ఘ೔
 
 (4.40)
 
where ௡ܲ,௜ is the relative price for child care as described in (4.13).  
Regarding the child’s quality for the case that a household decides to stay full-time at 
home in (4.38), we find that, in contrast to the case of the interior solution, the effect of an 
increase in parental child care quality is ambiguous as the household cannot further 
increase parental child care.24 An increase in the quality of public child care in (4.41) has 
a negative effect for households opting for a parental child care benefit due to the increase 
in the income tax. The impact for households demanding public child care is likely to be 
positive for households choosing this corner solution as it depends on the secondary 
earner’s wage rate and households choosing this corner solution usually carry a relatively 
small wage rate. The same applies to an increase in the quantity of publicly provided 
                                                 
24 See Appendix 4.D for the remaining derivations in this section. 
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child care in (4.42). The effects also critically depend on the secondary earner’s parental 
child care quality as in the case of households choosing an interior solution of parental 
and external child care. 
߲ݍ௜∗|௛೔ୀଵ,௦೔ୀ଴
߲ݍ௚ ൌ ߶௜|೓೔సభ,ೞ೔సబ ቊሺ1 െ ߩ௜ሻߙ௜݃
൅ ߟ௜݃ഥ݉ ௡ܲ,௜ݍ௛ݍ௦ݍ௚ ൫1 ൅ ߙ௜݃ݍ௚൯ൣߙ௜ ഥ݉ݍ௛൫ߨ௦ݍ௚ െ ߢߨ௚ሺ1 െ ߚሻݍ௦൯
െ ߢߙതߚ ത݊ݓ௜ߨ௚ݍ௦൧ቋ 
(4.41)
߲ݍ௜∗|௛೔ୀଵ,௦೔ୀ଴
߲݃ ൌ ߶௜|೓೔సభ,ೞ೔సబ ቊሺ1 െ ߩ௜ሻߙ௜݃
൅ ߟ௜ഥ݉ ௡ܲ,௜ݍ௛ݍ௦ ൫1 ൅ ߙ௜݃ݍ௚൯ൣߙ௜ ഥ݉ݍ௛൫ߨ௦ݍ௚ െ ߨ௚ሺ1 െ ߚሻݍ௦൯
െ ߙതߚ ത݊ݓ௜ߨ௚ݍ௦൧ቋ 
(4.42)
߲ݍ௜∗|௛೔ୀଵ,௦೔ୀ଴
߲ߚ ൌ
ߟ௜߶௜|೓೔సభ,ೞ೔సబ݃ߨ௚
ഥ݉ ௡ܲ,௜ݍ௛ ൫1 ൅ ߙ௜݃ݍ௚൯ሺߙ௜ ഥ݉ݍ௛ െ ߙത ത݊ݓ௜ሻ 
(4.43)
߲ݍ௜∗|௛೔ୀଵ,௦೔ୀ଴
߲ߪ ൌ
ߟ௜߶௜|೓೔సభ,ೞ೔సబ
ഥ݉ ௡ܲ,௜ݍ௛ ൫1 ൅ ߙ௜݃ݍ௚൯ሾሺ1 െ ߙ௜ሻ ഥ݉ݍ௛ െ ሺ1 െ ߙതሻ ത݊ݓ௜ሿ 
(4.44)
 
with ߶௜|೓೔సభ,ೞ೔సబ ≡ ߠ ቀ
௉೙,೔
஻ ቁ
ఎ೔ ൬ ଵା௤೓ଵାఈ೔௚௤೒൰
ఘ೔ ൐ 0.  
An increase in the subsidy for public child care, ߚ, in (4.43) is also likely to have a 
positive effect on the child’s quality for households opting for public child care, while we 
observe a negative effect for households choosing a parental child care benefit. Increasing 
the parental child care benefit in (4.44), on the other hand, has a negative effect for 
households choosing ߙ௜ ൌ 1  while the effect is likely to be positive for households 
choosing ߙ௜ ൌ 0 . Both effects are again likely to be positive as they depend on the 
secondary earners wage rate. As households in this corner solution choose the maximum 
amount of parental child care time, the effects also critically depend on the parental child 
care quality. 
The results are very similar for the case of a household with more than one child in (4.39) 
and can be found in Appendix 4.D. 
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Proposition 4.4: For a household choosing a corner solution of staying at home and 
opting for public child care, an increase in both the quantity and quality of as well as in 
the subsidy for publicly provided child care is likely to have a positive effect on the 
child’s quality. For a household opting for a parental child care benefit, an increase in 
the parental child care benefit is in this corner solution likely to have a positive effect on 
the child’s quality. In both cases the effects crucially depend on the secondary earner’s 
parental child care quality. 
 
In case of secondary earners with a relatively high wage rate choosing a corner solution of 
consuming external child care and abstaining from parental child care in (4.40), we find 
that the child’s quality increases in the secondary earner’s wage rate. The impact of an 
increase in the quality of private external child care in (4.45) is positive for ߢ ൒ 1 and 
otherwise depends on the household’s preferences for parental child care and child-
specific consumption. 
߲ݍ௜∗|௛೔ୀ଴,௦೔ୀଵିఈ೔௚
߲ݍ௦
ൌ ߶௜|೓೔సబ,ೞ೔సభషഀ೔೒ ቊሺ1 െ ߩ௜ሻሺ1 െ ߙ௜݃ሻ
െ ߟ௜ሺ1 െ ߢሻߨ௦ൣ1 ൅ ݍ௦ሺ1 െ ߙ௜݃ሻ ൅ ߙ௜݃ݍ௚൧൫1 ൅ ߙ௜݃ݍ௚൯
௡ܲ,௜ሺݍ௦ሻଶ ቋ 
(4.45)
 
with ߶௜|೓೔సబ,ೞ೔సభషഀ೔೒ ≡ ߠ ቀ
௉೙,೔
஻ ቁ
ఎ೔ ൬ ଵଵା௤ೞିఈ೔௚൫௤ೞି௤೒൯൰
ఘ೔
.  
An increase in the quality of public child care in (4.46) has a negative effect for 
households opting for the parental child care benefit due to the increase in the tax rate. 
The effect for households demanding public child care is ambiguous and also depends on 
the price effect as well as on the households’ preferences for child-specific consumption 
and parental child care. The same applies to an increase in the quantity of public child 
care in (4.47). For households with a small preference for parental child care - this should 
be the case for households choosing this corner solution - opting for publicly provided 
child care, the effect with respect to the quantity is likely to be negative if ݍ௚ ൏ ݍ௦. In this 
case, an increase in the quantity of publicly provided child care decreases the maximum 
amount of private child care the households can consume and the total quality of external 
child care therefore decreases. 
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߲ݍ௜∗|௛೔ୀ଴,௦೔ୀଵିఈ೔௚
߲ݍ௚
ൌ ߶௜|೓೔సబ,ೞ೔సభషഀ೔೒ ൝ሺ1 െ ߩ௜ሻߙ௜݃
൅ ߟ௜݃ഥ݉ ௡ܲ,௜|௛೔ୀ଴,௦೔ୀଵݍ௛ݍ௦ݍ௚
ൣ1 ൅ ݍ௦ሺ1 െ ߙ௜݃ሻ
൅ ߙ௜݃ݍ௚൧ൣߙ௜ ഥ݉ݍ௛൫ߨ௦ݍ௚ െ ߢߨ௚ሺ1 െ ߚሻݍ௦൯ െ ߢߙതߚ ത݊ݓ௜ߨ௚ݍ௦൧ൡ 
(4.46)
߲ݍ௜∗|௛೔ୀ଴,௦೔ୀଵିఈ೔௚
߲݃
ൌ ߶௜|೓೔సబ,ೞ೔సభషഀ೔೒ ቊሺ1 െ ߩ௜ሻߙ௜൫ݍ௚ െ ݍ௦൯
൅ ߟ௜ഥ݉ ௡ܲ,௜ݍ௛ݍ௦ݍ௚ ൣ1 ൅ ݍ௦ሺ1 െ ߙ௜݃ሻ
൅ ߙ௜݃ݍ௚൧ൣߙ௜ ഥ݉ݍ௛൫ߨ௦ݍ௚ െ ߨ௚ሺ1 െ ߚሻݍ௦൯ െ ߙതߚ ത݊ݓ௜ߨ௚ݍ௦൧ቋ 
(4.47)
߲ݍ௜∗|௛೔ୀ଴,௦೔ୀଵିఈ೔௚
߲ߚ
ൌ
ߟ௜߶௜|೓೔సబ,ೞ೔సభషഀ೔೒
ഥ݉ ௡ܲ,௜ݍ௛ ൣ1 ൅ ݍ௦ሺ1 െ ߙ௜݃ሻ ൅ ߙ௜݃ݍ௚൧݃ߨ௚ሺߙ௜ ഥ݉ݍ௛
െ ߙത ത݊ݓ௜ሻ 
(4.48)
߲ݍ௜∗|௛೔ୀ଴,௦೔ୀଵିఈ೔௚
߲ߪ
ൌ
ߟ௜߶௜|೓೔సబ,ೞ೔సభషഀ೔೒
ഥ݉ ௡ܲ,௜ݍ௛ ൣ1 ൅ ݍ௦ሺ1 െ ߙ௜݃ሻ ൅ ߙ௜݃ݍ௚൧ሾሺ1 െ ߙ௜ሻ ഥ݉ݍ௛
െ ሺ1 െ ߙതሻ ത݊ݓ௜ሿ 
(4.49)
 
One main difference in the results for this corner solution compared to the one where 
households do not consume external child care is that increases in both the subsidy for 
public child care (see (4.48)) and the parental child care benefit (see (4.49)) are likely to 
have a negative effect on the child’s quality for all households. Secondary earners 
choosing this corner solution of abstaining from parental child care carry relatively high 
wage rates and thus do not benefit from the redistribution via the income tax. Hence, they 
do not benefit from increasing subsidies or parental child care benefits. Both results also 
depend on the secondary earner’s parental child care quality. The larger the secondary 
earner’s parental child care quality, the smaller is the negative effect on the child’s 
quality. This relationship can be explained by the effect of the policy instruments on 
fertility. The more children a family has, the more it benefits from redistribution via the 
number of children. 
Chapter 4: The Role of Government in Child Care Provision 
100 
 
Proposition 4.5: For a household choosing a corner solution of consuming the maximum 
amount of private external child care and working full-time, an increase in both the 
subsidy for publicly provided child care and the parental child care benefit is likely to 
have a negative effect on the child’s quality. For a household opting for publicly provided 
child care, the effect of an increase in the quantity of public child care in this corner 
solution depends on the qualitative differences between public and private child care. 
 
 
4.4 Welfare analysis 
 
In the welfare analysis, we analyze the redistribution effects of the four policy 
instruments on households with different incomes and preferences. We assume that the 
benevolent government maximizes the household’s indirect utility function ௜ܸ൫݃, ݍ௚, ߚ, ߪ൯ 
subject to the government’s budget constraint in (4.5). For households choosing an 
interior solution of parental and external child care time, we find the following indirect 
utility levels for the two options of choosing publicly provided child care or a parental 
child care benefit: 
௜ܸ|ഀ೔సబ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߛ௜ሻ lnሾሺ1 െ ߛ௜ሻሺ ௜ܻ ൅ ݓ௜ሻሺ1 െ ݐሻሿ
൅ ߛ௜ ln ൥ߛ௜ߠ
ሺ1 െ ߩ௜ሻ
ߨ௦ ሺ ௜ܻ ൅ ݓ௜ሻሺ1
െ ݐሻݍ௦ ቆ ௡ܲ,௜|ഀ೔సబܤ ቇ
ఎ೔
൬ ߩ௜ߨ௦ݍ௛ሺ1 െ ߩ௜ሻݓ௜ሺ1 െ ݐሻݍ௦൰
ఘ೔൩ 
(4.50)
௜ܸ|ഀ೔సభ ൌ 	 ሺ1 െ ߛ௜ሻ lnሾሺ1 െ ߛ௜ሻሺ ௜ܻ ൅ ݓ௜ሻሺ1 െ ݐሻሿ
൅ ߛ௜ ln ൥ߛ௜ߠሺ1 െ ߩ௜ሻߨ௦ ሺ ௜ܻ ൅ ݓ௜ሻሺ1
െ ݐሻݍ௦ ቆ ௡ܲ,௜|ഀ೔సభܤ ቇ
ఎ೔
൬ ߩ௜ߨ௦ݍ௛ሺ1 െ ߩ௜ሻݓ௜ሺ1 െ ݐሻݍ௦൰
ఘ೔൩ 
(4.51)
 
The policy parameters do not influence the parent’s own consumption but only their 
child-specific consumption choices. Households always adjust child care time such that 
there is no difference in the two scenarios in (4.50) and (4.51) with this respect. Due to 
the income effect, the households’ endogenous decision on ߙ influences their decision 
concerning child-specific consumption. We thus find that for a household choosing an 
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interior solution of parental and external child care the only crucial factor is the size of the 
respective policy instrument and therefore the relative price for child care, ௡ܲ,௜ . 
Household ݅’s indirect utility is identical in both situations as long as the parental child 
care benefit equals the relative benefit from publicly provided child care: 
௜ܸ|ഀ೔సబ ൌ ௜ܸ|ഀ೔సభ 	 ⟺ 				ߪ ൌ
݃ൣߨ௦ݍ௚ െ ߨ௚ሺ1 െ ߚሻݍ௦൧
ݍ௦  (4.52)
 
For households choosing an interior solution of parental and external child care, both 
policy instruments, the parental child care benefit and publicly provided child care, are 
thus equally effective with respect to welfare and their decision which instrument to 
choose only depends on the relative benefit the household receives in total. Households 
choosing an interior solution of parental and external child care will thus opt for public 
child care as long as ൛݃ൣߨ௦ݍ௚ െ ߨ௚ሺ1 െ ߚሻݍ௦൧ ൐ ߪݍ௦ൟ holds independent of their income. 
 
Proposition 4.6: For a household choosing an interior solution of parental and external 
child care time, publicly provided child care and the parental child care benefit are 
equally effective with respect to welfare. The household’s decision for a policy instrument 
in this case only depends on the relative benefit the household receives from the policy 
instrument in total. 
 
For households choosing a corner solution, changes in the policy parameters do not only 
influence the parents’ child-specific consumption choices but also child care options and 
their own consumption possibilities in this period. In case of secondary earners choosing 
a corner solution of not consuming private external child care and not working, the 
household’s consumption possibilities in this period are decreased as the secondary 
earner’s labor supply is zero. Thus, the only source of income is the primary earner’s net 
income. Next to the parents’ preference for children and their quality, ߛ௜ , parental 
consumption in this case also depends on their preference for child-specific consumption, 
ߟ௜, and the relative price for child care, ௡ܲ,௜. We find the following indirect utility levels 
for the first case with ݄௜ ൌ 1 and ݏ௜ ൌ 0 for the two scenarios: 
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௜ܸ|ఈ೔ୀ଴,௛೔ୀଵ,௦೔ୀ଴
ൌ ሺ1 െ ߛ௜ሻ ln ൝ ௜ܻሺ1 െ ݐሻ െ ߛ௜ߟ௜ሺ ௜ܻ ൅ ݓ௜ሻሺ1 െ ݐሻ௡ܲ,௜|ఈ೔ୀ଴
ቈݓ௜ሺ1 െ ݐሻݍ௛ ൅
ߨ௦
ݍ௦቉ൡ
൅ ߛ௜ ln ൥ ߛ௜ߟ௜ߠ௡ܲ,௜|ఈ೔ୀ଴
ሺ ௜ܻ ൅ ݓ௜ሻሺ1 െ ݐሻ ቆ
௡ܲ,௜|ఈ೔ୀ଴
ܤ ቇ
ఎ೔
ሺ1 ൅ ݍ௛ሻఘ೔൩ 
 (4.53)
௜ܸ|ఈ೔ୀଵ,௛೔ୀଵ,௦೔ୀ଴ 
ൌ ሺ1 െ ߛ௜ሻ ln ൝ ௜ܻሺ1 െ ݐሻ െ ߛ௜ߟ௜௡ܲ,௜|ఈ೔ୀଵ
ሺ ௜ܻ ൅ ݓ௜ሻሺ1 െ ݐሻ ቈݓ௜ሺ1 െ ݐሻݍ௛ ൅
ߨ௦൫1 ൅ ݃ݍ௚൯
ݍ௦ ቉ൡ 
൅ߛ௜ ln ൥ߛ௜ߟ௜ߠ൫1 ൅ ݃ݍ௚൯௡ܲ,௜|ఈ೔ୀଵ
ሺ ௜ܻ ൅ ݓ௜ሻሺ1 െ ݐሻ ቆ
௡ܲ,௜|ఈ೔ୀଵ
ܤ ቇ
ఎ೔
ቆ 1 ൅ ݍ௛1 ൅ ݃ݍ௚ቇ
ఘ೔
൩ 
 (4.54)
 
For households with ݊௜ ൐ 1 who are therefore choosing a corner solution with ݄௜ ൌ ଵ௡೔ 
and ݏ௜ ൌ 0, we find the following indirect utility functions for the two scenarios: 
௜ܸ|ఈ೔ୀ଴,௛೔ୀ ଵ௡೔,௦೔ୀ଴ൌ ሺ1
െ ߛ௜ሻ ln ൝ ௜ܻሺ1 െ ݐሻ െ ߛ௜ߟ௜ሺ ௜ܻ ൅ ݓ௜ሻሺ1 െ ݐሻ௡ܲ,௜|ఈ೔ୀ଴
ቈݓ௜ሺ1 െ ݐሻݍ௛ ൅
ߨ௦
ݍ௦቉ൡ
൅ ߛ௜ ln ൥ ߛ௜ߟ௜ߠ௡ܲ,௜|ఈ೔ୀ଴
ሺ ௜ܻ ൅ ݓ௜ሻሺ1
െ ݐሻ ቆ ௡ܲ,௜|ఈ೔ୀ଴ܤ ቇ
ఎ೔
൭
ߛ௜ߟ௜ሺ ௜ܻ ൅ ݓ௜ሻሺ1 െ ݐሻ ൅ ௡ܲ,௜|ఈ೔ୀ଴ݍ௛
ߛ௜ߟ௜ሺ ௜ܻ ൅ ݓ௜ሻሺ1 െ ݐሻ ൱
ఘ೔
൩ 
(4.55)
௜ܸ|ఈ೔ୀଵ,௛೔ୀ ଵ௡೔,௦೔ୀ଴ൌ ሺ1
െ ߛ௜ሻ ln ൝ ௜ܻሺ1 െ ݐሻ
െ ߛ௜ߟ௜ሺ ௜ܻ ൅ ݓ௜ሻሺ1 െ ݐሻ
௡ܲ,௜|ఈ೔ୀଵ
ቈݓ௜ሺ1 െ ݐሻݍ௛ ൅
ߨ௦൫1 ൅ ݃ݍ௚൯
ݍ௦ ቉ൡ
൅ ߛ௜ ln ൥ߛ௜ߟ௜ߠ൫1 ൅ ݃ݍ௚൯௡ܲ,௜|ఈ೔ୀଵ
ሺ ௜ܻ ൅ ݓ௜ሻሺ1
െ ݐሻ ቆ ௡ܲ,௜|ఈ೔ୀଵܤ ቇ
ఎ೔
൭
ߛ௜ߟ௜ሺ ௜ܻ ൅ ݓ௜ሻሺ1 െ ݐሻ ൅ ௡ܲ,௜|ఈ೔ୀଵݍ௛
ߛ௜ߟ௜൫1 ൅ ݃ݍ௚൯ሺ ௜ܻ ൅ ݓ௜ሻሺ1 െ ݐሻ ൱
ఘ೔
൩ 
(4.56)
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Note that the consumption possibilities of the parents are identical for the two cases in 
(4.53) and (4.55) as well as in (4.54) and (4.56). The only difference is the child care time 
which depends on the maximum amount of parental child care time available to the 
parents. The parents’ decision whether to opt for the parental child care benefit or public 
child care in these scenarios not only depends on the relative benefit they receive but also 
on their preferences and their income. Parental consumption in this corner solution is 
always larger in case the household opts for the parental child care benefit as this policy is 
a direct payment which increases parental income. Households with a low preference for 
children and their quality, ߛ௜, therefore benefit more from a parental child care benefit 
than from publicly provided child care. For households with a relatively large preference 
for children and their quality, ߛ௜, the decision also depends on the household’s preference 
for parental child care. 
 
Proposition 7:  A household with a large preference for parental consumption choosing a 
corner solution of not consuming private external child care and not working benefits 
more from a parental child care benefit than from additional publicly provided child 
care. 
 
In case parents choose a corner solution of abstaining from parental child care and 
consuming the maximum amount of external child care, their consumption possibilities 
are also influenced in this period due to the time restrictions.  
௜ܸ|ఈ೔ୀ଴,௛೔ୀ଴,௦೔ୀଵൌ ሺ1
െ ߛ௜ሻ ln ൝ሺ ௜ܻ ൅ ݓ௜ሻሺ1 െ ݐሻ
െ ߛ௜ߟ௜ሺ ௜ܻ ൅ ݓ௜ሻሺ1 െ ݐሻ
௡ܲ,௜|ఈ೔ୀ଴
ቈݓ௜ሺ1 െ ݐሻݍ௛ ൅
ߨ௦ሺ1 ൅ ݍ௦ሻ
ݍ௦ ቉ൡ
൅ ߛ௜ ln ൥ߛ௜ߟ௜ߠሺ1 ൅ ݍ௦ሻ௡ܲ,௜|ఈ೔ୀ଴
ሺ ௜ܻ ൅ ݓ௜ሻሺ1 െ ݐሻ ቆ
௡ܲ,௜|ఈ೔ୀ଴
ܤ ቇ
ఎ೔
൬ 11 ൅ ݍ௦൰
ఘ೔
൩ 
 (4.57)
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௜ܸ|ఈ೔ୀଵ,௛೔ୀ଴,௦೔ୀଵି௚ൌ ሺ1
െ ߛ௜ሻ ln ൝ሺ ௜ܻ ൅ ݓ௜ሻሺ1 െ ݐሻ
െ ߛ௜ߟ௜ሺ ௜ܻ ൅ ݓ௜ሻሺ1 െ ݐሻ
௡ܲ,௜|ఈ೔ୀଵ
ቈݓ௜ሺ1 െ ݐሻݍ௛ ൅
ߨ௦ൣ1 ൅ ݍ௦ ൅ ݃൫ݍ௚ െ ݍ௦൯൧
ݍ௦ ቉ൡ
൅ ߛ௜ ln ൝ߛ௜ߟ௜ߠൣ1 ൅ ݍ௦ ൅ ݃൫ݍ௚ െ ݍ௦൯൧௡ܲ,௜|ఈ೔ୀଵ
ሺ ௜ܻ ൅ ݓ௜ሻሺ1
െ ݐሻ ቆ ௡ܲ,௜|ఈ೔ୀଵܤ ቇ
ఎ೔
ቆ 11 ൅ ݍ௦ ൅ ݃൫ݍ௚ െ ݍ௦൯ቇ
ఘ೔
ൡ 
 (4.58)
 
Whether parental consumption is increased or decreased depends on the parents’ 
preference for (child-specific) consumption. Parental consumption in (4.57) and (4.58) 
therefore also depends on the parents’ preference for children and child-specific 
consumption as well as on the relative price for child care. 
Contrary to the circumstances before, the secondary earner in this case does work full-
time and therefore her wage rate is relevant for parental consumption. Hence, the parents’ 
decision whether to opt for a parental child care benefit or publicly provided child care in 
this corner solution also not only depends on the relative benefit they receive but also on 
their preferences and their income. As opposed to the scenarios discussed before, parental 
consumption in this corner solution is not always larger in case the household opts for a 
parental child care benefit. In this case, the household’s decision for a policy option 
depends on the qualitative differences between private and public external child care. In 
all three corner solutions, welfare in the two scenarios is not equal if the relative benefits 
from the parental child care benefit and public child care are identical, that is if 
൛݃ൣߨ௦ݍ௚ െ ߨ௚ሺ1 െ ߚሻݍ௦൧ ൌ ߪݍ௦ൟ holds. This condition is not sufficient for households 
choosing a corner solution of parental and external child care. For households choosing a 
corner solution of abstaining from parental child care and consuming the maximum 
amount of external child care, the two scenarios are equal if the relative benefits from the 
parental child care benefit and public child care are identical and at the same time 
ݍ௦ ൌ ݍ௚  holds. As long as ݍ௦ ൐ ݍ௚ , the households always benefits more from the 
parental child care benefit than from publicly provided child care. 
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Proposition 4.8: For a household choosing a corner solution of consuming the maximum 
amount of private external child care and working full-time, the decision whether to opt 
for a parental child care benefit or publicly provided child care depends on the 
qualitative differences between private and public external child care. If the relative 
benefit the household receives from the policy instruments in total is identical and 
ݍ௦ ൐ ݍ௚ holds, the household prefers the parental child care benefit to publicly provided 
child care. 
 
We can therefore conclude that while for households choosing an interior solution the 
decision whether to opt for the parental child care benefit or public child care only 
depends on the relative benefit the households receives from the policy option, the 
decision is much more complex for households choosing a corner solution. In case of 
corner solutions, the household’s decision depends not only on the relative benefit but 
also on the household’s income and her preferences for children as well as for 
consumption and child care. 
 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
Summarizing our comparative statics results regarding the reconciliation of family and 
work for households choosing an interior solution of parental and external child care, we 
find that for households opting for public child care, an increase in the quantity of 
publicly provided child care has a negative effect on both fertility and secondary earner’s 
labor supply, while the effects of an increase in its quality depend on the price effect and 
may be positive. For households opting out of publicly provided child care and thus 
demanding a parental child care benefit, increases in both the quantity and the quality of 
public child care have negative effects on fertility and the secondary earner’s labor supply 
because of the increase in the income tax. Our results suggest that both a price subsidy for 
publicly provided child care and the parental child care benefit has a negative effect on 
fertility and the secondary earner’s labor supply for all households.  
Our finding with respect to the parental child care benefit is similar to Apps and Rees 
(2004) and Gathmann and Sass (2012). Apps and Rees (2004) show that a parental child 
care benefit – or in their case a child benefit - may have a negative effect on fertility. 
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Gathmann and Sass (2012) find that an increase in the parental child care benefit has a 
negative effect on female labor force participation and that the decline is strongest for 
single parents and low income households.  
Our results suggest that only an increase in the quality of privately provided external child 
care may have a positive effect on both fertility and the secondary earner’s labor supply 
for all households. Even though an increase in the quality of private external child care 
also leads to an increase in the price for child care, parents will increase their demand for 
children and at the same time increase their labor supply if the price effect is not too 
large.  
Regarding privately provided external child care, our results for households opting for 
publicly provided child care predict that there is a crowding-out effect with respect to all 
policy instruments for secondary earners with a relatively high wage rate. As mentioned 
above, only an increase in the quality of publicly provided child care may have a positive 
effect on the secondary earner’s labor supply while for all other instruments the effect is 
negative. Parents thus do not use the publicly provided child care to substitute parental 
child care time but rather substitute private external child care time. For households 
opting for a parental child care benefit, we observer a crowding-out effect of private 
external child care for all three instruments influencing publicly provided child care. For 
these households, only an increase in the parental child care benefit may lead to a stronger 
demand for private external child care but at the same time it has a negative effect on the 
secondary earner’s labor supply. This result is similar to Havnes and Mogstad (2011) who 
evaluate the effect of new subsidized child care on labor supply. They find that the 
subsidized child care mostly crowds out informal care arrangements implying a 
significant net cost of the child care arrangement.  
Our results with respect to the child’s quality suggest that for low income households 
with a large parental child care quality opting for public child care, an increase in both the 
quantity and quality of as well as in the subsidy for publicly provided child care is likely 
to have a positive effect. These households benefit from redistribution via the income tax. 
The same applies to households opting for a parental child care benefit with respect to an 
increase in the parental child care benefit. For high income households, however, the 
impact of the policy instruments is likely to be negative due to the negative income effect.  
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In case of households choosing an interior solution of parental and external child care, we 
find that both policy instruments, a parental child care benefit and publicly provided child 
care, are equally effective with respect to welfare and the household’s decision which 
instrument to choose only depends on the relative benefit the household receives in total. 
This decision is independent of the household’s income. For households choosing a 
corner solution, on the other hand, the decision depends on a variety of parameters: their 
income, their preferences for children, child care and consumption as well as on the 
policy parameters. Low income households choosing a corner solution of staying at home 
and not consuming external child care opt for a parental child care benefit if they have a 
small preference for children and their quality. For high income households, the decision 
depends on qualitative differences between private and public external child care. If the 
relative benefit the households receive from the policy instruments is identical and the 
quality of private external child care is larger than the quality of publicly provided child 
care, households in this corner solution also benefit more from the parental child care 
benefit than from publicly provided child care. 
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Appendix 
 
4.A: First-order conditions of the maximization problem 
 
The first-order conditions of the household’s maximization problem in (4.4) are the 
following: 
߲ ௜ܷ
߲݊௜ ൌ
Ψ௜ െ ߛ௜ሺ ௜ܻ ൅ ݓ௜ሻሺ1 െ ݐሻ
݊ሼΨ௜ െ ሺ ௜ܻ ൅ ݓ௜ሻሺ1 െ ݐሻሽ (4.A.1)
߲ ௜ܷ
߲݄௜ ൌ
ߛ௜ߩ௜ݍ௛
1 ൅ ݄௜ݍ௛ െ
ሺ1 െ ߛ௜ሻ݊௜ݓ௜ሺ1 െ ݐሻ
ሺ ௜ܻ ൅ ݓ௜ሻሺ1 െ ݐሻ െ Ψ௜ (4.A.2)
߲ ௜ܷ
߲ݏ௜ ൌ
ߛ௜ሺ1 െ ߩ௜ሻݍ௦
1 ൅ ݏ௜ݍ௦ ൅ ߙ௜݃ݍ௚ െ
ሺ1 െ ߛ௜ሻ݊௜ߨ௦
ሺ ௜ܻ ൅ ݓ௜ሻሺ1 െ ݐሻ െ Ψ௜ (4.A.3)
߲ ௜ܷ
߲ݖ௜ ൌ
ߛ௜ߟ௜
ݖ௜ െ
ሺ1 െ ߛ௜ሻ݊௜ܤ
ሺ ௜ܻ ൅ ݓ௜ሻሺ1 െ ݐሻ െ Ψ௜ (4.A.4)
 
with Ψ௜ ≡ ݊ൣݏ௜ߨ௦ ൅ ݄௜ݓ௜ሺ1 െ ݐሻ ൅ ݖ௜ܤ ൅ ߙ௜݃ߨ௚ሺ1 െ ߚሻ െ ሺ1 െ ߙ௜ሻߪ൧ 
 
 
4.B: Demand functions 
 
Demand function for parental child care in the model: 
݄௜∗ ൌ
ە
ۖۖ
ۖ
۔
ۖۖ
ۖ
ۓ 1 if ݓ௜ ൏ ݓෝ௟௛ and ݊௜ ൏ 11
݊௜ if ݓ௜ ൏ ݓෝ௟
௛ and ݊௜ ൒ 1
1
݊௜ if ݓෝ௟
௛ ൑ ݓ௜ ൑ ݓෝ௨௛ and ݊௜ ቆߩ௜ ௡ܲ,௜ݍ௛ െ ߟ௜ݓ௜
ሺ1 െ ݐሻ
ߟ௜ݓ௜ݍ௛ሺ1 െ ݐሻ ቇ ൒ 1
ߩ௜ ௡ܲ,௜ݍ௛ െ ߟ௜ݓ௜ሺ1 െ ݐሻ
ߟ௜ݓ௜ݍ௛ሺ1 െ ݐሻ if ݓෝ௟
௛ ൑ ݓ௜ ൑ ݓෝ௨௛ and ݊௜ ቆߩ௜ ௡ܲ,௜ݍ௛ െ ߟ௜ݓ௜
ሺ1 െ ݐሻ
ߟ௜ݓ௜ݍ௛ሺ1 െ ݐሻ ቇ ൏ 1
0 if ݓ௜ ൐ ݓෝ௨௛ 0 0
 
 (4.B.1)
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Demand function for external child care in the model: 
ݏ௜∗ ൌ
ۖە
۔
ۖۓ 0 if ݓ݅ ൏ ݓෝ݈ݏ
൫1 െ ߩ݅൯ܲ݊,݅ݍݏ െ ߟ݅ߨݏ ቀ1 ൅ ߙ݅݃ݍ݃ቁ
ߟ݅ ഥ݉ ߨݏݍݏ if ݓෝ
݈ݏ ൑ ݓ݅ ൑ ݓෝݑݏ
1 െ ߙ݅݃ if ݓ݅ ൐ ݓෝݑݏ
 (4.B.2)
 
 
4.C: Comparative statics results: Interior solution 
 
The results for changes in the secondary earner’s wage rate, parental child care quality 
and the quality of privately provided external child care on fertility, parental child care, 
the demand for private external child care and the child’s quality are the following:  
߲݊∗݅
߲ݓ௜ ൌ െ
ߛ௜ߟ௜ሺ1 െ ݐሻ
൫ ௡ܲ,௜൯ଶ
ቊ ௜ܻሺ1 െ ݐሻݍ௛ െ
ߨ௦
ݍ௦ െ
ߙ௜݃ൣߨ௦ݍ௚ െ ߨ௚ሺ1 െ ߚሻݍ௦൧
ݍ௦ െ ሺ1 െ ߙ௜ሻߪቋ 
 (4.C.1)
߲݊∗݅
߲ݍ௛ ൌ
ߛ௜ߟ௜ሺ ௜ܻ ൅ ݓ௜ሻݓ௜ሺ1 െ ݐሻଶ
൫ ௡ܲ,௜൯ଶሺݍ௛ሻଶ
 (4.C.2)
 
߲݄∗݅
߲ݓ௜ ൌ െ
ߩ௜ ൤ܲ݊,݅ െ ݓ݅ሺ1 െ ݐሻݍ݄ ߨ௦൨
ߟ௜ሺݓ௜ሻଶሺ1 െ ݐሻ  
(4.C.3)
߲݄∗݅
߲ݍ௛ ൌ
ߟ௜ െ ߩ௜
ߟ௜ሺݍ௛ሻଶ (4.C.4)
 
߲ݏ∗݅
߲ݓ௜ ൌ
ሺ1 െ ߩ௜ሻሺ1 െ ݐሻ
ߟ௜ߨ௦ݍ௛  (4.C.5)
߲ݏ∗݅
߲ݍ௛ ൌ െ
ሺ1 െ ߩ௜ሻݓ௜ሺ1 െ ݐሻ
ߟ௜ߨ௦ሺݍ௛ሻଶ  (4.C.6)
 
߲ݍ݅∗
߲ݓ௜ ൌ
߶௜ݍ௦
ݓ௜ݍ௛ ൣߩ௜ ௡ܲ,௜ݍ௛ ൅ ሺ1 ൅ ߟ௜ሻݓ௜ሺ1 െ ݐሻ൧ (4.C.7)
߲ݍ݅∗
߲ݍ௛ ൌ െ
߶௜ݍ௦
ሺݍ௛ሻଶ ൣߩ௜ ௡ܲ,௜ݍ௛ ൅ ሺ1 ൅ ߟ௜ሻݓ௜ሺ1 െ ݐሻ൧ (4.C.8)
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The results for the comparative statics analysis for child-specific consumption are the 
following: 
߲ݖ∗݅
߲ݓ௜ ൌ
ሺ1 െ ݐሻ
ܤݍ௛  (4.C.9)
߲ݖ∗݅
߲ݍ௛ ൌ െ
ݓ௜ሺ1 െ ݐሻ
ܤሺݍ௛ሻଶ  (4.C.10)
߲ݖ∗݅
߲ݍ௦ ൌ െ
ሺ1 െ ߢሻߨ௦൫1 ൅ ߙ௜݃ݍ௚൯
ܤሺݍ௦ሻଶ  (4.C.11)
߲ݖ∗݅
߲ݍ௚ ൌ
݃൛ߙ௜ ഥ݉ݍ௛ൣߨ௦ݍ௚ െ ߢߨ௚ሺ1 െ ߚሻݍ௦൧ െ ߢߙതߚ ത݊ݓ௜ߨ௚ݍ௦ൟ
ഥ݉ܤݍ௛ݍ௦ݍ௚  (4.C.12)
߲ݖ∗݅
߲݃ ൌ
ߙ௜ ഥ݉ݍ௛ൣߨ௦ݍ௚ െ ߨ௚ሺ1 െ ߚሻݍ௦൧ െ ߙതߚ ത݊ݓ௜ߨ௚ݍ௦
ഥ݉ܤݍ௛ݍ௦  (4.C.13)
߲ݖ∗݅
߲ߚ ൌ
݃ߨ௚ሺߙ௜ ഥ݉ݍ௛ െ ߙത ത݊ݓ௜ሻ
ഥ݉ܤݍ௛  (4.C.14)
߲ݖ∗݅
߲ߪ ൌ
ሺ1 െ ߙ௜ሻ ഥ݉ݍ௛ െ ሺ1 െ ߙതሻ ത݊ݓ௜
ഥ݉ܤݍ௛  (4.C.15)
 
 
4.D: Comparative statics results: Corner solutions  
 
The results for changes in the secondary earner’s wage rate and parental child care on the 
child’s quality for the corner solutions are the following:  
߲ݍ௜∗|௛೔ୀଵ,௦೔ୀ଴
߲ݍ௛ ൌ െ
߶௜|೓೔సభ,ೞ೔సబ൫1 ൅ ߙ௜݃ݍ௚൯
௡ܲ,௜ሺݍ௛ሻଶሺ1 ൅ ݍ௛ሻ ൣߟ௜ݓ௜ሺ1 െ ݐሻሺ1 ൅ ݍ௛ሻ
െ ߩ௜ ௡ܲ,௜ሺݍ௛ሻଶ൧ 
(4.D.1)
 
߲ݍ௜∗|௛೔ୀ଴,௦೔ୀଵିఈ೔௚
߲ݓ௜ ൌ
ߟ௜߶௜|೓೔సబ,ೞ೔సభషഀ೔೒
௡ܲ,௜ݍ௛ ൣ1 ൅ ݍ௦ሺ1 െ ߙ௜݃ሻ ൅ ߙ௜݃ݍ௚൧ሺ1 െ ݐሻ 
(4.D.2)
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The results for the comparative statics analysis for the corner solution where the 
secondary earner decides to stay at home full-time with the children with ݊௜ ൐ 1 are the 
following: 
డ௤೔∗|೓೔స భ೙೔,ೞ೔సబ
డ௤೒ ൌ ߶௜|௛೔ୀ భ೙೔,௦೔ୀ଴݃ ൜ߙ௜
ሺ1 െ ߩ௜ሻ ൅ ఎ೔൫ଵାఈ೔௚௤೒൯ൣఈ೔௠ഥ௤೓൫గೞ௤೒ି఑గ೒ሺଵିఉሻ௤ೞ൯ି఑ఈഥఉ௡ത௪೔గ೒௤ೞ൧௠ഥ௉೙,೔௤೓௤ೞ௤೒ ൅
ఘ೔൫ଵାఈ೔௚௤೒൯൛ఈ೔௠ഥൣగೞ௤೒ି఑గ೒ሺଵିఉሻ௤ೞ൧ାఉ௡തగ೒ൣఈഥ௚గೞ൫఑ିሺଵି఑ሻఈ೔௤೒൯ା఑ఙ௤ೞሺఈഥିఈ೔ሻ൧ିሺଵିఈഥሻఈ೔ఙ௡ത൫గೞ௤೒ି఑గ೒௤ೞ൯ൟ
ൣ௉೙,೔௤೓ାఊ೔ఎ೔ሺ௒೔ା௪೔ሻሺଵି௧ሻ൧ሺଵି௧ሻ௤ೞ௤೒ ൠ  
 (4.D.3)
డ௤೔∗|೓೔స భ೙೔,ೞ೔సబ
డ௚ ൌ
߶௜|௛೔ୀ భ೙೔,௦೔ୀ଴ݍ௚ ൜ߙ௜ሺ1 െ ߩ௜ሻ ൅
ఎ೔൫ଵାఈ೔௚௤೒൯ൣఈ೔௠ഥ௤೓൫గೞ௤೒ିగ೒ሺଵିఉሻ௤ೞ൯ିఉ௡ത௪೔గ೒௤ೞ൧
௠ഥ௉೙,೔௤೓௤ೞ௤೒ ൅
ఘ೔൫ଵାఈ೔௚௤೒൯൛ఈ೔௠ഥൣగೞ௤೒ିగ೒ሺଵିఉሻ௤ೞ൧ାఉ௡തగ೒ሺఈഥ௚గೞାఈഥఙ௤ೞାఈ೔ఙ௤ೞሻିሺଵିఈഥሻఈ೔ఙ௡ത൫గೞ௤೒ିగ೒௤ೞ൯ൟ
ൣ௉೙,೔௤೓ାఊ೔ఎ೔ሺ௒೔ା௪೔ሻሺଵି௧ሻ൧ሺଵି௧ሻ௤ೞ௤೒ ൠ  
(4.D.4)
߲ݍ௜∗|௛೔ୀ ଵ௡೔,௦೔ୀ଴
߲ߚ
ൌ ߶௜|௛೔ୀ ଵ௡೔,௦೔ୀ଴൫1 ൅ ߙ௜݃ݍ௚൯݃ߨ௚ ቊ
ߟ௜ሺߙ௜ ഥ݉ݍ௛ െ ߙത ത݊ݓ௜ሻ
ഥ݉ ௡ܲ,௜ݍ௛
൅ ߩ௜൛ߙ௜ݍ௦ሺ ഥ݉ െ ߪ ത݊ݍ௦ሻ ൅ ߙത ത݊ൣߨ௦ ൅ ߙ௜݃ൣߨ௦ݍ௚ െ ߨ௚ሺ1 െ ߚሻݍ௦൧ ൅ ߪݍ௦൧ൟൣ ௡ܲ,௜ݍ௛ ൅ ߛ௜ߟ௜ሺ ௜ܻ ൅ ݓ௜ሻሺ1 െ ݐሻ൧ሺ1 െ ݐሻݍ௦ ቋ 
(4.D.5)
డ௤೔∗|೓೔స భ೙೔,ೞ೔సబ
డఙ ൌ ߶௜|௛೔ୀ భ೙೔,௦೔ୀ଴൫1 ൅ ߙ௜݃ݍ௚൯ ൜
ఎ೔ሾሺଵିఈ೔ሻ௠ഥ௤೓ିሺଵିఈഥሻ௡ത௪೔ሿ
௠ഥ௉೙,೔௤೓ ൅
ఘ೔൛௠ഥ௤ೞሺଵିఈ೔ሻା௡തൣగೞሺଵିఈഥሻାఈ೔௚ൣగೞ௤೒ିగ೒ሺଵିఉሻ௤ೞିఈഥ൫గೞ௤೒ିగ೒௤ೞ൯൧ିఈഥఉ௚గ೒௤ೞ൧ൟ
ൣ௉೙,೔௤೓ାఊ೔ఎ೔ሺ௒೔ା௪೔ሻሺଵି௧ሻ൧ሺଵି௧ሻ௤ೞ ൠ  
(4.D.6)
 
with ߶௜|௛೔ୀ భ೙೔,௦೔ୀ଴ ≡ ߠ ቀ
௉೙,೔
஻ ቁ
ఎ೔ ൬ ఊ೔ఎ೔ሺ௒೔ା௪೔ሻሺଵି௧ሻା௉೙,೔௤೓ఊ೔ఎ೔൫ଵାఈ೔௚௤೒൯ሺ௒೔ା௪೔ሻሺଵି௧ሻ൰
ఘ೔
. 
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